Unholy Alliance? Nationalism And The Orthodox Church
http://www.rferl.org/specials/religion/ ... odox-1.asp
By Jeremy Bransten
Many of the countries in which the Orthodox Church has a significant following were devastated by communism and by the interethnic conflicts that followed its collapse. Some say the church is uniquely poised to help these societies rebuild, but others question whether Orthodoxy itself -- and its historical ties to nationalism -- may be part of the problem. In this first of a two-part series on the Orthodox Church, RFE/RL examines this unique link between church and state.
Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksii II accuses the Vatican of "stealing souls" on its territory.
A leading bishop in Russia denounces the import of Western human rights values as an "alien concept."
In Serbia, the Orthodox clergy rallies behind ultranationalist politicians. A senior churchman rails against the West's "devilish lust for power." Another calls for the creation of a "Greater Serbia."
Are these isolated examples of the abuse of faith, or is there a natural -- and sometimes toxic -- link between Orthodoxy and nationalism?
The alliance between the church and state in the Orthodox world has deep historical roots. During times of foreign domination, the church played a key role in safeguarding national languages, traditions, and historical memory.
The emergence of independent nation-states in the 19th and 20th centuries was accompanied by the formation of autocephalous -- or self-governing -- Orthodox churches, whose boundaries copied the borders of the new countries. The clergy of these new states no longer took direction from the Patriarchate of Constantinople, but from their own church leaders.
Radmila Radic, a historian at the Institute of Contemporary History in Belgrade, said that for many Orthodox clergy, the national component has remained a key part of their identity, leading to an inevitable involvement in politics.
"It's true that they must involve themselves because the national question is a part of their thinking, their way of thinking and their way of acting in the church," Radic said. "The name: the 'Serbian Orthodox Church,' or the 'Macedonian Orthodox Church,' or 'Russian Orthodox Church,' or 'Greek Orthodox Church' explains much. The national name in front of the Orthodox Church, I think, means a lot."
After the communist regimes fell, some clergy sought to reassert their influence by backing nationalist leaders.
The communist period led to an inevitable decline in the church's influence. After the communist regimes fell, some clergy sought to reassert their influence by backing nationalist leaders. In Serbia, Radic notes, this led to an alliance between key figures in the Serbian Orthodox Church and former Serbian and later Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.
"The leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church believed in the 1980s that Milosevic would solve the national question and that he would return the church to its rightful position -- as they believed -- in society," Radic said. "The church demanded the return of material possessions, the return of religious education in schools, permission for building new churches, the return of the theological faculty at Belgrade university, etc."
Milosevic rose to power on a wave of pro-Serbian rhetoric, with many church leaders contributing to the nationalist atmosphere. A key moment came in 1987, two years before Serbs marked the 600th anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, in which Serbian Tsar Lazar perished and the Serbs lost their autonomy to the Turks.
Tsar Lazar's bones were taken from their repository in the Patriarchate in Belgrade and carried on tour throughout the regions claimed as historic parts of Serbia. The pilgrimage included stops in Bosnia and Croatia, before Tsar Lazar's remains were reburied in Kosovo.
Historians point to this highly symbolic event, which emphasized the Serbian nation's territorial claims as well as its feelings of martyrdom, as a defining moment. Two years later, Milosevic would famously use the 1389 battle to promise Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo: "No one will ever beat you again!"
There are many examples from this era of the church working hand-in-hand with the state and the nationalists.
But as the 1990s progressed, many clergy -- aware that a national tragedy was unfolding -- sought to change course and loosen their ties to the state. Radic said this proved difficult in practice.
"The Serbian Orthodox Church could not exist without state support, in the first place, financial support," Radic said. "The Serbian Orthodox Church has never solved this problem and it has no international backing like the Catholic Church, for example. And do not forget that Serbian Orthodox priests have families and they do not live in celibacy like Catholic priests and others."
Paschalis Kitromilides, a political science professor at the University of Athens, is the author of numerous books on Orthodoxy and nationalism. He agrees with Radic that the lack of financial autonomy is a major problem.
But he notes that by the mid-1990s, the leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church, under Patriarch Pavle, had openly turned against Milosevic and allied itself with the democratic movement that eventually led to his toppling. This, Kitromilides said, proves the church's moral power.
Kitromilides argues that those who draw an inevitable link between Orthodoxy and nationalism are wrong. He said that ultimately, Christian values transcend nationalism:
"No, there is nothing intrinsic in the connection between Orthodoxy and nationalism. There are some elements in the hierarchy of the [national] churches, which are actively involved in the promotion of nationalism," Kitromilides said. "If the Orthodox Church is a Christian institution, it cannot be intrinsically linked to nationalism because Christianity -- the set of Christian values in which a Christian believes -- is not intrinsically nationalistic. On the contrary, [the values] are of a universal character and they refer to all of humanity."
As far back as 1872, the patriarch of Constantinople convoked a synod of Orthodox leaders to condemn nationalism and forbid its propagation.
There have been previous attempts to reject nationalism. As far back as 1872, the patriarch of Constantinople convoked a synod of Orthodox leaders to condemn nationalism and forbid its propagation. Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew, who acts as the spiritual leader of the worldwide Orthodox faith, strongly reiterated that stand at a conference in Brussels in 2004.
"Overstressing the racial origins for one, and mainly racism, as well as discrimination against weaker minorities on the basis of racial, religious, linguistic, or any other reasons, together with xenophobia, are ideologies and mental attitudes that are entirely opposed to the attitude, the convictions, and the principles espoused by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which is the main exponent of the Orthodox Church," Bartholomew said.
Despite the patriarch's words, the popular attitude that the interest of the church and nation are intertwined remains common. Zoran Kostic, a 51-year-old Orthodox Serb, said in Belgrade that "I think that Orthodoxy is a key determinant of the Serb people, because the Serb nation was born on the altar. The process of the creation of the [Orthodox] Church meant at the same time ultimately the creation of the [Serbian] nation."
Citizens of Orthodox countries often consider themselves to be Orthodox even if they are not particularly religious. They perceive their Orthodoxy as a cultural or ethnic identifier.
"In every census of the population in Serbia from the 1960s until the last census, most people declared that they were 'Orthodox.' But this does not mean that they were all religious," Belgrade historian Radic said. "We must differentiate between [belonging to a Church and being religious]. In the Balkans, but not only here, [national identity and Church membership] go hand-in-hand. So I think people go to church much more and especially young people declare themselves as religious, but I don't think that Serbs really know their faith."
Professor Kitromilides said the confusion between cultural identity and faith remains all too widespread and points to a basic misunderstanding of what it means to be an Orthodox Christian.
"It just betrays confusion and hypocrisy. You are either a believer in the values of Christianity, and you are Orthodox, or you are not a believer and you are not Orthodox," Kitromilides said. "Of course, you certainly can feel you belong to a cultural tradition, but that is not a religious identity."
(RFE/RL's South Slavic service contributed to this report)
(Published on 26 October 2004)