

Against the Jacobites

St. John of Damascus



Against the Jacobites by *Saint*
John of Damascus

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Introduction

The Jacobites—also known as the Syrian Miaphysites—followed the teachings of *Severus of Antioch* and rejected the *Council of Chalcedon*¹. They believed in a single, composite nature of Christ after the Incarnation, which they called *Miaphysis*², deriving from Jacob Baradaeus³.

¹ Council of Chalcedon – the fourth ecumenical council of both the Catholic Church and Eastern Orthodox Church that defined and dogmatized the Christological position *Dyophysis*—which holds that Christ is one person, retaining two natures—one truly *divine*, one truly *human*

² Miaphysis – one nature

³ Jacob Baradaeus – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_Baradaeus

A Treatise by John the Humble Monk of Damascus to Daraya the Jacobite

1. "Even the good is not good when it is not done well" is a wise saying of the wise. The divine apostle also testifies concerning the children of the Hebrews that they have zeal for God, but not according to knowledge, placing his testimony not in praise, but surely in blame. Good is zeal for piety, but mixed with love; hateful is wickedness, but one who receives this is worthy of mercy. I hate corruption, but I tend to the limb as long as it is not yet completely useless, and "I move every stone," as the saying goes, and I search out every art and devise a remedy against evil and call upon God as helper, being struck by reverence and longing for my kinsman and our common name and shaking off external blame. If therefore I persuade, thanks to the giver of health for health; if I do not persuade, "alas for evils, alas," by cutting I deliver what is desired, grieving indeed, but nonetheless I give it up, fleeing association, so that the evil might not be distributed, so that more things might not become corrupted, and with the prophet not mocking but lamenting I cry out: "We have healed Babylon and it was not healed." And I add the cause: "Because it did not wish to be." For both the disease and the acceptance of therapy are voluntary. These things urged me to write: not strife, not zeal, not refutation, not desire for victory, not manner of display, not hatred, but mercy proceeding from divine longing and for my neighbor. "For if you draw back," he says, "my soul is not pleased with you." For God has placed us for this purpose: to comfort, to admonish, to convert, to care for beauty, to dig, to put dung around, to heal barrenness. And we call both barrenness and evil fruitfulness barrenness, just as we call a bad voiced person a voiceless tragedian; "for woe to me if I do not preach the gospel," and if I bury the talent, I shall be sent away as useless and wicked through sloth from the joy of my lord. Receive therefore a word of healing struck by the grace of the spirit, so that God may be pleased, and you may make the church a partner in joy. The cross of the Lord made this one thing of heavenly and earthly beings.
2. Since our entire discourse has been established concerning nature, we say this: that concerning the holy and superessential deity, that is the monarchical and consubstantial Trinity, Arius and Eunomius and their polytheistic and no less atheistic faction openly babbled three essences, cutting up nature along with the

hypostases, knowing badly, and thinking nature the same as hypostasis, while Sabellius the Libyan foolishly belched out one hypostasis, badly destroying the three and obliterating them because of the unity of essence, thinking hypostasis equal to nature and the same as essence. But concerning the supremely good and saving economy of the one God Logos of the holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son of the Father, our Lord Jesus Christ, the evil man worshipper Nestorius who perished evilly, and Diodore and Theodore of Mopsuestia, knowing two natures, divide both the hypostasis and say that the hypostases are co numbered with the natures, two, and they cut the one Son and Christ and Lord into two sons and divide him into two persons because they supposed hypostasis the same as nature, while Dioscorus and Severus and their many headed and therefore headless hydra, positing one hypostasis, defined also one nature, not knowing "neither what they say nor concerning what they make assertions"; for these too conceived the same opinion concerning nature and hypostasis and did not stop their impiety at this point, but also concerning the holy and super divine Trinity they thought there were three particular essences and natures, but one common one in theory, somehow seeming to exist and without hypostasis, not knowing, the noble and supposedly wise ones, that those who hold to piety should not follow entirely the doctrines of the wise from outside, but should become skilled money changers to recognize the stamp of truth and distinguish the genuine from the counterfeit.

3. But not so the nurslings of piety, the heralds of truth, but following the divine law and being guided by the light of divine knowledge they did not devise superfluous things nor have they become righteous beyond what is fitting, but traversing the middle and royal path they did not incline to the left, they were not carried away to the apparent right, they did not correct distortion by distortion, but standing in the midst of evils within the boundaries of truth and rejecting the inclination in either direction they were initiated from her and initiated others into one essence in the holy Trinity, but three hypostases. "Conversely," as the divinely speaking Gregory says, in the saving economy two essences or natures, but one hypostasis or person, and they defined essence and nature as the same, and again hypostasis and person as the same, but the difference between essence and nature toward person and hypostasis as very great, as much as the common has toward the particular.

4. First then, if it seems good, let us investigate concerning nature and hypostasis and learn what each signifies, and thus we shall clearly know whether we must speak of two natures in Christ or one. But let the purpose also be predetermined: not to ostracize truth by strife, but to track it by desire; for thus it knows how to be found by seekers. "For draw near to me," he says, "and I will draw near to you," and "where two or three are gathered in my name, there I am in their midst," but also "you ask and it shall not be given to you, because you ask badly," and "where there is strife and jealousy and divisions, are you not carnal and walking according to man?" and "you cannot believe in me while receiving glory from men."
5. But let us begin the discourse from here. The God bearing Basil says writing to Amphilochius: "Essence and hypostasis have this difference, which the common has toward the particular," and after other things: "The name of essence presents to us a certain indefinite concept finding no stability from the commonality of what is signified, but the name of hypostasis presents and circumscribes the common and uncircumscribed in some particular thing through the appearing properties." Who holding to truth will not recognize how great a difference there is between nature and hypostasis? For if essence and hypostasis are the same, and the Son is of one essence with the Father, he will be of one hypostasis, or fulfilling another hypostasis, he will also be of another nature; and as he is consubstantial, he will also be of the same hypostasis, or as he is of different hypostasis, by reasonable conversion he will also be of different essence. Similarly also concerning humanity: if what subsists is hypostasis, and human nature subsists as hypostasis, and as all humanity is one indivisible nature, so it will also be one indivisible hypostasis.
6. But if you say that there is one account concerning the holy deity and another concerning the Lord's economy for us, tell us who inquire: If nature and hypostasis are the same, confessing Christ from two natures, will you not also be forced to say from two hypostases and either never dare to speak of two natures in Christ or also be compelled by our positions to speak of two hypostases in him? If nature is the same as hypostasis, and you speak of another nature of his deity and another of his flesh, tell us of another hypostasis of his deity and another of his humanity.

7. If nature is the same as hypostasis, and Christ is consubstantial with God and the Father and consubstantial with us, he will also be of the same hypostasis with both the Father and us, and the hypostases both of deity and of humanity will be of one hypostasis. If nature and hypostasis are the same, why do you not assert difference of hypostases as also of natures in Christ? That nature and hypostasis are not the same has been sufficiently demonstrated to those not blinding their understanding.
8. I call hypostasis that which exists by itself; for the name of hypostasis is homonymous. Sometimes it signifies what is self hypostatic and self sufficient and what does not have existence in another nor is an accident, as the holy fathers also rarely used it of essence, and sometimes what subsists by itself, that is the individual, and sometimes what is not in a subject nor non existent, and sometimes what is subject to predication.
9. Therefore leaving aside what is burdensome, rightly divide the word of truth; for you do not say, as the holy fathers have said, that nature and hypostasis are the same, but rather you confess nature as particular as also hypostasis by itself. That particular natures should not be spoken of, we shall know from this.
10. If you confess particular natures in the holy Trinity, you glorify it as of different essence, and Arius is raised up again. But if you give to each of the divine hypostases of the holy Trinity an essence that belongs to it individually, and confess these consubstantial according to the common essence, and essence and hypostasis are the same, there will be according to you a tetrad of hypostases, three particular and one common, and similarly a tetrad of essences. And each of the hypostases will be of two natures and hypostases, one common and one particular, and they will be both consubstantial and of different essence, both of the same hypostasis and of different hypostases. And who will not laugh, or rather lament the excess of madness? Is this not nonsense and the fabrication of an evil spirited mind, a dark invention of demons and a monstrosity of Hellenic babbling? Which of the God bearing ones has ever said this, unless perhaps you would introduce to us your holy Aristotle as a thirteenth apostle and prefer the idolater to the divinely inspired? But let us return to what is proposed.

11. For if there is no nature without hypostasis, nor essence without person, nor again hypostasis and person without essence (for this does not exist), but essence and hypostasis are not the same, nor nature and person. For essence and what is in essence are not the same, nor what is enhypostatic and hypostasis. For what is in something and that in which it is are different; what is in essence is what is observed in essence, that is the collection of accidents which reveals hypostasis, not essence itself. What is enhypostatic is not hypostasis, but what is observed in hypostasis. Essence is what exists somehow, whether by itself or with another or in another: by itself as the essence of fire, with others as soul and body (for these together have hypostasis), in another as fire in a wick and as the flesh of the Lord in his beginningless hypostasis. For hypostasis signifies someone or this particular thing pointed out along with the raising of a finger, but what is enhypostatic signifies essence. And hypostasis defines a person by characteristic properties, but what is enhypostatic means not being itself an accident, which has existence in another. For if what is in something and that in which it is are the same, it is time for you to call virtue and the virtuous the same and by reasonable conversion vice and that in which vice is, and according to you the devil himself will be vice and his creator the creator of vice, and since the accident is in essence, the accident will be essence and essence will be accident, or since the body is ensouled, I mean the human body, according to you the body will be soul. And who will bear the madness of this confusion?
12. That there is no essence without hypostasis, we know clearly, but we do not say that what is enhypostatic and hypostasis are the same, nor essence and what is in essence; but hypostasis is what is in essence, and essence is what is enhypostatic. For we know the essence of the holy deity to be enhypostatic (for it is in the three hypostases) and each of the hypostases likewise to be in essence (for these exist in the essence of the holy deity). And concerning the ineffable and mind transcending economy of the Lord we say hypostasis is in essence as existing in the essences from which it is also composed, but each of his essences is enhypostatic; for his deity has eternally the one common hypostasis with him, as also that of the Father and the Spirit, and his ensouled and rational flesh, the same is to say his humanity, recently having its hypostasis in it and having inherited this hypostasis. Thus neither is either of Christ's natures without hypostasis nor is each by itself hypostasis or possesses hypostasis privately and separately, but both share the same and one hypostasis.

13. With these things thus predetermined let us come to what is sought. This is whether Christ is two natures and in two natures or one, as you monstrous ones claim. Therefore one who reasons about something must make his principles or propositions from common and true concepts (and I call common those confessed by both sides); for thus what is woven would be syllogism and not paralogism, and the conclusion true and not absurd.

14. It is confessed therefore by all the holy fathers that the union came to be from deity and humanity and that Christ is perfect in deity and the same perfect and complete in humanity. Tell us therefore: Do these things seem right to you also? You will agree, as it seems to me. But what are deity and humanity, essence or accident, nature or hypostasis? I think you will say essence and nature. For that they are not accidents is clear to everyone; that they are not hypostases has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes. For if the names of deity and humanity signify hypostasis, it is time for you to speak also of three deities because of the threefold character of the hypostases and infinite humanities because of the infinity of hypostases, or hypostasis within hypostases, which no one who is not wise, but even very dull in understanding, has ever dared to say. Each name therefore is significative of nature, that of deity clearly and that of humanity. Therefore deity and humanity are one nature, I do not mean in the Lord, but absolutely? No, one who is not mad will say; for the created is not the same in essence as the uncreated and creator, nor the body as the incorporeal, nor the begun as the beginningless. Another nature therefore is that of deity and another that of humanity, and there are two natures. Christ therefore being from deity and humanity is from two natures. If therefore you say Christ is from deity and humanity and from two natures, tell us: Are these two things, that is deity and humanity, in Christ or not? You would affirm, if indeed you do not choose to be completely impious. How then do you not say Christ is two natures? For if saying Christ is from deity and humanity you confess him from two natures and "from deity and humanity" has equal force with you to "from two natures," how saying Christ is deity and humanity even after the union and in deity and humanity will you not confess him to be two natures and in two natures?

15. If deity and humanity are not the same as in natural quality, but are different and different, other and other, let every right thinking person consider whether what is other and other according to nature is one according to essence and not two, and

if two and not one, clearly natures; for "other" signifies nature, as those wise in these matters have determined. But are nature and nature one or two? Clearly two; for even to infants it is clear that one and one are two.

16. But if you say that what is united is one: but hear that what is united is not one in all respects, but insofar as it is united. For if what is united is one in all respects, since man is composed of dissimilar natures, it is necessary to say that soul and body are one in all respects, and the incorporeal will be body, and the body incorporeal; and since deity and humanity are united, they will be one according to essential difference, and either the divine will be created or the human uncreated.
17. If those things which are united are one in all respects, and the body is composed of contrary qualities, we shall say that heat and cold are the same, and dryness and moisture are likewise the same, and Peter and John, since they are united by nature, are therefore also one in hypostasis, the two being one. But this does not seem so to those who think well and to the truth, but rather that those things which are united, insofar as they are united, are one: Peter and John, since they are united according to nature, being consubstantial, are one according to nature, but soul and body, since they are united according to hypostasis, are one according to hypostasis. For one could not say, while keeping sober reasoning, that soul and body are one according to nature.
18. If the union has come about from two natures, either they were two before the union or in the union or after the union. And if they existed before the union, why do we blame Nestorius? But if the flesh also existed after the union, why do you blame us? But if you say that in the union, and the union remains, both now and forever indissoluble, then both now and forever they are and will be two. But if you say that the one in the union is at the time of the incarnation of the Word, before they were united, were they two or united? For if both existed before the union, it is necessary to say that the union is from two hypostases. But if you say two in the union, and number according to you necessarily introduces division, then the union is the cause of division, and in the union you divide the union.
19. If each of the things from which Christ is preserves its own definition and principle of essence even in the union, and the definition of Christ's divinity is one

thing and that of his humanity is another, why do you call those things which are not arranged under one and the same definition one nature and not two natures?

20. If the flesh of the Word of God is consubstantial with his uncreated divinity according to you, you suffer from confusion of essence, and why do you not burst forth what has long been laboring within you? But if it is not consubstantial, how could things that are not consubstantial be of one nature, or how could things of one nature not also be consubstantial? For if we are not drunk, the definition of consubstantiality is having the same essence.
21. If Christ is consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us according to the same nature, then we are altogether consubstantial with the Father. For things that are consubstantial with the same thing according to the same nature are also consubstantial with each other. But if he is consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and with us according to humanity, tell me, are divinity and humanity one nature? But if they are not one, then altogether they are two, and Christ is two natures and in two natures. But if they are one, how do they differ? For things that differ either differ essentially or accidentally. But if accidentally, they would be hypostases and not natures. But if essentially, then natures. For things that differ are at least two, for the one, insofar as it is one, does not differ. For difference necessarily contributes number.
22. Consubstantial things receive the same definition. If therefore Christ is one incarnate nature, and this, as you say, is the definition of his essence, and he is consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us, then both the Father and we will be one incarnate nature of divinity.
23. Difference introduces at least two different things, either natures or hypostases, or one hypostasis differing from itself. And if natures, then essentially. But if hypostases, then accidentally. But if one hypostasis, then being altered and changed according to separable accident. Choose therefore one of these: either say that Christ is two hypostases after the union, or that his divinity differs from his humanity according to separable accident, and the uncreated and without beginning and impassible and omnipotent and such things will be, and likewise also the created and begun and passible and such things, accidents, and these separable and changeable and alterable, the things from which Christ is. Either

proclaim with us and the truth that Christ is two natures, whose difference you also confess. For speaking of a difference of essences, you will be compelled to say that they exist and are preserved. For there could be no difference of what does not exist. For how do things that are not preserved differ? But if they are truly preserved, let them also be numbered.

24. But if you say that from two natures one composite nature has resulted, tell us: How do the things that are composed naturally come to be composed? For one composite nature is constituted from different natures when, as natures are united, something other than the things united comes to be, and neither this nor that is properly thought or spoken of, but something else, as from the four elements, I mean fire and air and earth and water, a body is constituted, when the four are united and mixed, and what results is neither fire nor is it called such, nor air nor water nor earth, but something else from these besides these. Similarly, from horse and donkey, a mule is neither horse nor donkey nor is it called such, but something else from these besides these. But our Lord Jesus Christ, being from divinity and humanity, is perfect both in divinity and in humanity, and is and is called both God and man, and wholly God and wholly man, which cannot be found in composite nature. For the whole body is not fire, nor is the whole man soul, nor is the whole mule horse. Therefore Christ is not one composite nature, but one composite hypostasis, not something else from others, but from others the same things: for from divinity and humanity he is both God and perfect man, yet two natures in one composite hypostasis and in two natures one composite hypostasis.
25. If Christ is of the same nature and consubstantial with the Father who is of simple nature, but also has composite nature, he will have two natures, one simple and one composite.
26. If the divinity of Christ is uncreated and without beginning, but his humanity is created and begun, how will the without beginning and the begun be of one nature?
27. If Christ is one composite nature, but the simple and the composite are not consubstantial, and the Father is of simple nature, then Christ is not consubstantial with the Father.

28. If Christ is one composite nature from divinity and humanity, but his mother is not from divinity and humanity, then he is not consubstantial with his mother. And you have moved the eternal boundaries which our fathers set, calling Christ consubstantial with the Father according to divinity and the same one consubstantial with us according to humanity.
29. But if you speak of the natures of Christ according to conception and contemplation, tell us, you conceivers and contemplators of natures: Is conception of true and existing things, as it were distinguishing and discerning by thought those things which seem simple to perception, as in the case of man, recognizing along with the visible body also the invisible soul, or is it a fabrication of the mind according to a combination of sensation and imagination, composing and fabricating from existing things those things which do not exist at all, like the mythical invention of hippocentaur and goat stags (does it therefore signify a reality?), or is it a mere sound and meaningless like "skindapsos" and "blityri"? If therefore it is the second, then fantasy and deception is the mystery of the economy. But if it is the first, and you contemplate the natures as two according to conception (and contemplation is of existing things), why do you not number the existing things, since indeed the holy fathers said not that the natures, but that their distinction is according to conception? "For when the natures," he says, "are distinguished by conceptions." If therefore the natures are distinguished by conception, it is clear that what is by conception is not in actuality or existence. For if what is by conception is in existence, and the father said the distinction is by conception, he speaks of the distinction in actuality and existence, which is impossible. You therefore, saying that divinity and humanity in Christ after the union are by conception, do not confess these in actuality or in reality. Therefore according to you he will be neither God in truth and existence nor man, but something else besides these.
30. And again, if you say that the two natures of Christ are in contemplation, and contemplation concerns existing things, as those skilled in these matters have distinguished, then the natures of Christ also exist; and if they exist, why do you flee from number as if it were some specter?

31. But if you say that he who speaks of two natures divides the *oikonomia* and speaks of two Christs, then also he who speaks of union from two natures will speak of union from two Christs.
32. If speaking of two natures divides Christ, but you say two natures in the union, then in the union you divide the union and the union will be, according to you, division.
33. Nature and nature will never be said to be of one nature, but perhaps of one hypostasis, nor will hypostasis and hypostasis be of one hypostasis, but of one nature. Therefore, saying that the things from which Christ is are of one nature, you would confess these to be hypostases and not natures. But if, choosing truth over falsehood, you say that the things from which Christ is after the union are of one hypostasis, you would confess these to be natures.
34. If you confess the difference of natures even after the union, how is it that speaking of natures in the plural you do not confess two natures? For if according to you there is one composite nature after the union, you ought to speak not of a difference of natures, but of a difference of one nature with itself, which is for you, not us, to say and think; for the same nature will never have an essential difference with itself.
35. If there is one nature of Christ, tell us its name; for what exists must both be named and be appropriately named, just as the nature of God is divinity and of man humanity. How then shall we name the nature of Christ? Christness? But none of the God inspired have said this. But divinity-humanity? Neither this. Why then do you introduce to us a nameless nature? But if you say that natures are innovated and something strange happens to the strangeness of the mystery, yet nothing is more incomprehensible or higher than the nature of God, and nevertheless the alone incomprehensible has endured to be named by us. Either therefore say that the nature devised by you is higher and greater than divinity, and it suffices for us, or reveal its name, or with the heralds of truth say that the natures of Christ are divinity and humanity and not the nature; for divinity and humanity is not one nature.

36. If from divinity and humanity there is one nature of Christ, then divinity in Christ is a part of nature and not a complete nature, and likewise humanity.
37. If your composite nature is not at all consubstantial with the Father nor with the mother, and Christ is the whole, then Christ, qua Christ, is consubstantial with no one. And if this is so, when he is consubstantial with someone, he is not Christ. Therefore being consubstantial with the Father, he is not Christ. It is necessary therefore that one of two things: either being consubstantial with the Father he is not Christ, or being Christ he is not consubstantial with the Father.
38. Things that are composed are composed from contraries, but according to the natural philosophers nothing is contrary to essence. Therefore it is impossible for there to be an essence composite from essences.
39. Either the natures or the essences are constituted by essential differences. If therefore one nature has been constituted from divinity and humanity, then divinity and humanity will be not natures but essential differences.
40. Things that are of one essence are certainly of different hypostases, but things of one hypostasis are of different essences. Therefore either say that the divinity and humanity of Christ are of one essence but of different hypostases, or saying they are of one hypostasis, confess two natures and not one. Where there is difference of essence, there is not one nature. Therefore either say that the flesh is consubstantial with the divinity of the Logos, or saying they are of different essences, confess two natures.
41. You who say there is one nature of the divinity of Christ and of his flesh, tell us: in what nature did Christ suffer? In the composite one, clearly, you will say; for saying one, you necessarily attribute the suffering to it, and according to you both the divinity and the humanity of Christ will be passible.
42. It is customary for philosophical reasoning to place the discussion about quantity before that about quality, and it adds the reason, that where there is quality, quantity will certainly be observed; "for difference is the difference of things that differ." How then, speaking of difference of essential qualities, do you not confess the number of those that differ essentially?

43. If there is one composite nature of Christ, it will be either only passible or impassible or both passible and impassible according to the same respect and both at once, or changeable and sometimes passible and sometimes impassible, or part of it passible and part of it impassible. Choose therefore which of these impieties you wish. For if only passible, Christ is not God. But if only impassible, he is not man. But if sometimes passible and sometimes impassible, he is neither by nature, but rather accidentally; for what is by nature does not change. But if part of it is passible and part impassible, and each is by nature what it is, the parts will not be of the same nature, and thus Christ will be two natures, who is not one nature but one composite hypostasis from two natures and in two natures and two natures. For it is impossible for the same nature to be at once passible and impassible; for one and the same nature cannot be receptive of contrary essential differences.
44. In every union the things united, even if they are confused or mixed together, remain not departing from their proper nature. For even if wine is mixed with water, there are two natures in the mixture; and wax and pitch, even if they are confused together, neither has departed from its proper nature, but in the mixture the two natures remain. For even if they are united and each does not display its proper property pure and unharmed because of the confusion and mixture with what is united, nevertheless each remains by nature what it was, and there are two natures, not one, as those who know how to judge such things reckon; for who does not know that in the mixture of wine and water there are two natures? If therefore these things are so, how do you, even knowing the difference and confessing the properties of the natures, proclaim these to be one and not two, and do not give to the unconfused the characteristics of confusion? But it is clear that you labor toward change and disappearance and consubstantiation, but you do not wish to bring into the open the change of impiety.
45. The things united become one by the union, not after the union, and as long as they remain in the union and the union is preserved, they are one, insofar as they are united. How then do you say two in the union, but after the union obstinately claim that one nature has come to be, having taken the blessed Cyril's "after the union" instead of "in the union"? For when has the union, having come to be, ceased, or what has caused it to cease, so that its result might be suspected to be something other than itself and not in itself beyond the things from which it is?

For the union is not like the nature of things that have come to be and no longer exist, such as time and dancing and such things.

46. If something other than the union has come to be after the union, it is clearly confusion and not union.
47. If confusion makes the two natures one, and the unconfused does the same thing according to you, tell us what is the difference according to you between the unconfused and confusion.
48. If Christ is said to be visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, tangible and intangible according to one essence and another, and not according to one person and another, and "another thing" signifies essence, why do you not speak of two essences?
49. "Another thing" is signifying of essence according to logic, but "another person" of hypostasis; if therefore saying Christ is "one thing and another" you will not be compelled to speak of two natures, then say also "one person and another"; for you will not signify two hypostases.
50. If you say that the dyad introduces division, learn well from being taught that the philosophical account does not define number as division, but as a heap of monads or a pouring out of monads. So it indicates union rather than division. For the division of the monad is half and half, but the dyad is an addition of a monad; for it is more a matter of division to say "the two are one and one," but to grasp one and one under one and to say "two" is a matter of connection and union. Either number brings together, but does not divide, since, if the dyad is a cutting of the monad, and what is cut is cut in two, then number is cutting and not addition, and if this is so, just as the monad when cut makes the dyad, in the same way it would be necessary for the two when cut to make the tetrad. And where did the three come from? For it would be necessary for only even numbers to be counted with the odd ones being excluded, or rather to speak truly, that number is spoken of in two ways: one exists by itself as the very nature of number, the other is observed in relation and in a thing, just as white is both whiteness and that which has been whitened.

This nature of number, therefore, neither divides nor connects, but receives both; for instance, the dyad, if you examine the monads from which it is composed, is divided into these things (for the two is divided into one and one), but if you observe their gathering together, it is rather connected from these things; for one and one is two, and two and two is four. And again, number is not division, but a sign indicating the quantity of the underlying things, whether united or divided by another account and not by number dividing or connecting these things; for when we say ten cubits of this wood which happens to be continuous, we do not also divide with the number the unity in the ten cubit wood; and again when we say ten palm trees, we know these to be in division; and when we say one measure of grain or perhaps of palm trees, we know the grains contained in the measure to be in division. And if number is applied to natures, it indicates not primarily their quantity, but their difference in kind; for when we say two natures of ox and horse, we indicate not their division according to quantity, but their variation according to species. But when we say three horses or men, Peter perhaps and James and John, we indicate rather their separation and that they are not such and such persons, but so many rather. And in the case of the holy and consubstantial Trinity, proclaiming three hypostases, we confess one essence and nature of these. But in the case of the saving economy, saying two natures, we indicate their difference in form, not their separation, just as there we rightly exclude the number of essences, even if no hypostasis is without essence, so also here we exclude the number of hypostases, even if no nature is without hypostasis.

51. If the dyad absolutely introduces division and for this reason you flee from the number of natures, why do you not avoid the number of properties? You confess one nature of God the Word incarnate, and this is a common opinion for both you and us; for it is the teaching of the fathers. But if you wish to indicate two natures through this, your war against the truth is vain. If you put this forward simply as indicative of one in contradiction to the two, the word "incarnate" is thrown in by you in vain. But if it indicates neither one simply nor two united, certainly whatever fractional part between the one and the two is taken, this will indicate to you the "incarnate," whether two thirds or one half; and you would be masters of the quantity, seeing that the blessed Athanasius and Cyril here used the name of nature to indicate the hypostasis in an improper and not proper sense as being more universal. For the more universal things are predicated of the particular

things, and it is not at all the same thing (for the hypostasis is not nature, for the hypostasis is not universal), nevertheless it receives both the name and the definition of the universal, but it does not convert. For the hypostasis or the individual of nature is nature, but not only nature, but with properties, while nature is not hypostasis or individual. Thus they indicated the hypostasis by the name of nature improperly and not properly, so that what is said is one hypostasis of God the Word incarnate; for it is not the nature of God the Word that is incarnate, but the hypostasis. And the divine evangelist is a witness crying out clearly in this way: "The Word became flesh." But the Word is not nature, as has been shown above, but hypostasis. And the God bearing Cyril himself says elsewhere these things: "The nature of the Word, that is, the hypostasis, which is the Word itself." For if the nature of the Word, that is, the divinity, is incarnate (for the Word had no other nature besides the divinity, and the Word is of the same nature as the Father and the Spirit, and all things are common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit except the mode of existence), then the Father and the Spirit are also incarnate. We confess, therefore, a union of natures according to hypostasis and the incarnation of the Word and the deification of the flesh; for incarnation is to partake of flesh and the things of flesh. Therefore, the enhypostatic hypostasis of God the Word is incarnate, that is, God the Word, and becomes flesh and becomes hypostasis to the flesh, and being previously God, he later becomes flesh, that is, man, and one composite hypostasis comes to be of the two natures, and in it through the incarnation the two natures of divinity and humanity are united and interpenetrate each other. But the interpenetration comes from the divinity; for this imparts to the flesh its own glory and brightness without partaking of the passions of the flesh. Therefore, the nature of the flesh is deified, but does not carnalize the nature of the Word. The nature of the Word deifies what is assumed, but is not incarnate; for the lesser is benefited by the greater. The greater is not harmed by the lesser; for just as iron is fired but fire is not ironized, and just as flesh is animated but the soul is not carnalized, so the divine nature deifies the flesh, but is not itself carnalized. For the divine nature is not receptive of any addition or subtraction, and is impartive but not receptive; therefore, it has not become one composite nature. It is the same thing, therefore, to say "enhypostatic hypostasis" and "nature of God the Word"; for as has been said, the blessed Athanasius and Cyril indicated the hypostasis by the name of nature. For the hypostasis is also nature, but nature is not also hypostasis; for it does not convert. For universals are predicated of particulars,

but particulars are not affirmed of universals. But even if of some iron being fired the nature of iron is said to be fired, it is necessary to know that this is because the nature of iron is receptive of firing and because firing is a work of nature; but in the case of the incarnation of the Word, incarnation is not a work of nature, but a mode of economic condescension. It is not possible, therefore, to say that one of the hypostases of the divinity has something which not all the hypostases possess, except the mode of existence. And incarnation is a mode of second existence befitting the only-begotten Son and Word alone, so that the property may remain unmoved.

52. But you will perhaps say: How then do we say that the nature of the flesh has been deified and has suffered? Are we not, by affirming these things of all the hypostases of humanity, but saying that the nature of the Word is incarnate, referring the incarnation to the Father and the Spirit? Because all human nature is receptive of things according to nature and against nature and above nature without change of nature, but the divine nature is unreceptive of all alteration and addition, and not only this, but also because that flesh was the firstfruits of our lump and had not become an individually subsistent hypostasis, but was an enhypostatic nature, completing the composite hypostasis of Christ, and was united to God the Word not for its own sake, but for the common salvation of nature, we say therefore that the nature of divinity is united to the nature of humanity, but the hypostasis of the Word is incarnate; for incarnation is the assumption of flesh and becoming hypostasis to flesh, but union is the coming together of two things and their convergence into the same thing.

53. The example of man, if you take it in terms of species and nature, will have no place in reference to Christ; for we have not yet heard of a species of Christs even now. Therefore, Christ is not nature, but hypostasis; for according to the blessed Cyril, "the name Christ neither has the force of a definition nor indicates any essence." But if you take it in terms of a particular man, and he is a hypostasis, it is not improper. It should be known that it is not necessary for examples to be like in every way to the things demonstrated, but rather to have both similarity and dissimilarity in some respect, since otherwise it would not be an example. Justin, therefore, the philosopher and martyr, speaks thus in the Exposition concerning the orthodox confession: "Some, understanding the union

as of soul to body, have thus explained it; and the example is fitting, even if not in all respects, at least in some respect; for just as man is one but has two natures"

54. . . . See how he did not say: "Man is one from two natures," but: "He has two natures," so that even after the union of the two natures he said that man has two natures. "For just as man is one," he says, "but has two different natures in himself, and reasons according to one thing but acts according to another in what has been reasoned (for having reasoned with the rational soul, if it happens, about the construction of a ship, he brings what has been conceived to completion with his hands), so the Son, being one and having two natures, works the divine signs according to one, but receives the lowly things according to the other; for by that by which he is from the Father and God, he works the signs, but by that by which he is from the virgin and man, he willingly endured the cross and the passions and similar things naturally." To which does the example appear to you to advocate, to those who dare to speak of one nature in Christ or to those who orthodoxly proclaim two without confusion and without division? And Gregory the Theologian says these things: "For there are two natures, God and man, since there are also soul and body, but not two sons or gods."

55. That it has very much dissimilarity, we shall know from this. From what do you say man is composed? From soul and body, obviously. Why then do you not confess Christ to be from God and man? Or for what reason do you not say man is from soulness and bodiness just as Christ is from divinity and humanity? Why is man not called wholly soul and wholly body as Christ is wholly God and wholly man, and wholly perfect in soulness and wholly perfect in bodiness as Christ is wholly perfect in divinity and wholly perfect in humanity, and wholly soul with the body and wholly body with the soul as Christ is wholly God with his flesh and wholly man with his beginningless divinity? For man has become something else from soul and body, that is, man, but Christ remains the same things from different elements, God and man from divinity and humanity. But if it has the likeness in all respects, it would be necessary for your composite nature also to be called Christness, just as humanity is and is called the nature of men.

56. But in another way, the soul, being preoccupied by the passions of the body, often suffers before the body and suffers along with it continuously; for it often agonizes over the cutting of the body and suffers before the passion of the body

and is altered, and after the cutting no less receives the things of pain passibly from the body, which no one could ever say of the divinity of the Lord unless he is mad in mind. If, therefore, man is also said to be of one nature, it is as species, not as hypostasis. For when man is compared to man, they are said to be of one nature as consubstantial and as being arranged under one species; but when man is studied in terms of nature, two natures will be observed in him, I mean soul and body. For in the comparison of soul to body, who is so senseless as to say that both are of one nature? But there is no species of Christs; for there are not many Christs composed of divinity and humanity, so that all being arranged under the same species might be proclaimed of one nature, but there is one Christ from two and recognized in two natures.

57. "But notice how the blessed Cyril describes him also in two kids, but he brings the example not in relation to the hypostases, but in relation to the difference between the living and the sacrificed." And we say this too, that it is not impossible for one nature to come to be from two created things perhaps, but it is impossible for one nature to come to be from created and uncreated, either partaking of both or being something else besides these according to Gregory the Theologian. For how can the same thing both have begun to be and not have begun?
58. If it is the same thing to say "from divinity and humanity" and "from two natures," by not saying two natures in Christ after the union, you do not confess divinity and humanity in him after the union either.
59. The things of one essence will have the same differences without fail. For neither, because man is rational and the angel is rational, will one nature of angel and man be spoken of; for the angel is immortal, but man is mortal, and it does not have the likeness in every way. And man is mortal, and the dog is also mortal, but man is rational, while the dog is irrational and they are not of one nature. It is necessary, therefore, that the things of one essence have the same essential differences without fail. If, therefore, there is one essence of the divinity of God the Word and of his flesh, the same differences will belong to both without fail.

60. If the things from which Christ exists are not in him, they have either perished or are in another; and where, show us.
61. If in the case of consubstantial beings the one nature that is spoken of indicates identity of nature, not of hypostasis, how in the case of heterosubstantial beings will the two natures indicate not the difference of substances, but division of hypostases?
62. Things related to each other are together and always together; but the union and the things united are among things related to each other. Therefore the union and the things united are together. Either therefore proclaim also the things united or cease also the union. And who then is the cause of the division?
63. "One and another" are pronouns of hypostases, but "one thing and another thing" are of natures according to Gregory the theologian. If therefore "one and another" always indicates the hypostases in theology, then "one thing and another thing" would always indicate the natures in the economy.
64. To say "different by nature" and "different nature" is the same thing. If therefore the first is always said of the divinity of Christ and his humanity, so is the second always. But "different and different nature" will not be one.
65. What do you mean by composite nature? Does it signify two things with singular expression as among the fathers the double and twofold nature and as chorus and people, or one thing with plural expression as Athens, Thebes and such things? If therefore the former, it is superfluous to say "one"; for the fathers did not say "one." If the latter, "composite" is superfluous; for the same thing is signified to you from both the simple and the composite. But if something else besides what has been said, you introduce to us another confused nature like a mule and the monstrosity of the polymorphous animals among the Greeks.
66. The one incarnate nature either wears the flesh as a form and is one and incarnate like bronze fashioned in the shape of a statue, or the flesh that was assumed having been changed into the nature of the one who assumed it, or as the nature of the one who assumed having been changed into the nature of what was assumed and having suffered departure from its own substance, or

substance is united to substance and there are two. Choose therefore what you prefer, proclaim either Christ has two natures or not two at all; for things spoken contradictorily are wholly opposed. Either therefore proclaim two or say one absolutely. For why do you put forward a word whose power you deny, for the deception of the more simple?

67. In saying "one nature of God the Word incarnate" you either deny the power of "incarnate" or you speak of two natures by circumlocution from name and definition, openly naming one nature, but indicating the other from the definition, if indeed flesh ensouled with rational and intelligent soul is the nature of man.
68. Things of different substance become one by union and not by nature; for things of the same substance are one by nature. Therefore nature is one thing and union another, and the one thing accomplished from each is different, one nature from consubstantiality, but one hypostasis from hypostatic union.
69. "The name Christ" according to blessed Cyril "neither has the power of a definition nor indicates the substance of something." But if it does not indicate substance and does not have the power of a definition, it would be a hypostasis and not a nature. For substance and nature are naturally indicated by definition, but person and hypostasis by description, since the one is composed of essential elements, the other of accidental elements. But the name God is indicative of substance, and likewise also man. Why therefore will you not proclaim the one Christ, who is God and man, as one composite hypostasis as Christ, but as God and man two natures?
70. Even if the union comes about from perfect things, yet in relation to the whole or the result of the union, the things that came together for union are called parts, as perhaps a brick from dust and chaff and water, each of which is perfect by itself, but is reckoned a part in relation to the brick. Therefore the two natures are parts of Christ; for he consists of divinity and humanity. How therefore are the parts not in the whole and the whole not in the parts? For they are either in him or elsewhere or they have been destroyed, and he himself is either in them or in others besides these or nowhere.

71. If the flesh is of the same nature as the divinity of the Word, how has the Trinity not become a quaternity? For consubstantial things belong to different hypostases. But if it is heterosubstantial, how is Christ not two natures?
72. If God the Word and the Father are two in some respect, but the flesh and God the Word are not two in any respect, God the Word is more united to the flesh than to the Father. But if not more, then at least God the Word and the flesh are two in some respect. And if two in some respect, it is according to nature; for it is not according to hypostasis.
73. The one Christ, the composite hypostasis, is identical by nature to the Father and the Spirit, and to the Mother and to us; for he is consubstantial both to the Father and to us, but differs according to hypostasis. If therefore you give him one composite nature, you will call the Father and the Holy Spirit of composite nature and say the Trinity and humans are of one nature, but if a hypostasis recognized in two natures, he will be consubstantial to the Father in one respect and to us in another.
74. Divinity is predicated of the three hypostases of the life giving Trinity, and likewise humanity is predicated of the infinite hypostases of human nature. If therefore you say one nature of divinity and humanity, according to you one nature has come to be in Christ of the three holy hypostases of the Trinity and of the infinite hypostases of humanity.
75. If you speak of a particular and individual substance of the Word and identify nature and hypostasis as the same thing, show us some of the holy fathers who spoke of three natures or substances in the case of the holy Trinity, and we will be silent, placing hand on mouth. But if you cannot show this, why do you boast speaking from the heart and not from God in vain?
76. The quantity of things is represented not only by definite number, but indeed also by indefinite number such as perhaps many and few and more and less; and proportion often knows how to do the same thing as greater and equal and less, but also demonstrative speech, I mean this and that and these and other and different, and order as before this and after that and from the beginning and later, and perhaps other ways. If therefore you call all the ways that indicate the

quantity of things divisive, the refutation is at hand; for you speak of one and one nature, and different and different, and other and other and natures indefinitely and properties and greater and less and before and after. But if you suppose that only definite number and especially the dyad divides, it is a matter of authority; for what is the rejection of truth that holds otherwise? For the dyad and the two together represent the things numbered by comprehensive power, or the divided number of your "one and one" considered by itself.

77. Above all announce this to us: Does Christ have divine nature even after the union? Yes, you will say. Does he also have human nature? You will agree to this too, unless you wish to be impious with uncovered head. Therefore are divine nature and human nature one nature or two? But if you say one, the Father will be consubstantial to us; but if two and not one, why not, having cast away pride far off with its progenitor, will you confess with us one Christ, one Son, one Lord, one hypostasis from two natures and two natures and in two natures after the union? For if you never say Christ is of two natures, why do you say he is of one nature after the union in vain? But if, saying he is of two natures before the union, you confess he is of one after the union, you fight directly against the truth; for before the union or the divine incarnation, being one hypostasis of one simple nature or the divine, he was not even Christ. Either therefore you will completely deny the two natures in Christ or you will call Christ two natures before the incarnation from the virgin, not enduring to give him his two natures that truly belong to him after the union. For we, standing in the harbor of piety and repelling every storm of heretical malice by the breezes of the Spirit, in the case of the holy and super praised Trinity worship one substance, one nature of divinity, but three perfect hypostases, confessing that they have no essential difference from one another, but we understand all the divine names commonly and unitedly and identically and simply and indivisibly and wholly of all divinity or of the substance or nature of the three hypostases, the lordship and holiness, the kingdom, power, energy, will, authority, but we know distinctly the Father, the Son and the Spirit, I mean the unbegotten and the begotten and the proceeding, knowing the Father alone as unbegotten, the Son alone as begotten, the Holy Spirit alone as proceeding, with the property of each not changing or moving, not knowing these as accidents (for nothing befalls God), but as characteristic properties of each hypostasis, perfect God the Father, perfect God the Son, perfect God the Holy Spirit, God and God and God, but the three together

understood and known as one God, not fused into one person and one hypostasis (away with that!), but with Son and Spirit referred to one cause, the Father. For there is one God, because there is one divinity, but not three gods like three men; for they are not cut by substance, not separated by power, not divided by place, not by energy, not by will, having unalterable establishment and mutual indwelling in one another. For where would they be if they did not remain in one another? For thus each would be circumscribed. Therefore one God from three perfect hypostases, so that composite nature from imperfect ones might not be supposed, but one from three perfect, simple and incomposite, super perfect and pre perfect.

78. In the case of the saving economy that surpasses all comprehension, we confess that the one of the holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son and Word of God, by the good pleasure of the Father was incarnate from the Holy Spirit and Mary the holy ever virgin and Theotokos. And we worship his two births, one pre eternal and everlasting without cause from the Father without mother, and one from the virgin mother without father for our salvation, neither saying that the Father was incarnate and born nor the Holy Spirit; for the property of sonship is unchangeable. Therefore being Son he became Son again; for being Son of God and the Father he became son of man, one composite hypostasis from two natures. For being a hypostasis with inherent nature he assumed an enhypostatic nature as firstfruits of our lump. We say enhypostatic, not as having existed individually or as having had its own hypostasis, but as having existed in the hypostasis of the Word. For simultaneously flesh, simultaneously flesh of God the Word; simultaneously rational ensouled flesh, simultaneously rational ensouled flesh of God the Word, with the difference of the natures in no way destroyed through the union; for the things from which the one Christ and Lord exists have remained unchangeable and unalterable, but they have come together into one composite hypostasis without confusion and without division; for we dogmatize hypostatic union. But hypostatic union both preserves the difference of the substances that came together and knows how to maintain the unity of the person. For since the Word is not consubstantial with the flesh nor separated from what coexists with him, it is neither lawful to speak of one nature in his case nor two hypostases; for these things make hypostases. For consubstantiality indicates what is one and the same in substance, but different according to hypostasis, while conversely hetero-substantiality indicates what is

the same according to hypostasis but different according to nature of the things united.

79. Thus Christ is not one and another, lest we serve a tetrad, but one thing and another, lest we attribute suffering to the divinity. For if he were one and another, we would vainly boast of the theosis of our nature through the incarnation of the Word. For if the indwelling of one in another is incarnation, God would have endured many incarnations. For he says, "I will dwell in you and walk among you," and "Do you not know that you are a temple of God and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" But if not one thing and another, then flesh and divinity are the same according to nature, and all things are confused and mixed together. If therefore he is not one and another, Christ is one and one hypostasis, for hypostasis is another. But if one thing and another (and nature is the other), then clearly not one according to nature. But if not one, it is evident to all that there are two. Therefore he is one according to hypostasis, being identified with himself, but being distinguished by the characteristic properties of the extremes. For even if his holy flesh was not without share in the characteristic properties, nevertheless the collection of these and the hypostasis and composition of the flesh came to be not according to itself, but in the hypostasis of the Word, and it did not have its own hypostasis. Hence it was neither anhypostatos nor did it have its own hypostasis, but exists as two natures, being united and divided by the same substance of the extremes and the heteroousios of the parts.

80. When we say two natures, we do not divide the union, but we flee from change and confusion. For we know that these are numbered by reason and mode of difference. For just as we flee confusion, so also we reject division both in the case of the holy and divine Trinity and in the case of the economy of the one of the holy Trinity. For just as there we confess three hypostases but proclaim one essence and nature, knowing neither any of the hypostases to be without essence, but not assigning essence to each individually nor proclaiming a definitive number of quantity of essences, lest we introduce the heterogeneous and different substance, so also here when we say two natures we do not divide the hypostatic union nor introduce a number of hypostases, even if they are not without hypostasis, but we show the different in kind and different substance. For just as there the number of hypostases does not harm the same substance nor introduce natural division to the hypostases, but signifying the difference of the

hypostases does not cut the unity of the essence, so here the quantity of the natures does not divide the same and unified of the hypostases, but shows the difference as in natural quality and the collection of those that have come together. Therefore when we say that the union has come to be from two perfect natures, we do not say according to mixture or confusion or change or blending, nor again personal or relative or according to dignity or same will or same name or same honor, as the God hating Nestorius said, but we proclaim it to be essential and hypostatic orthodoxy, not as the two essences having produced one composite essence, but as having been truly united to each other into one composite hypostasis of the Son of God, and we define that their essential difference is preserved. For the created has remained created, and the uncreated uncreated; the mortal mortal and the immortal immortal, and the one shines forth in miracles, while the other has submitted to insults. For even if the one suffering these things and working those miracles is one, and both belonged commonly to the one, nevertheless that from which the things of insult are common is one thing, and that from which the boastings are common is another, different and different by reason and mode of difference, but each belonging commonly to each by the mode of exchange through the mutual indwelling of the parts into each other and the hypostatic union. "For each form works in communion with the other that which is proper to it." Therefore indeed the Lord of glory is said to be crucified, clearly not as to divinity, but as to the co subsistent flesh, and the Son of man is written to have ascended where he was before, not where he was before as man, but where he existed as God and was indivisible from the Father. For we neither proclaim the divinity to be passible or to suffer in flesh, nor do we confess the flesh or humanity to be pre eternal, but him who has both this and that, sometimes we name Christ from both together, and sometimes we say God from divinity from one of the parts, and again man from humanity. And we say God passible, not as God, but as also man, and we proclaim a pre eternal child not as child, but as also God. For he is one, this and that, God and man, perfect God and perfect man, bearing all the properties of divinity, the divinity, the unbegun, the immortal, the lordship, the omnipotent will and energy, and bearing the entire essence of flesh completely, soul, body, mind and their natural and blameless passions and properties, the free will and energy, hunger, thirst, tears, grief, distress, agony, death. "My Lord and my God," says Thomas, and "God was the Word," and "the Word became flesh," the theologian said in the Spirit, and "In the beginning was the Word," and "I will, be cleansed,"

and "they would not have crucified the Lord of glory." These and such things and the power of divine signs proclaim his divine nature and energy.

81. Then "I have authority to lay down my life and I have authority to take it again," and "Handle me and see that a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see me having," and "we have the mind of Christ," and "entering into a house he wished that no one should know, and he could not escape notice," and "Father, let not my will be done, but yours." And the breaking of bread and the walking and the extension of hands on the cross and the thinking and the vital nutritive and growth and sensitive power present the human energy, and "afterwards he was hungry," and the tear over Lazarus and "I thirst," and "now my soul is troubled," and "I am sorrowful unto death," and "he began to be grieved and amazed and distressed," and "Father, into your hands I commend my spirit, and having said this he expired." Are not these things clearly, just as the former things witness to the divinity, so also these witness to his humanity and the difference and unconfused nature of the natures? For how will these things and those be said of one nature?

82. Therefore he is perfect God and perfect man, God by nature and man by nature, perfect in divinity and complete in humanity. For even if he became man according to economy, nevertheless he became man by nature; wholly God and wholly man, wholly God even with his flesh and wholly man with his superessential divinity. We say that Gregory the Theologian spoke showing this: "Of which the one deified, the other was deified," and "I dare to say homotheos." For just as we know the incarnation of the Word to be without change and alteration, so also the theosis. "For the Word himself became flesh, having been conceived from the virgin, but having come forth as God with the assumption, which had already been deified by him simultaneously with its being brought into existence, so that the three things happened together: the assumption, the existence, and its theosis by the Word, and thus the holy virgin is conceived and called Theotokos, not only because of the nature of the Word, but also because of the theosis of the human, of which simultaneously the conception and existence have been miraculously accomplished; the conception of the Word, and the existence of the flesh in the Word himself, through the Theotokos supernaturally providing the being formed to the Former and the being made man to God and Maker of all things, deifying the assumption, the union

preserving the united things such as they were also united; I mean not only the divine, but also the human of Christ, that which is above us and according to us. For it did not first become according to us and afterwards become above us, but always from the first existence it was both through having its existence in the Word himself from the very conception. Therefore it is human according to its proper nature, but God's and divine supernaturally."

83. "And we proclaim the holy virgin properly and truly Theotokos; for as he who was born from her is true God, so she who conceived God incarnate from her is truly Theotokos. But we say that God was born from her not as having received from her the eternal existence of divinity, but as having been incarnate from her unchangeably and having become man and been born," one Christ, one Son, one Lord, one hypostasis, the same God and man, not introducing another person into the Trinity.

84. "Hence we also define the addition in the Trisagion as blasphemous as introducing a fourth person into the Trinity and placing in parts the enhypostatos power of God and in parts the crucified one as being other than the Strong, or glorifying the holy Trinity as passible and crucifying with the Son the Father and the Holy Spirit" or showing the Holy Spirit and immortal to be passible. For this Trisagion hymn was long ago mystically initiated by the Holy Spirit through his liturgical spirits the seraphim to the God seer Isaiah, mystically revealing the three hypostases of the divinity and the one lordship and nature. For Isaiah himself said he had seen God the Father, but John the Theologian said the Son had been revealed to him, and Paul the divine apostle the Holy Spirit. Hence the entire assembly of the holy fathers have taken this Trisagion hymn to the holy Trinity. "For Gregory the Theologian says: 'Thus indeed the holy things of the holy, which are also covered and glorified by the seraphim with three sanctifications, come together into one lordship and divinity; which has also been philosophized by another of those before us most beautifully and most highly.' "

85. From some divine revelation, the historical books declare that in the time of Proclus, archbishop of Constantinople, when the people there were in procession because of some God sent threat, a child of the people was caught up and the hymn was thus taught by some angelic instruction: "Holy God, Holy Strong, Holy Immortal, have mercy on us," and they were commanded to sing it. And the

revelation was confirmed by the immediate outcome; for as soon as they sang, the wrath ceased. We say this is the power of the hymn: "Holy God" the Father, from whom God the Son and God the Holy Spirit; "Holy Strong" the Son, the wisdom and power of the Father; "Holy Immortal" the Holy Spirit; "for the Spirit is life giving," and "the law of the Spirit of life," and the God-bearing David: "My soul thirsted for God the strong, the living." But we say these things not limiting divinity to the Father alone nor power to the Son alone or immortality to the Spirit alone, "but taking all the divine names simply and unitedly upon each of the hypostases and imitating the divine apostle saying: 'But to us there is one God the Father, from whom all things and we from him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things and we through him.' But also Gregory the Theologian speaking thus: 'But to us there is one God the Father, from whom all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things, and one Holy Spirit, in whom all things, the "from whom" and "through whom" and "in whom" not cutting natures, but characterizing the properties of one and unconfused nature.' "

86. Therefore it is truly laughable and childish for the Trisagion song, which was previously and afterwards initiated through angels and confirmed by the cessation of the threat and established by the witness of the holy fathers as revelatory of the one trihypostatic divinity, to be trampled down by the irrational opinion of the fuller; for thinking to cleanse this sacred hymn like a garment and make it more brilliant than is fitting, he made an addition to the Trisagion as if superior to the seraphim, as if legislating against the Holy Spirit. But oh the audacity, not to say the folly. But we say thus, even if demons are torn apart: "Holy God, Holy Strong, Holy Immortal, have mercy on us."
87. For the confirmation of what has been said we have also appended quotations from the holy fathers, whose mouth has been oracular as the mouth of God, being revered by whose respectability, together with us and the truth, orthodoxly proclaim one God and one nature in three hypostases and the one of the holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son of God, and after the incarnation one Christ, one Son, one Lord and one hypostasis in two natures unconfusedly and indivisibly.
88. Quotations from holy fathers proving that Christ is one from two natures and two natures and in two natures even after his saving and supremely good

incarnation. From Saint Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, from his work *Against Valentinus*: For just as the ark was gilded within and without with pure gold, so also the body of Christ was pure and transparent, adorned within by the Word, guarded without by the Spirit, so that from both the brilliance of the natures might be shown forth.

89. From Saint Justin, philosopher and martyr, from the third book concerning the holy Trinity, chapter three: And entering her womb like a divine seed, he forms for himself a perfect man as a temple, taking some part of her nature and making it substantial for the formation of the temple, and clothing himself with this according to the ultimate union, the Son of God came forth as both.
90. From the same author, from the same work, chapter seventeen: Just as man is one, yet has two different natures, and thinks according to one but acts according to what has been thought according to the other (for having reasoned with the rational soul, if it happens, about the construction of a ship, he brings what has been conceived to completion with his hands), so the Son, being one and having two natures, worked divine signs according to one nature, but received humble things according to the other.
91. From Saint Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, from his work *Against Heresies*: "Who, being in the form of God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant." You have two forms. Hold fast to these, falsify neither. For neither did the Son of God, being man and God, destroy the divine form, nor being God did he reject the human form. Since therefore we have two forms, I mean the lordly and the servile, the one divine by nature, the other human by nature, the one from before the ages, the other from later times, the one from the Father, the other from a virgin, the one from the Father alone, the other from the virgin alone, since these two realities subsist as two in one (for we neither divide the God-Word from the body nor know two sons and Christs, but the Son of God from before the ages became man from the very womb of the virgin in later times, perfect. For as the Father who begot generated a perfect Son, so the same and one Son and Word of the Father, wishing to save man who was completely perishing, became perfect man, so that having saved what was outside he might not leave what was inside

betrayed, for he did not take up a body and leave the soul, but took up both soul and mind <...>

92. From Saint Methodius, Bishop of Patara and Martyr, from his discourse on the Presentation: Him who is invisible in vision, incomprehensible in comprehension, exceedingly great in smallness, in the temple and in the highest places, on the virginal throne and on the cherubic chariot, below and above without spatial separation, in the form of a servant and in the form of God the Father, the obedient one and king of all.
93. From Saint Basil, Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, from his discourse Against Eunomius: For I say that being in the form of God is able to be equal to being in the essence of God. For as taking the form of a servant signifies that the Lord came to be in the essence of humanity, so saying that he exists in the form of God presents the property of the divine essence.
94. From the same, from his dialogue against Aetius the Arian: For you will never be able, nor will anyone else, to demonstrate or prove in truth that the aforementioned holy fathers and teachers, or we, or any of the select fathers and teachers of the holy catholic and apostolic church, either said or taught in writing or orally, as you say, concerning Christ our God, one composite or simple or uniform nature, or one will and one energy, or any of the forbidden and rejected doctrines from the catholic and apostolic church. For if we build again those things which we destroyed, according to the divine apostle we establish ourselves as transgressors. On the contrary, we rather proclaimed that our Lord Jesus Christ is double in all respects, in one hypostasis and in one person, without any division or confusion whatsoever. For to speak of one nature and will and energy concerning the same our Lord Jesus Christ and not two belongs to the teaching and mindset of evil believing and blasphemous men who think like you.
95. From Saint Athanasius, from his Letter to Epictetus: But if the Word is consubstantial with the body having its nature from earth, and the Word is consubstantial with the Father according to the confession of the fathers, the Father himself will also be consubstantial with the body made from earth. And

why do they still blame the Arians for saying the Son is a creature, when they themselves say that the Father is consubstantial with creatures?

96. And a little later: What Hades has belched forth to say that the body from Mary is consubstantial with the divinity of the Word?

97. From Saint Gregory the Theologian, from his second Letter to Cledonius: For there are two natures, God and man, since there are also soul and body, but not two sons or gods. For here there are not two men, even though Paul thus designated the inner and outer man.

98. From the same, from his Apologetic: This is what the law, our pedagogue, wants for us; this is what the prophets, mediators between Christ and the law, want; this is what Christ, the perfecter and end of the spiritual law, wants; this is what the emptied divinity wants; this is what the assumed flesh wants; this is what the new mixture wants: God and man, one from both and both through one.

99. From the same, from his second discourse On the Son: And the sign is this: whenever the natures are distinguished in thought, the names are also divided together. Listen to Paul saying: "So that the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory." God of Christ, but Father of glory. For if the combination is one, it is not by nature but by union.

100. From the same, completion of the recent citation from his first Letter to Cledonius: But if it must be said briefly, the elements from which the Savior comes are one thing and another, if indeed the invisible is not the same as the visible and the timeless is not the same as that which is under time. But he is not one person and another person, God forbid. For both are one by mixture, God having become man and man having been deified, or however one might name it. I say "one thing and another" in the opposite way from how it is with the Trinity. For there it is "one person and another person," so that we might not confuse the hypostases, but not "one thing and another thing," for the three are one and the same in divinity.

101. Scholion: If "not one thing and another" because there is one nature, then "one thing and another" is not one nature. And if "opposite from how it is with the

Trinity, there three hypostases because of 'one person and another person,' but one nature because of 'not one thing and another thing,'" here there are two natures because of "one thing and another," but one hypostasis because of "not one person and another person."

102. From the same, from his second discourse On the Son: This is what creates error for the heretics: the conjunction of names when the names are interchanged because of the mixture. And the sign is this: whenever the natures are distinguished in thought, the names are also divided together. Listen to Paul saying: "So that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory." God of Christ, but Father of glory. For if the combination is one, it is not by nature but by union. What could be clearer than these things?
103. Scholion: Things that are not one by nature are certainly two. But if by union, then according to hypostasis. Therefore the divinity of Christ and his humanity are two by nature but one by hypostasis.
104. From the same, from his poems: God came as mortal, gathering two natures into one, the one hidden, the other manifest to mortals.
105. From Saint Ambrose of Milan, from his discourse on the incarnation or against Apollinarius: But while we were refuting these, others arose saying that the body of the Lord and the divinity are of one nature. What Hades belched forth such blasphemy? For the Arians are already more tolerable than these, by whom the trunk of contentiousness and unbelief is increased from these things, who more contentiously affirm that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not of one essence, since these say that the divinity of the Lord and the flesh are of one essence.
106. From the same, from his work to Gratian the emperor; and Saint Cyril brought forward this usage in the synod at Ephesus: Let us preserve the distinction of the divinity and the flesh; for one speaks in each, the Son of God, since each nature is in him
107. From the same, from his interpretation of the divine symbol: Those who say that Christ is a mere man or that the divine Word is passible or that he was

changed into flesh or that he possessed a consubstantial body or that he brought it from heaven or that it is a phantom, or those saying that the divine Word is mortal or that he needed resurrection from the Father or that he assumed a soulless body or a mindless man or that the two essences of Christ were confused according to mixture and became one essence, and who do not confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is of two essences unconfused, but one person, according to which there is one Christ, one Son, these the catholic and apostolic church anathematizes.

108. From Saint Amphilochius, bishop of Iconium, from his letter to Seleucus: Thus I confess Christ to be God and man, the Son of God, one Son of two natures, both passible and impassible, both mortal and immortal.
109. And a little later: Therefore I say one Son of two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly. Christ suffers therefore, the Son of God, not in divinity, but in humanity.
110. From the same, from the same letter: The nature that was assumed suffers, but the one that assumed remains impassible. The divine Word appropriates impassibly the human passions of his own temple, I mean the cross and death and the other things that are contemplated concerning him economically, he appropriates them, himself suffering nothing. Since the twofold natures come together into one person <...>
111. From Saint Gregory bishop of Nyssa, from his letter to Philip the monk: Things that are consubstantial have identity, but things that are of different essence have the opposite. For even if by ineffable union the composite things are one, yet not by nature because of the unconfused. Therefore Christ, being two natures and truly known in them, has the monadic person of sonship.
112. From the same, from his work against Apollinarius: If therefore in opposite properties the nature of each of these is contemplated, I mean of flesh and divinity, how are the two natures one?
113. From Saint Cyril archbishop of Alexandria, from his address to the Alexandrians: I do not accept the mixed; for it is foreign to the apostolic faith and

to the orthodox tradition of Christ. For mixture works the disappearance of the natures, but the ineffable union confessed by those who think rightly preserves both natures unconfusedly and produces one Christ from both, the same having become both God and man, and not two Christs, but rather one united and not mixed. For if the two natures have been mixed into one mixture, being of different essence, neither is preserved, but both having been confused have disappeared.

114. And a little later: And the temple is dissolved at the time of the three day burial by his will; and again he raised it up, and it was united to him by ineffable and inexpressible word, not mixed in him or made fleshless, but preserving in himself the unconfused properties of the two natures that are of different essence. For surely the natures were not mixed in the ineffable and unconfused union, but they were united by ineffable and inexpressible word and are beyond all mind according to the thrice blessed and truly ecumenical teacher and archbishop of orthodox faith, our Athanasius, who shone forth in the great synod at Nicaea among the three hundred and eighteen bishops, saying: A meeting of two things dissimilar and unequal according to nature has taken place, not a mixture of ineffable God and mortal body, not according to disappearance or making fleshless, but according to ineffable and inexpressible and indescribable union; with two natures of different essence being preserved in one Christ, the Son of God, and neither being confused nor destroyed nor divided.

115. Scholion. See how the holy fathers, equally fleeing confusion and division, say that the two natures are preserved in one Christ, that is, in one hypostasis.

116. From the same, from his discourse on faith: For he never departed from his own divinity, even though he emptied himself taking the form of a servant for us, not losing the divine form, so that according to you he might readily be deified as man (may it not be!), but rather having constructed for himself a living and perfect temple in the holy virginal womb and having put it on and been united to it by ineffable word with both natures being preserved and not mixed, he came forth, appearing as man but understood as God, Jesus Christ.

117. From the same, from his letter to John of Antioch: We know that the theological men make some of the evangelical and apostolic sayings about the Lord common as concerning one person, but divide others as concerning two

natures, and the God befitting ones according to the divinity of Christ, but the humble ones according to the humanity.

118. Scholion. If truly one person in Christ after the union, then truly also two natures.
119. From the same, from his letter to Acacius bishop of Melitene: But perhaps those of the opposite party might say this: Behold clearly those making confession of the orthodox faith name two natures, but they insist that the sayings of the God speakers are divided according to their difference. Then how are these things not contrary to yours? For you could not distribute the sayings to two persons, that is hypostases. But, best men, I would say, we have written in the chapters: "If anyone distributes the sayings to two persons, that is hypostases, and attaches some as to a man conceived privately apart from the Word from God, but others as God befitting to the Word from God the Father alone, let him be condemned." But we have in no way removed the difference of sayings.
120. Scholion. You see how he does not refuse to say two natures, but to confess them privately and separately.
121. From the same, from his work on Leviticus: For he commands that two birds be taken, living and clean, so that you might understand through the birds the heavenly man who is both man and God, divided into two natures insofar as it extends, into the word befitting each. For he was the Word who shone forth from God the Father in flesh from woman, yet not being divided; for Christ is one from both.
122. From the same, from his discourse on the Trinity: Having as it were a boundary of divinity and humanity, having the meeting of both as in one and the convergence into identity of those separated by nature according to union and interweaving.
123. From the same, from his letter to Succensus: Therefore considering, as I said, the manner of the economy, we see that two natures came together with each other according to indissoluble union unchangeably and immutably; for flesh is

flesh and not divinity, even though it became the flesh of God; likewise also the Word is God and not flesh, even though he made the flesh his own economically. When we consider this, we do nothing wrong to the convergence into unity; saying that it came to be from two natures, yet after the union we do not divide the natures from each other nor do we cut the one and indivisible into two sons, but we say one Son and, as the fathers have said, one nature of the divine Word incarnate. Therefore insofar as it extends to conception and to seeing only with the eyes of the soul, in what manner the Only Begotten became man, we say the natures are two, but we confess one Son and Christ and Lord, the Word of God who became man and was incarnate.

124. Scholion. Let everyone who does not blind the mind observe the father's meaning. For he did not say "after the union" we do not confess the natures, but "we do not divide"; for he says the natures are two; "but one Son and Christ and Lord," and having said "we say one Son" he added "and one nature of the Word incarnate," here naming nature as hypostasis. For the Son is not nature, that is essence, but hypostasis. For if the Son is nature, but the Father is not Son, he will not be of the same nature as the Son; nevertheless he also indicates the nature of the flesh writing to the same Succensus; so that, even if according to you he here calls nature essence, he introduces also the nature of the flesh by saying "incarnate." He writes thus:

125. From the same, from his second letter to Succensus: For if having said "one nature of the Word" we had been silent not adding "incarnate," but as it were setting aside the economy, perhaps their argument would not be implausible to them pretending to ask: If one nature is the whole, where is the perfection in humanity or how did the essence according to us subsist? But since both the perfection in humanity and the indication of the essence according to us has been introduced by saying "incarnate," let them cease setting up a reed staff for themselves.

126. Scholion. Therefore cease, you people, "setting up a reed staff for yourselves," obeying the teacher. For see, he has clearly said that by saying "incarnate" "the perfection in humanity and the indication of the essence according to us has been introduced" and that "one nature is not the whole"; but if not one, it is entirely clear to everyone that there are two.

127. From Saint John Chrysostom, from his discourse on Lazarus: Tin partakes of lead and silver, having the appearance of silver, the nature of lead; thus also Christ, being God and man, preserves the two natures in himself, and just as he preserves the natures in himself, so also he himself is in them, not being other than them.

128. From the same, from his letter to Caesarius the monk: Thus also here, when the divine nature established in him one Son, it produced one person, the composite, known indeed by indivisible and unconfused word not in one nature alone, but in two perfect ones. For in the case of one, where is the unconfused? Where the indivisible? Where might union be spoken of? For it is impossible to be united to oneself or divided. What Hades belched forth to speak of one nature in Christ after the union? For either holding the divine they deny the human, I mean our salvation, or holding the human they make denial of the divine nature; since let them say, which has lost its own property? For if the union still remains strong, it is necessary that the properties of the union also be preserved; since this is not union, but confusion and disappearance of the natures.

