

Saint Mark Eugenikos, Metropolitan of Ephesus
Syllogistic Chapters Against the Latins
(Συλλογιστικά κεφάλαια κατά των Λατίνων)

The Syllogistic Chapters Against the Latins

1. If indeed the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, He would proceed from Them either 1) as from two Hypostases, or 2) as from their common essence, or 3) from their generating (or originating) power (ἐκ τῆς ἀροβλητικῆς δυνάμεως). If He proceeded from the Father and the Son as from two Hypostases, then clearly there would be two Sources, two Causes, and two Originators in the Divine Trinity, and thus the unity of origin and the fact that the Father is the “only Source of the divine essence” would be disrupted. But if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son in the sense of proceeding from their common essence, first of all, it has never been heard of until now that anyone would say that a third Hypostasis proceeding from two Hypostases would not proceed from them, but from some common essence. Thus, we return again to the first position. For the Hypostasis is nothing other than an essence with a personal characteristic; hence, what proceeds from the essence of one or two must also proceed from the Hypostasis or Hypostases. Moreover, the property of the Divine essence to generate is not simple, for it is the Spirit, and it generated something different from itself, though of the same common essence. But if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son in the sense of proceeding from the “generating power,” which belongs to Both, the question is: what is this “generating power,” and is it distinct from the essence, or is it one with it? And if it is one with it, then again the same arguments bring about the same absurdities. But if it is something other than the essence, then we would have to admit that something distinct from God’s essence is being attributed to Him, which, while disputed in other matters, (it would be better) for them (the Latins) to avoid these words rather than accept them as an object of confession. Moreover, would it not be absurd to consider as something distinct from the Divine essence the very thing that generates the Divine essence or Hypostasis? But, thus, they would again not avoid two origins, for what is born of a father and a mother proceeds from their generating power or their generating power, which is common to both, though differing in form; yet, nevertheless, proceeding from two Hypostases, it has two sources of its birth, and no one would deny this. So too, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the generating power of the Father and the Son, He will have two sources of His being.

“But even the creature,” they say, “existing from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, through Their creative power, came into being from the one God and Creator, and has one Source – the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. So what then prevents the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, from being from one God and Originator (Προβολῶς) and having one Source – the Father and the Son?”

(But asking the question in this way), you will free us, dearest, from the labor (of discussing it) by clearly showing the Holy Spirit to be like the creatures. For if in the same way that the creature came from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, then what else is the Holy Spirit but a creature? But turning back to you, I will say the opposite and more pious, namely – that so simply, indeed, the matter stands regarding the creature, but not so regarding the Holy Spirit. For that which in the matter of creation came from two or many persons,

can be said to have come from one, speaking in terms of the concept of creation, and this is not only in terms of Divine creation, in which the same will, desire, wisdom, power, and action (energy) exist, but also in terms of human creation and our own; for the same concept of art in its various aspects is one, and all the arts are one. Therefore, what has come from many persons can be said to have come from one, and one has a principle (source). But as for that which has being from two by nature, no one could say that it comes from one; nor is it possible – to conclude that each of these two has the same mode of producing being; moreover, the Latins themselves say that the procession of the Spirit is different – from the Father and differently – from the Son, and in the first case (they say) it is directly, and in the second – indirectly. Thus, they cannot avoid two origins unless they are willing to fall into many absurdities.

“What prevents,” they say, “it from having indeed two Sources, but of course, one under the other, so that from two it becomes one. This is what Gregory the Theologian also says: ‘Source from Source.’”

If you mean Sources in the sense that one is somewhat closer and the other farther, I don’t know, truly, whether they will form one Source – by the subordination of one to the other, or whether they will remain two, because they are really distinct from each other. Think about this. Each of these two Sources is more one than the other and less one than the other: in one case it is more, in the other – less; the one that is closer is the greater Source, because it is closer; the one that is farther is a greater source because it encompasses within it the one that is closer. If they are thus distinct, how will they become one (Source)? Who would say that Adam and Seth are one source of Enos, though each of them is a source, one closer, the other farther? How would they be one source? How can we bear the blasphemy of those who, by framing the question in this way about Sources, distance the Spirit far (*πὸρρω*) from the Hypostasis of the Father and proclaim Him as it were the “Grandson” (of the Father)? Meanwhile, it is said: “...proceeding from the Father” and “the Spirit proceeding from the Father’s Hypostasis.” But what Gregory the Theologian said, he said comparatively in relation to the creature, as if he had said: “Creator from Creator,” as “Light from Light” and “God from God,” and “Good from Good”; He is in everything, as the Father, One God with Him, and the One Light, and the One Good, and the One Source of all creation. **“All things were made through Him,”** says the Evangelist, **“and without Him nothing was made that was made”** (John 1:3). And what was not created, certainly is not from Him and not by Him, i.e., in our case – the Holy Spirit (for He is uncreated. A.A.). What precisely this was that Gregory the Theologian meant in his saying is clear from the fact that elsewhere he says: “Unbegotten and the Source and the One Who is with the Source, the One God.” He did not say: “The One Who is from the Source,” but “with the Source” – proceeding from the Unbegotten, of course. And if indeed he thought that the Son is the Source of the Spirit, where would he have had a better opportunity to express this, oh, most stubborn of men?! But neither he nor anyone else from our theologians thinks in this way, though you might waste time (trying to find and prove this).

2. "The Spirit," says the Theologian of Nyssa, "proceeds from the Father's Hypostasis"⁶. But if He proceeds also from the Son's Hypostasis, what else does this signify, except that He proceeds from two Hypostases? And if He proceeds from two Hypostases, what else is it but that He has two Beginnings of His Being? Thus, as long as the Latins assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, they will not escape dual beginnings.

3. If both the Son is from the Father and the Spirit is from the Father, then why wouldn't the Spirit also be the Son? – Because They differ from each other, according to the theologians, in their mode of being, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father in a different manner than the Son, not by birth. But if the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, is not the Son, what then is the exact distinction between the Son and the Spirit, both in relation to the Father and in relation to each other? For if from the Father proceed both the Son and the not-Son, but Something Else, it is clear that, in relation to the Father, They differ in their mode of being (substance) and are, as caused (i.e., proceeding from the Cause), in relation to the Cause. As for the relation to each other, They are distinguished by the very contradiction of their opposite statements: for it is evident that "to be the Son" is contradicted by "not to be the Son." Thus, beyond this, I say that there is no need for the opposition of states to distinguish the Son from the Spirit, since the very contradiction of their opposite statements makes the distinction (between Them).

4. Not wishing to follow the generally accepted principles of theology, but inventing others, the Latins, in support of their teaching, do not distinguish, as we do, what is common to God (for we say that one thing is common to all the Persons of the Holy Trinity, while another is personal and proper to each Divine Person), but make some other distinction, saying that one thing is "personal," another "common," and another "most common" (*κοινώτατα*, *communissinia*): that which pertains to One Person they call "personal," that which pertains to Two is "common," and that which pertains to all Three is "most common." But this distinction is unusual, and by custom is a novelty of the Latins, as is clear from their own words. But let us examine what they mean by "common" and not "most common." – This means to be from the Father, specifically "to be from the Cause" ("causality" *το αἰτιατόν*), and also "to be sent from Him" and similar expressions. But in relation to the Father and the Son, this means "sending the Spirit" and "pouring out" and "producing" and similar actions, which, they assert, is the same as "producing the Spirit by nature." Let us examine this question from the beginning. If "being from the Cause" ("causality") were something different from birth and procession when these expressions are used in relation to God, it might be appropriate to say that this is a common property for Two (the Persons of the Holy Trinity – the Son and the Holy Spirit). But if, in reasoning, it is impossible to accept "causality" by itself in relation to each of Them without implying the mode (for in one case, causality is birth, and in another, procession), then "causality" is one term that signifies two things: birth and procession; and these are the personal properties of each of Them. Therefore, what is "common" to these Two Persons in relation to the Father are precisely those personal properties by which They are distinguished both in relation to the Father and in relation to each other. As for the words "to send"

and the like, it is best to understand them as "goodwill," as Gregory the Theologian says⁷, and refer them to the First Cause of all things, so as not to be enemies of God. Furthermore, what pertains to a particular time and once, for something and for some reason, should not be attributed to Divine properties, which are eternal and without beginning. This also applies to the "sending" (of the Holy Spirit), for what pertains to a specific time and was once for something and for a reason, it would not be reasonable to attribute it as a personal property to the Father and the Son in relation to the Spirit, let alone to the eternal and pre-existent procession of the Spirit. Moreover, the Spirit is not lacking the property of "sending," as is shown in the words of the Prophet, speaking on behalf of the Son: **"The Lord sent Me and His Spirit"** (Isaiah 48:16). If this is said in the sense that, only as a Man, He could be sent (by the Holy Spirit), how can this be confirmed? – Either show it, or do not reason about it. However, the divine Chrysostom, in his homily on the Holy Spirit, shows that in this place, from the words of Isaiah's prophecy, it is said in reference to the Father, Who may be sent by the Son and the Spirit⁸. Thus, "sending" would be "most common" and not "common," as the Latins think. Also, the procession of the Spirit in eternity is not "common" for the Father and the Son. Moreover, there is nothing surprising in the relation between the Son and the Spirit, if they share something in relation to the Father, for He is not only the Beginning, but also without beginning and without cause, and They, both of Them, have the Father as their Beginning. What then shall we ascribe to the Father and the Son that would also not belong to the Spirit? – But this is not allowed by Dionysius the Great, who clearly expresses this: "What is common to the Father and the Son is also common and proper to the Holy Spirit, as the Divine Word declares"⁹. And Gregory the Theologian says: "All that the Father has, the Son has, except the Cause; all that the Son has, the Spirit has, except Birth"¹⁰.

Let us further examine the matter of "sending." The Father is known in the Old Testament; the Son, however, was to be known in the New. Therefore, the sending of the Son is as if He was revealed by the Father in the world. Then, when the Son is known, the Holy Spirit was to be known as well; therefore, it is said that from the Father and the Son, who have already been known, He is sent, that is, He is revealed. For what else can "sending" and "sending away" from the omnipresent God, Who does not change His place, mean? Therefore, Christ says: **"If I go, I will send Him to you"** (John 16:7). It is clear that this is not about eternal procession, for He did not say: "If I do not go, I will not send (*οὐ προβάλλω*) the Comforter; but if I go, then I will send," but rather, "if I will be taken from your eyes, I will show you His grace and power." Moreover, since changing places is foreign to the concept of God (for this is the nature of bodies), if it is said about the "sending" of the Son, it is spoken in the sense of His coming into the world in the flesh. For **"God sent His Son into the world, born of a woman"** (Gal. 4:4); but when it is said about the "sending" of the Holy Spirit, Christ signifies His grace and action (energy), not the Hypostasis Itself. And that grace and action are one, but the Hypostasis is something different, the divine Chrysostom testifies, saying in his homilies on the Gospel of John: "The grace of the Spirit is sometimes called fire, sometimes water, signifying that these are not names of the essence, but of the action (energy)." And again:

"Here the 'Spirit' should be understood in the sense of 'action' (energy): for it is divided, and it is sent; it is sent by the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, showing the common action of the Trinity, or rather the identical one"¹¹. Thus, there is nothing that is common to the Father and the Son that is not also common to the Spirit, as the famous Dionysius shows.

5. "The Spirit," says the Theologian of Nyssa, "proceeds from the Hypostasis of the Father." Who does not understand from this that the procession of the Spirit is an inherent, personal property of the Father? For, just as when we say that the Hypostasis of the Only-Begotten (Son) became incarnate, we express that this is not common to the Father and the Spirit, so also, when we say that the Hypostasis of the Father produces the Holy Spirit, we do not attribute this equally to the Son. Therefore, let the Latins either point to someone among the theologians who says that this happens also from the Hypostasis of the Son, or let it be clear from this that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father.

6. Having in the confession of the Holy Spirit as third (in order among the Persons of the Holy Trinity), after the Father and the Son, the Latins believe that on the basis of this order, they can prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son. For, if He did not have a relation to the Son in respect of His being, they say, He would not be counted as third, and would not have His place after Him. But, oh, venerable ones, I would say to you in answer to this that if the Son is second after the Father (for this is required by the order itself, and nothing else lies between Them), who else could the Holy Spirit be but third? For, undeniably, He is not first; second, by necessity, is the Son; and third, therefore, is the Holy Spirit, truly being the Fulfillment of this blessed Trinity. Therefore, I believe that this order was preserved by the theologians, so that, if the Spirit were placed immediately after the Father, people would not consider Him to be the Son; for when they speak absolutely, they also remove the very order. "For there is no, they say, ordinal reckoning in the Holy Trinity not because there is no ordinal reckoning in Her, but because She is above it"¹², and also: "The Same Ones (the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity) are both counted and reckoned and numbered under"¹³. So, how does this order serve your position, when it is not necessary that something which follows in order should have its being from that which precedes it? Let us also bring you Basil the Great, who speaks on this very issue: "Since," he says, "the Holy Spirit, from Whom all gifts of grace proceed to the created world, depends on the Son, with Whom He is directly known; but from the Father, He depends as the Cause of being, from Whom He proceeds; the sign of His personal hypostatic property is this: to be after the Son and with Him to be known and from the Father to have being"¹⁴. Do you hear this heavenly herald, what he says? – "From the Son," he says, "He depends," i.e., He is closely connected with Him; not that He proceeds from Him, but that He is known with Him directly as from the Father having being; "for the middle position of the Only-Begotten," as his brother Gregory of Nyssa says, "while preserving for Him the Only-Begottenness, does not remove the Spirit from the natural relationship with the Father." And further: "The recognitional sign of the Holy Spirit is this: to be after the Son and to be known

with Him and from the Father to have being"¹⁵. What could be clearer or wiser than these words, or more in agreement with our teaching?!

7. The Latins think that something great speaks in favor of their opinion in that it is said of the Holy Spirit that He is the "Spirit of the Son," but I refer this also to the same as "proper to the Son" and "not alien to the Son," and to similar expressions. But does it follow from this that He proceeds from Him? The first Theodore would not allow this¹⁶, for by this he would introduce a blasphemous and ungodly teaching. Therefore, the divine Cyril also speaks in these words: "In no way do we allow altering a single word in what is there (in the Nicene Creed), nor to disturb a single syllable. For it was not they who spoke, but through them the Holy Spirit spoke, Who proceeds from the Father and God, but is not alien to the Son, according to the nature of the essence"¹⁷. Do you hear in what sense it is said – "the Spirit of the Son" and "proper to Him" and "not alien"? – "According to the nature of the essence" – He says – namely, as consubstantial with Him... And Basil the Great also says in the 18th chapter to Amphilocheus: "It is said: the Spirit of Christ – as united to Him by nature"¹⁸. So, what better interpreter of the apostolic and his own words shall we seek, apart from those divine Teachers?

8. That after the Resurrection the Lord gives the Spirit to the Disciples through a breath, the Latins explain by saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him. But that it was not the very essence of the Spirit that was given then through the breath is evident from the fact that at that time the Holy Spirit had not yet come. "If I do not go...," says Christ, "the Comforter will not come to you" (John 16:7). And the divine Chrysostom testifies in his commentary on John, saying: "Some say that Christ did not give the Spirit to the Disciples then, but by His breath made them capable of receiving it. However, no one will err if he says that they did indeed receive some spiritual authority and grace to forgive sins, which is why He added: 'Whoever sins you forgive, they are forgiven' showing thereby what kind of action (energy) He gives: for grace is immeasurable, and the gift is manifold. For, behold, even from Moses, receiving the Spirit, God gave it to others, and in the Lord Christ, all the grace of the Spirit rested. 'For God does not give the Spirit by measure.'" Therefore, even from Him, He gave and by it He performed miracles. "O Spirit of God," He says, "I will cast out demons"¹⁹.

9. Then, what is said, that the Holy Spirit is the "Image of the Son," they draw to support their dogma. – To this we say that there is absolutely no necessity, whether in art or in the nature of things, for an image to have as its cause the one it represents²⁰. For although it is said that the Son is the "Image of the Father," it is not in the sense that He relates to Him as the Cause, but in the sense that He represents and depicts Him within Himself, as He says to Philip in one place, "He who has seen Me has seen the Father" (John 14:9). Thus, the Holy Spirit is the "Image of the Son" not in the sense that He is the Cause of the Spirit, but in the sense that the Son could not be known otherwise except through the Holy Spirit. "For... no one," says the Apostle, "can say that Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12:3). And then: "He will glorify Me, for He will take of what is Mine and declare it to you" (John 16:14). Explaining this, the divine Chrysostom says: "That

is, He will declare to you what is in harmony with My words. For what is Mine is the Father's; He, by declaring to you from what is the Father's, will declare it from what is Mine"²¹. For just as the Son, having come to fulfill the Old Law, i.e., to perfect it and add what was lacking in it because of the weakness of the hearers, thereby glorified the Father who gave this Law (For "I have glorified You on earth," He says, "I have finished the work You gave Me to do" (John 17:4)), so the Holy Spirit, in turn, accomplishes the work of the Son. "I have many things to say to you," says (Christ to the Disciples), "but you cannot bear them now: however, when He, the Spirit of Truth, comes, He will guide you into all truth: for He will not speak of Himself, but whatever He hears, He will speak, and He will tell you of things to come" (John 16:12–14). "From what is Mine," He says, "He will take and declare to you," namely, that which is lacking. And this is the same work as the work of the Father, for "all that the Father has is Mine" (John 16:15). Thus, the Holy Spirit is the Image of the Son in the sense that He declares what belongs to the Son and glorifies the Son, receiving from His work and perfecting it, just as Christ Himself accomplished the work of the Father.

10. On "per Filium" in relation to the Procession of the Holy Spirit They believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds just as much from the Son as from the Father, asserting that the phrase "per" signifies the same as "ex" in Scripture. Indeed, "per" is equivalent where the discourse concerns creation, especially when it is applied separately to the Son apart from the Father. For instance, "All things," they say, "were made through Him." However, the procession of the Spirit is never stated separately from the Father; rather, it is said to originate from the Father and to be brought about through the Son. It is clear, therefore, that the phrase "through the Son" signifies something different than "from the Son," although, in truth, it does not even speak of procession but of bestowal. For John of Damascus says: "We name the Spirit as indeed the Spirit of the Son, but we do not say 'from the Son'; rather, we confess that it is made manifest through the Son and is imparted to us through Him." This distinction clearly demonstrates that the phrase "through the Son" signifies something entirely different from what the Latins mean by it. And if it were sometimes said in relation to the essential procession of the Spirit, we again invite the theologians to interpret their own words. Gregory of Nyssa states in his writings against Eunomius: "The Holy Spirit is understood conjointly with the Son, without being considered posterior to the Son, so that the Only Begotten is never thought of without the Spirit; rather, He also has the principle of His existence from the God of all things, from whom the Only Begotten Light shines forth through the true Light." Here, the words "without being considered posterior" mean the same as "through the Son," which elsewhere Gregory explicitly explains as equivalent to "with the Son." He writes: "Through Him and with Him, the Holy Spirit proceeds, before any intervening void or unsubstantial medium can be imagined." Chrysostom, while explaining the apostolic phrase, "That now through the Church the manifold wisdom of God might be made known to the rulers and authorities," understands "through the Church" as equivalent to "together with the Church." For the Church does not teach the angels.

In the same way, the phrase "through the Son" must be understood here. For the matter stands thus: When the Holy Spirit is said to proceed essentially from the Father, the addition of "through the Son" ensures that He is not regarded as another Son. The Father requires a Son corresponding to Himself, and thus the inclusion of the Son maintains the unique property of the Only Begotten and does not exclude the Spirit's natural relation to the Father. Gregory again says:

"The Son is called proximate to the First, for the name 'Son' implies the Father; however, the Holy Spirit is not described as proximate to the First but rather through that which is proximate to the First." This demonstrates the mutual relation and communion between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, as well as the equal honor and shared nature of their procession from the Father. Thus, if the Father were called the Progenitor, the Spirit would be proximate to the Progenitor, and the Son, through the one who is proximate to the Progenitor—that is, the Spirit. Both proceed from the Father jointly and with equal honor. Therefore, the preposition "through" provides no support to the Latins for establishing their opinion. In fact, it shows the opposite. To confirm this further, let the most holy Maximus, a witness and confessor of the truth, testify. He writes in his epistle to Marinus, a presbyter of Cyprus: "The synodal letter of the most holy Pope of that time was not criticized by the citizens of the imperial city in all the chapters you mentioned, but only in two, one concerning theology, namely, that he said the Spirit proceeds also from the Son, and the other concerning the economy, namely, that he said the Lord was not without original sin as far as His humanity is concerned. Regarding the first, they cited statements from the Roman Fathers and Cyril of Alexandria in his commentary on the Gospel of John, from which it is shown that they did not make the Son the cause of the Spirit's procession (for they recognize the Father as the sole cause of the Son by generation and of the Spirit by procession), but rather that they signified that the Spirit proceeds through the Son, thereby demonstrating the shared substance and the absence of any difference in nature." Here, the Latins proceed contrary to the illustrious Maximus. For he, along with the Romans of his time and even the Pope, transfers the term "from" into "through" and states that this signifies the absence of any difference in substance. However, the Latins, disregarding the words of the Fathers and treating them with indifference, consider "through the Son" to mean the same as "from the Son," attributing the cause of the Spirit to the Son, which the Fathers explicitly denied. What could be more shameless in such contention?

11. Concerning the Attributes of the Divine Nature. Certain attributes that pertain to the divine nature are always spoken of in the singular, even though they are understood in the three persons. For example: God, Creator, King, Good, and similar terms (for we say one God, one Creator, one King, one Good, referring to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit). Other attributes, however, are always expressed in the plural, even if they are common only to two persons, such as "to be from a cause," which is spoken of the Son and the Spirit. For we say that two are "from a cause," not one. Since this is so, and the Latins attribute the principle of divinity to two persons—namely, the Father and the Son—we must ask them to which of the two they assign this principle. If they say it belongs to the latter (the Son), the absurdity will be evident, for there would then be two

principles, just as there are two who are "from the principle," thereby opening the way to a duality of principles, and the celebrated unity of the principle would be abolished. But if they assign it to the former (the Father), a question arises as to how this can be. For if these things are both common and natural, they equally pertain to the three persons. Furthermore, even on this reasoning, they will fall into the same difficulty: the one principle, insofar as it is both generator and producer (that is, the Father alone), is not the same numerically as the one principle insofar as it is producer only (that is, the Father and the Son together, as they claim). Thus, in this way too, there are two causes and two principles, and they are surrounded on all sides by the duality of the principle.

The Principle of Divinity and Its Application to Father and Son

The principle of divinity, as the Latins themselves concede, applies differently to the Father and the Son, not in the same manner. It pertains to the Father insofar as He is both generator and producer, and to the Son insofar as He is producer only. However, the difference, according to the Fathers, implies a numerical distinction. Therefore, two principles of divinity are posited, and thus the unity of the principle is abolished by the Latins.

Thomas Aquinas and the Distinction of Divine Persons: Thomas, the doctor of the Latins, considers that some form of opposition is required to distinguish the divine persons. He states that since material distinction has no place in divine matters, the opposition of relation is the sole basis for distinguishing the persons, as no other opposition is found. However, it must be shown that the opposition of contradiction is more suitable for distinguishing them, as all theologians agree that this is the only way the divine persons are separated. First, it is evident in divine matters that for any person, their mode of existence is sufficient to distinguish them from another. Moreover, theologians define the modes of existence in the divine persons as "unbegotten," "begotten," and "proceeding." Or, more universally, as "without a principle" and "from a principle," which, as is clear, are in contradictory opposition to one another—for "to have a principle" and "to lack a principle" are contradictory. Thus, the Father is distinguished from the Son and the Spirit by this contradictory opposition. The Son and the Spirit are similarly distinguished from each other by their proper modes of existence. For to originate through generation and to originate not through generation but through procession are their respective modes of subsistence and are mutually opposed in contradiction. Gregory the Theologian affirms this: "Proceeding indeed from the Father, but not in the manner of the Son; for it is not through generation, but through procession." Therefore, this distinction of contradiction, being in agreement with the truth and with all theologians, is indeed suitable for distinguishing all the divine persons. As for the distinction proposed by Thomas, which he considers the sole appropriate method—the distinction of relation—it separates the Father from those who proceed from Him (namely, the Son and the Spirit) but does not in any way separate the other persons from one another. For neither of the two is the principle of the other, nor is such a distinction supported by any theologian. On the contrary, the Fathers state: "The Father is the sole cause," as John of Damascus declares. Gregory of Nyssa also writes: "We understand another distinction in that which proceeds from the cause." This distinction is different from that which exists between the cause and that which is from the cause. Indeed, the illustrious Dionysius

pronounces it impious to say or think anything beyond what the sacred Scriptures, divinely revealed to us, proclaim.

12. The Principle of Divinity According to the Latins: The principle of divinity, as the Latins themselves have admitted, corresponds differently to the Father and the Son, not in one and the same way. Rather, it pertains to the Father as He is the Begetter and Emanator, but to the Son as He is only the Emanator. However, the difference between these, according to the Fathers, introduces a duality of principles. Thus, two principles of divinity are granted, and thereby, the unity of the principle is rejected by the Latins.

13. On the Distinction of Divine Persons: Thomas, the teacher of the Latins, held that some opposition is required to distinguish the divine persons. He asserted that, because a material distinction has no place in the divine, the opposition of relation alone serves as the reason for distinguishing the persons. He claimed no other opposition exists. Therefore, it must be shown that the opposition of contradiction is more suitable for distinguishing them, as all theologians agree that the divine persons are distinguished from one another solely by this kind of opposition. First, it is clear that in the divine, the mode of subsistence of any person is sufficient to distinguish it from another. Furthermore, theologians establish the modes of subsistence in the divine persons as unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding—or, more universally, as either lacking a principle or being from a principle. These modes, as is evident, are mutually opposed in contradiction. For to have a principle and not to have a principle are contradictory. Thus, the Father is distinguished from the Son and the Spirit by this contradictory opposition. Likewise, the Son and the Spirit are distinguished from one another by their own proper modes of subsistence. For to originate through generation and to originate not through generation but through procession are modes of subsistence mutually opposed in contradiction. Gregory the Theologian affirms this about the Spirit: "Proceeding from the Father, but not in the manner of the Son; for it is not through generation, but through procession." This distinction of contradiction, therefore, is entirely consonant both with truth itself and with the consensus of all theologians. It is certainly suitable for distinguishing all the divine persons. The distinction introduced by Thomas as the sole appropriate one—namely, the distinction of relation—indeed separates the Father from those who proceed from Him, namely, the Son and the Spirit. However, it does not in any way distinguish the other persons from one another. For neither of them is the principle of the other. Furthermore, such a distinction is not known to have been applied by any theologian but is entirely contrary to their teaching. Damascene states: "The Father alone is the cause." Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa says: "And again, we understand another distinction of that which is from the cause." Here he refers to a distinction other than that which exists between the cause and what is from the cause. Finally, the illustrious Dionysius declares it wholly impious to say or think anything beyond what the sacred Scriptures, divinely delivered to us, proclaim.

14. If originating from the principle pertains differently to the Son and the Spirit (for the former originates through generation, and the latter through procession), this difference, according to the

Fathers, entails a numerical distinction. Thus, there are certainly two who originate from the principle, namely the Son and the Spirit. In precisely the same manner, if the principle of divinity does not pertain equally to the Father and the Son (for the Father is both begetter and emanator, while the Son is only an emanator), there will necessarily be two principles of divinity. Since difference is the cause of number—that is, duality—this conclusion aligns with the judgment of the theologians.

15. If it is more exalted for God to be the cause of divinity than to be the cause of created things, how is it that the Holy Spirit, who according to the Latins does not partake of what is more exalted in the Father and the Son, is not thereby inferior in dignity and divinity? If being the cause of divinity is a communicable reality, why does the Spirit not partake in this role? But if it is entirely incommunicable, as it is a property of the Father—just like being without a principle—the Son could in no way partake in it either, despite the Latins ardently maintaining otherwise.

16. We, in denying that the Son is the cause of the Spirit, in no way make Him less in dignity than God the Father. For we assert that being the cause of divinity is not a communicable reality, just as the Father's property of being without a principle or His very paternity is incommunicable. The Latins, however, believing that this causality is communicable but denying it to the Spirit, are compelled by necessity to render Him inferior in divinity and dignity to the Father and the Son. For this reason, and for others, they are frequently driven into blasphemies against the Holy Spirit.

17. If the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, He does so either insofar as they are distinct or insofar as they are united. If He proceeds insofar as they are distinct, then, since they are distinct in hypostases and are two, the Holy Spirit proceeds from two hypostases and, consequently, from two principles, as must necessarily follow. If, however, He proceeds insofar as they are united, then He no longer proceeds from them as distinct. Thus, He does not proceed from the hypostases of the Father and the Son—neither from the hypostasis of the Father nor from the hypostasis of the Son. Gregory of Nyssa, in one place, affirms the former to be true and the latter to be false, saying explicitly: “The Spirit proceeds from the paternal hypostasis.” Furthermore, what does it mean to say that the Spirit proceeds insofar as the Father and the Son are united? Perhaps they will claim it refers to the nature or to a spirative power. But if He proceeds from the nature, then He proceeds from Himself, since the nature is common to all three persons. If, however, He proceeds from a spirative power, the Spirit Himself would also need to possess this power. For, as Dionysius and Basil, those eminent theologians, affirm: “What is common to the Father and the Son is also common to the Spirit.” Yet the Latins provide a peculiar and even ridiculous response: they claim that the Spirit would indeed possess such a power if it were not impossible for Him to emit Himself. This is no different than someone, upon realizing that their argument implies a man is a stone, refusing to correct the reasoning and instead asserting that a man would indeed have been a stone if it were not impossible for a rational animal to be inanimate and immobile.

18. Whatever pertains to God must properly, uniquely, solely, always, and entirely pertain to Him. The natural and shared attributes belong equally to all three persons, while hypostatic and personal

properties belong uniquely to each individual person. Nothing in God is accidental, adventitious, or subsequently acquired; everything that pertains to Him is proper and singular. Thus, when God is described as good, wise, God, king, creator, invisible, immortal, and eternal, these attributes are singularly and properly ascribed to Him as they relate to creation. As the Apostle says: “To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only wise God” (1 Tim. 1:17); and again, “Who alone has immortality and dwells in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6:16). Similarly, whatever is said of any one of the three persons is said singularly and properly in relation to the others. Hence, the Father is called Father uniquely and solely; the Son is called Son uniquely and solely; and the Spirit is likewise called the Holy Spirit uniquely and solely. In the same way, the Father is uniquely and solely unoriginated, or without principle, while the other persons are solely and uniquely from the principle. Since there are only two categories—principle and that which is from the principle—if the Father alone has the role of principle, then the other persons must solely and uniquely be from the principle. Note that the term "solely" is always used in relation to an attribute: the Father is solely Father and not also Son; the Son is solely Son and not also Father; and the Holy Spirit is solely Spirit and not Father or Son. Similarly, the Father is solely without principle, not being caused or from a principle, and thus He is also solely the cause. The other persons, by contrast, are solely from the principle without being a principle themselves. If either the Son or the Spirit were also a principle, the exclusivity of the Father as the sole principle would be eliminated, violating what has already been necessarily demonstrated. For opposition, as even the Latins concede, is the basis of distinction, and two opposites cannot coexist in one and the same divine person. One of them would then not properly exist, and consequently, it would not exist at all. This is consistent with the statements of the saints, such as Damascene, who writes: “The Father alone is the cause”; and Theodore the Studite, who declares: “The sole begetter of the only-begotten Son is the Father alone; the sole light of the sole light is the splendor; and the Holy Spirit, the sole Spirit of the sole God, is the Lord of Lords, the one who truly exists.” Thus, the Son cannot have the role of cause, as He must solely be from the cause, just as the Spirit is solely the Spirit of the sole God the Father.

19. Let us ask the Latins: If you claim that the Son possesses whatever belongs to the Father, why do you not also make the Father the Son? They respond that such a claim would contradict the Son’s identity, as the distinction between the persons is based on opposition, not confusion, to avoid conflating them. If, then, the divine persons are distinguished by opposition, as you believe, most wise ones, and if opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it follows that being the cause and being from the cause cannot both apply to the same person. These are opposites; thus, the Son cannot simultaneously be from the cause and also the cause, just as the Son cannot simultaneously be the Father. What response can be given to this? They might claim that the Father would also be the Son if there were someone who could refer to Him as Son. What an absurdity! Here we encounter the same sophistry once again. Such reasoning is akin to asserting that every human being is begotten and then claiming that Adam, too, would have been begotten if only he had had a father.

20. The Latins assert that when speaking of the divine persons, there is no difference in Scripture between the prepositions *per* (through) and *ex* (from). Consequently, where it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son, they substitute *from* the Son. But we ask them to clearly demonstrate whether they have ever found in Scripture any instance where the Holy Spirit is said to proceed through the Father. For if the expressions are equivalent and interchangeable, this should also have been said, just as it is commonly expressed concerning creation: “Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ, through the will of God” (2 Cor. 1:1), or again, “Paul, an apostle not of men, nor through man, but through Jesus Christ and God the Father” (Gal. 1:1), or elsewhere, “I have gotten a man through God” (Gen. 4:1, LXX), and yet again, “Is it not through God that their interpretation comes?” (Gen. 40:8). In summary, if everything said about the divine Spirit equally refers to both the Father and the Son, then we would need to attribute all things equally to both and profess the procession equally from both. However, if certain things are attributed specifically to the Father, others specifically to the Son, and some equally to both, the Latins must take care not to confuse and mix these distinctions indiscriminately. For instance, it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son, supplies gifts to creation through the Son, abides in the Son, and rests in the Son. However, it is never said that the Spirit proceeds through the Father, is supplied through the Father, abides in the Father, or rests in the Father. Rather, it is said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father. Therefore, let what has been handed down be faithfully expressed, and what is omitted in tradition remain omitted. The idea that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son should be dismissed as a foreign and unsubstantiated concept.

21. When I consider the language that the saints consistently use regarding the Holy Spirit, it seems to me that the supporters of the Latin position fail even to grasp the logical structure of the discourse, let alone the divine dogmas or the intent of the Fathers, who, aided by the Spirit, investigated matters pertaining to the Spirit. What, indeed, can they say when the holy doctors distinguish the relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son through differing conjunctions? For instance, one says: “The Spirit also derives His existence from the God of all, but presents Himself to humanity through the Son.” Another states: “He proceeds from the Father and abides in the Son.” Yet another asserts: “He depends on the Son, with whom He is comprehended without distance by the mind, but His existence is suspended from the Father as the principle, from whom He also proceeds.” Another declares: “He proceeds indeed from God the Father, but is not alien to the Son in terms of substance.” Would the Latins still dare to assert that there is one single procession of the Spirit from both? What, then, would be the purpose of this distinction in speech, whereby different aspects are attributed to the Father and the Son? For who among the faithful has ever said that created things were made by God the Father and then adorned by the Son, when both equally, as one God and Creator, granted existence and embellishment to all things? Would it not be absurd to separate such expressions if the terms were equivalent? It would be as ridiculous as someone saying, “The heavens were established by God the Father, but compacted by the Son.” Indeed, anyone who uses such a divided formulation inevitably separates one from the other, just as

someone saying, "Paul was from Tarsus, but Peter was from Palestine," does not ascribe both qualities to either individual. Similarly, when one says that the incarnation occurred by the will of the Father, through the operation of the Son, and with the cooperation of the Spirit, each is attributed a unique role, and the others are excluded from it. It is therefore clear, even from such divided formulations, that it does not belong to the Father to be the one through whom the Spirit is supplied, nor to the Son to be the one from whom the Spirit proceeds.

22. When God spoke in the divine Scripture, knowing in advance the wickedness of humankind, He preemptively restrained any potential weeds of false teaching that might be sown by the enemy. He left no word incomplete; if a phrase seemed insufficient, He completed it elsewhere, or if it might give rise to error, He corrected it in another place, so that the saying of the wise would be fulfilled: "All things are right to the wise and those who find knowledge are straightforward." First, the phrase "The Father is greater than I" was uttered, which was necessary for those who would attempt to diminish the Son's paternal dignity. Yet, this was balanced elsewhere when Jesus said, "I and the Father are one," and again, "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me"; and the Apostle also states, "He did not consider equality with God something to be grasped." Furthermore, the passage from Proverbs, "The Lord created me," which was used by Wisdom, is clarified in the subsequent verses, for it is said, "Before the mountains, I was brought forth," referring to the creation and birth of the Son according to the flesh, and also the eternal generation. Similarly, when in the Gospels Jesus calls His Father the "only true God" (for He says, "That they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent"), to avoid the perception that He was excluding Himself from true deity, John, the same one who wrote these words, says in his epistle, "This is the true God and eternal life." Likewise, the Spirit is said to belong to the Father in terms of natural relation and the gift given to us (for He says, "It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you"), but to prevent anyone from thinking that the Spirit is alien to the Son, or that He is not also given by the Son, the Spirit is also called the Spirit of the Son. The Apostle states, "God has sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts." Now, if the phrase "proceeds from the Father" had meant that the Spirit also proceeded from the Son, surely the Scripture would have corrected this elsewhere, as the one who cares for the salvation of humanity would have made this known, either through Himself or through His disciples. Since nothing is said, it is clear that He did not mention it because the situation is not as such. Therefore, John of Damascus says, "We call the Spirit the Spirit of the Son, but we do not say that He proceeds from the Son." And the divine Apostle says, "Even if an angel from heaven should preach to you a gospel other than what we have preached to you, let him be anathema."

23. The name of the Father, when applied to God, encompasses all His properties; for it includes the concept of being unbegotten, as Basil the Great rightly explains, since the one who is properly Father and alone is not begotten by another. In relation to the Spirit, the Father is called the originator, according to the Scripture that says, "From the Father comes the light." If, therefore, the Son does not share in the name of the Father, neither will He share in the spirative property with

the Father, lest the Son appear to be both a father and a son, as we humans are accustomed to think. Thus, the Spirit is considered as the Son's nephew.

24. The Latins assert that the Father and the Son are one cause of the Holy Spirit. Let us then ask them: Just as the Father alone is the single cause of the Holy Spirit, are the Father and the Son one cause, or is it otherwise? If they say yes, then, since the Father alone is the one person, it would follow that both the Father and the Son are one person, thus leading to a Sabellian contraction. But if they state it differently, claiming the Father alone as the single cause in one sense and the Father and Son together in another, they must beware that they are, perhaps unwittingly, asserting two causes and two principles.

25. The Latins assert a general principle of distinction, applying it to all things that can be distinguished, claiming that they can be separated either according to matter or according to one of the oppositions. Indeed, although such a doctrine might be confirmed in created things, whether it must be transferred to divine matters is questionable, as divine realities do not fall under the same reasoning as created ones. Let us, however, set aside this issue for the moment and demonstrate, based on the purpose at hand, that this doctrine is neither necessary nor completely true even in relation to things that pertain to us and of which we have some knowledge—namely, created things. This is not only because the Latins present as universal something that is not universal, but also because, in cases where material or oppositional distinction is considered, neither the matter nor the opposition themselves cause the distinction. Rather, it is the things already distinguished that follow as connected elements, which indicates that things are distinguished in this way without the distinction itself being the cause.

Here is how the matter stands. Matter by itself is indivisible; for just as it exists without quality, it also exists without quantity. What lacks quantity is indivisible, and what cannot be divided cannot be distinguished. But what, by its own nature, neither divides nor distinguishes itself—how could it provide the cause for distinction? Furthermore, if a body is composed of matter, and according to the same matter, it is divided into certain quantities, then each part is taken and placed separately to show that it is this substance, not some other. This is called a material distinction. However, this does not make matter the cause of the distinction, since it is undifferentiated by itself. Instead, material division arises, through which quantity is added to what is distinct. Similarly, form is not the cause of the operation in bodies, for it lacks operation by its own nature, but it works in conjunction with matter. Nor is it true that a property that pertains to a composite because of the elements that constitute it is directly attributable to those elements. Therefore, form is not the principle of operation, even though the operation of bodies corresponds to the form, and neither is matter the cause of distinction, even though in composites, distinction is based on matter. We should not attribute the cause of distinction to matter, but we can rightly ascribe the cause to material division in things that consist of matter.

Additionally, in things that lack matter, it should be determined whether opposition is necessary for distinction. Things in the same kind are said to be divided by opposition when they are greatly

different or when they are separated by substantial differences. For example, in color, white and black are very distant and are even called opposites; in animals, the rational and non-rational are separated—humans and horses, for instance. Therefore, the question is whether those things are distinguished from one another where there is opposition or contrariety, or whether even those things placed in the middle between them are also divided. Certainly, they are distinguished as well, for all things depend on their common kind, and they are distinguished according to their specific distinguishing factors, even if they are not vastly different from each other, or even if they share contrary qualities. What, indeed, is the opposition between dark and red in color? What between a horse and an ox in animals? Since they are divided from the same genus, they are distinguished from the common genus, and as they are opposed to each other, they are also mutually distinguished by their respective qualities, though these distinctions are not easily specified. Therefore, opposition should not be taken as the cause of distinction, for in many cases, it does not even have a place. Rather, it is division itself that precedes and causes distinction, as it divides everything from the same genus by its specific qualities.

Indeed, the same principle of distinction applies to individuals. For what else can distinguish them if not matter? What if no opposition can be found in them? Will they not still be distinguished from one another? Certainly, many such monstrosities have been produced by Latin reasoning. However, even here, division brings about distinction by separating each thing according to its own qualities. It is not surprising that we may not easily identify the specific qualities that distinguish different species, but it is acknowledged that more than one thing can be divided from the same source. This could not happen unless they were distinguished both from each other and from their source. Therefore, the primary and most essential cause of distinction is division, not matter or opposition, as these are neither universally nor inherently apt for distinguishing. In fact, the very name of division, being related to distinction, clearly shows that division is the cause of distinction.

Moreover, the Latins claim that the opposition which they call "relative" is most suitable for distinguishing things. However, this is clearly baseless and does not even require demonstration. For, in the first place, such opposition is posterior in origin to nature itself. A person is first a man, and later a father; similarly, quantity is first possessed, and then a double amount is considered. Furthermore, relative terms involve a mutual implication; this is more about connection than distinction. Additionally, both terms can, in the same or different ways, converge, which is far from what constitutes a distinction. Thus, the commonly used Latin reasoning for distinguishing things based on matter or opposition is futile and reckless.

Let us now apply our doctrine to divine matters, where it fits better than the view supported by the Latins. The division in the divine persons closely resembles progression from the same source: division is itself a form of progression. Just as things divided from the same source, although they have not yet reached opposite positions, fall into categories that separate them from each other and from their source (for they could not be divided otherwise), so too in the divine persons, the Son and the Spirit are distinguished by the fact that they proceed from the same Father in different ways.

In this way, they are distinct both from the Father and from each other: from the Father, because they proceed from Him (everything that proceeds from something is, by nature, distinct from that from which it proceeds); and from each other, because they proceed in different manners, though this is completely unknown and ineffable to us. Therefore, opposition is not needed to distinguish the Son and the Spirit, as Thomas assumes. Even in created things, opposition is unnecessary. It suffices that the two are distinguished by their differing modes of progression. This is consistent with both the divine realities themselves and the teachings of the saints, as they have fully handed down this distinction. As Damascene the theologian writes in the eighth chapter of his *Theological Exposition*: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, not by generation, but by procession; a different mode of existence, incomprehensible and unknown, just like the generation of the Son." Gregory the Theologian likewise says, "The properties of the Father are that He is understood and said to be without origin and the origin; of the Son, that He is begotten; of the Spirit, that He proceeds."


26. As no divine persons are supplied by the Father in their existence, since they all have their origin and perfection from Him, neither does one supply the production of the other. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not a partner or associate with the Father in generating the Son, nor is the Son a partner with the Father in sending the Spirit. The action of generating and sending is perfect and singular, emanating solely from the Father to produce one.

27. Just as that which operates definitively also manifests its action definitively, so too does a defined action refer back to a defined agent. Thus, if generating and sending are the defined actions of one Father, sending, but not generating, is the defined action of the joint operation of the Father and the Son, according to the Latin view. However, generating is equally the defined action of the Son, just as proceeding is the defined action of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, there would be four distinct agents in the divine persons, each acting definitively: one Father, one producer distinct from the other, one Son, and one Holy Spirit. But four distinct agents producing four distinct actions cannot possibly result in the unity of the Trinity. The Latins, therefore, fail in their claim of faith in the Trinity, as they have mutilated it according to their own opinions.

28. The principle of the divine nature, according to the Latins, is either the hypostases of the Father and the Son, or their nature or some action. If it is the hypostases, how can there not be two principles (for there are two hypostases)? In the same way that if there are two hypostases, they bring about two effects. But if it is their nature, then it must be fully adequate, as nothing more can be added. For the Spirit is not a principle. If, then, something belongs to the nature of the Father and the Son, that would be the principle of the deity; and conversely, if something is the principle of the deity, it must be the nature of the Father and the Son. Therefore, the Holy Spirit will be as alien to the nature of the Father and the Son as He is to the principle. And do the Latins still accuse the Macedonians? If, finally, it is some action, we must determine whether it is one action or two. If two, then there must again be two principles; if one, we must also ask whether it is personal or natural. If it is natural, the Spirit will be alien to any natural action and thus to the nature. If,

however, it is personal, it will be specifically referred to one person. For it is absolutely necessary that a single personal action, if directed towards one effect, emanates from one person alone. Therefore, it is in vain that the Latins attribute a single spirative action and property to both the Father and the Son.

29. A single, simple action, which tends towards one effect, refers to a single agent. Let the agent be A, and the action it carries out directed towards C. There is a single, simple action between them, namely AC. I claim that the agent A is singular in number. It cannot be the case that there are two agents, AB. This B will either be part of A or placed separately. If it is part of A, it will not be something other than A, but one with it, and thus the entire system will be singular. If B is placed separately, imagine it first below. The action flowing from A to C will either be even and continuous or uneven. If it is even and continuous, since it is singular in number, it is clear that B, placed in the middle, will bring no help to the action, but will either do nothing or at least not act on C in the same way as A. However, if the action is uneven, it is evident that the action will gain strength, just as a river grows stronger when a stream flows into it. This is not the property of a singular, continuous action, for there is an interruption between the action and the addition of B's contribution, thus two actions are formed, not one. The same will happen if B is placed above A. In this case, it becomes even more evident that there are two actions: one from A to C and another from B to the same C. Therefore, it is impossible for a single action to refer to two agents, just as it is impossible for a single line to have two endpoints on either side. Thus, a singular action refers to a singular agent. Now, let us assume that the agent A is both the Father and the producer, and that C is the subsistence of the Holy Spirit, while the spirative action is placed between them, a single, simple, eternal action. Then let B be the Son. It is evident, therefore, that the single personal action by which the Spirit is sent refers to the Father, but not to the Son. This is what Aristotle clearly states in the fifth book of *Natural Inquiry*, saying: "A single action is that of one agent." And in the ninth book of the same work, he adds: "Where there is one motion, there is also one mover; if one thing moves another, the motion is not continuous."




30. It is fitting that the Father is the common source of the Son and the Holy Spirit, as Gregory the Theologian teaches. However, if the Son is indeed immediately from the Father, without any other cause, and the Spirit is not immediate but has the Son as its cause, then it is no longer common for them both to be from the Father, as they are not equally participants in this origin. Therefore, either the Theologian must be lying, or if the other view is to be said, then the Latins are completely mistaken when they attribute the cause of the Spirit to the Son.

31. The theologians assert that the mode of existence and property of the Holy Spirit is not simply to proceed but to proceed from the Father. But if this is the mode of existence and property, then what is said about proceeding from the Son either does not align or adds something to the existence, thus making the property double. Since what is proper must return to that from which it is

proper, it cannot overflow or lack, making it double. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone.

32. When we say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the one principle of created things, it is understood that we are speaking in comparison to the divine nature, for that is one, while these are many and diverse. In the same way, when we say that there is one principle of the deity, it is clear that we speak of it with respect to one person in relation to the others. And just as no created thing is taken to one principle because of its creation, so neither should any of the two persons be assumed to one principle by reason of the deity. For it is better for one to be the principle of many than for many to be the principle of one. Therefore, the Father alone is the unique principle of the Son and the Spirit, just as the Trinity alone is the unique principle of all created things. This is explicitly stated by the blessed Dionysius: "The Father is the only superessential fountain of the deity."



33. When different actions originate from the same agent at the same time, they clearly produce distinct effects. Suppose the agent is A, and its actions are sent at the same time, one to B and the other to C. I assert that C is distinct from B. For if they were the same, they would align precisely with each other, and the action directed to them would be the same. Therefore, they must be distinct. Let us imagine that A is the Father, who acts eternally and naturally; B is the Son, and C is the Holy Spirit. The actions between them are distinct: the action directed toward B is the generation of the Son, while the action directed toward C is the procession of the Holy Spirit. It is evident that the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, because the actions directed toward each are different. Hence, no further distinction is necessary between the Son and the Holy Spirit, as the distinct actions and processions themselves are enough to distinguish them.

34. Those who agree with the Latins ask us whether the Father emits the Holy Spirit with His virtue and wisdom or without them, assuming that if we deny one, we would affirm the other. For if the Son is the wisdom and virtue of the Father, the Father certainly emits the Holy Spirit with the Son, and not alone. We also agree that the Father emits the Holy Spirit with the Son, with the Word, wisdom, and virtue, as the holy Fathers say, for the Holy Spirit proceeds with the Word, accompanying and revealing it, so that neither the Word is without the Spirit, nor does the Spirit proceed without the Word. However, this does not mean that the Son is the cause of the Spirit's existence, just as the Spirit is not the cause of the Son. What proceeds from the Father and the Son in the same manner cannot be the cause of each other. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Son as He proceeds from the Father; if this were the case, there would be no difference between the Spirit and created things, which were also made by the Word of God, His wisdom, and His virtue. Indeed, "all things were made by Him, and without Him nothing was made that has been made." Hence, what is not made does not need to be said to exist through Him. Furthermore, the Son is not as much the wisdom and virtue of the Father as He is the Son and the

Word. The Son is the Word of the Father, but the Father is neither the Son nor the Word (since the Son is referred to the Father, and the Word is referred to the speaker). Wisdom and virtue of the Father, however, are as the Father Himself is wisdom and virtue, not merely wise and powerful. Wisdom is of wisdom, and virtue is of virtue, as God is of God and light is of light. The Father is called wisdom and virtue because all wisdom and virtue are in Him, just as in the image and exemplar. However, the Holy Spirit is no less wisdom and virtue, as no expert in Scripture would deny. These names are essential and common to the divine persons, as St. Augustine testifies in his work on the Trinity. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as wisdom and virtue proceed from wisdom and virtue, it is unnecessary and vain to ask whether the Father emits the Holy Spirit with His wisdom and virtue, unless someone wishes to convert this into a creaturely concept, as Scripture says, "The Lord established the earth in wisdom, and He prepared the heavens by understanding." Moreover, the Father does not need the aid of wisdom or virtue to bring about the procession of the Spirit, just as He does not need the aid of the Son's generation or any of the divine powers. This is proper to created things, as the theologians say. Therefore, both the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed equally and immediately from the essence of the Father, the Son with the Spirit, yet neither from the other nor in any way dependent upon each other.

35. If something is said singularly of the many in the divine persons, it is either the essence entirely or something essential. For just as there is one thing by which each person is distinguished from the others, there is also one thing by which the three are united. This thing, in fact, is the essence, or something of it, such as one will, one virtue, or one action. We say that the Son is God from God, and both are one God; light from light, and both are one light; wisdom from wisdom, and both are one wisdom; virtue from virtue, and both are one virtue. Therefore, the divine persons can only exist insofar as something singular exists within them, which is essential. If, then, the act of emitting is one in both the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit must also partake in this, as something essential, and He too would emit another person. But if He lacks this essential reality, there is no doubt that He would also lack the essence itself. The Latins must choose one of these two options; however, if they reject both, they must abandon their prior position, from which these conclusions necessarily follow.

36. If, according to the Latins, the Son and the Spirit proceed from the essence of the Father, but only the Spirit proceeds from the essence of the Father and the Son, the essence of the Father does not produce the same as the essence of the Father and the Son. What does not produce the same is, in fact, not the same. Therefore, the essence of the Father is not the same as the essence of the Father and the Son; and consequently, the essence of the Spirit must also be different. There would then be multiple essences within the divine Trinity, which is impious and absurd.

37. If the Father is the principle of both the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the Son is the principle only of the Holy Spirit, then these principles are not the same. Thus, the principle in the divine Trinity is not one but two, and the Latins' attempt to avoid a duality of principles is in vain.

38. The term "Son" signifies two things: his relation to the Father, inasmuch as he receives his being from Him, and the fact that he shares the same substance with the Father; for every son is consubstantial with his father. This is also indicated by the term "generation," by which both the cause of his being and consubstantiality are most clearly expressed. It is not the same for the Holy Spirit, nor is it for the term "procession." However, whenever we hear of the Spirit of the Father, we understand it as a certain gift of the Father that is given to us, sanctifies us, and operates within us. As the Lord says: "The Spirit of your Father, who speaks in you." Similarly, the Spirit of the Son is also said to be the same, for it is a common gift of both. As the blessed Augustine says, whenever we hear of the Spirit proceeding from the Father, we take it to mean both the cause of his being and his hypostasis, but not his consubstantiality, which neither the Spirit nor the procession can indicate. Therefore, when theologians wish to indicate simply the cause of being, they say "the Spirit who proceeds from the Father," teaching us this from the Lord, without mutilating or truncating the expression or leaving out the principle. But when they want to indicate consubstantiality at the same time, they add "through the Son," saying "Who proceeds from the Father through the Son," as if they were saying: "Not without the Son, nor from a different nature, but with generation, the procession is also understood." Hence, the divine Maximus says: "He who proceeds ineffably through the Son," and he certainly would not have added "generated" unless he wanted us to understand this. Moreover, the same theologian confirms this in a letter to Marinus, the presbyter of Cyprus, stating that the Romans of his time "do not recognize the cause of the Spirit as the Son, but rather show that He proceeds through the Son, and thus demonstrate the knowledge of the substance without any differentiation." The more recent and ridiculous theology of the Latins, however, interpreting the phrase "through the Son" as meaning a nearer principle, establishes the Father as a more remote principle, and not a principle proximate to the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit. Thus, the words of the venerable Gregory of Nyssa, who says, "Through the Son, the interposition is preserved and the Spirit is not excluded from the natural relation He has to the Father," are ignored. This theology introduces gradations and disparities into the Holy Trinity, placing the Father as the highest and first principle, the Son as inferior and a second principle, acting as a kind of intermediary between the Father and the Spirit, and finally, the Holy Spirit as the lowest and distant from the principle, thus leading into the abyss of tritheism, circumscribing the divine persons and making the Spirit almost like a grandchild.

39. I came across a certain Latin scholar writing on behalf of the Latins, who asserts that it is wrong to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son (for this would make two, distinct principles, one nearer and the other more remote). Instead, he claims that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son, as it is indeed added in the Symbol, so that the Father and the Son together are understood as one principle of the Holy Spirit. But if this is the case, as he says, the first part of his statement aligns with what our scholars teach. No longer should the expression "through the Son" be understood as implying a proximate principle, nor should the phrase "through the Son" be misused, as some who have separated from the Son have foolishly

done. If this is the case, and if the distinct persons of the Holy Spirit proceed from each, one having it from itself, and the other from the other, then two principles will indeed exist. After they have lost this connection, they will not avoid two principles; indeed, they will demonstrate their doctrine to be inconsistent and contradictory, undermining itself.

40. A certain Latin defender of the faith, one of those deserters from the true doctrine, asked me whether everything that naturally proceeds from something through something else has as its principle the thing through which it proceeds. I, in turn, asked him whether everything that naturally proceeds from something through something else has two principles of its existence, one being the cause through which it proceeds, and the other the cause from which it proceeds. For example, a man born of a man through a woman, as the Apostle says, has two principles: his father and his mother. Likewise, Jacob, born of Abraham through Isaac, has two principles: one nearer, the other more remote, namely his father and his grandfather. If, therefore, they wish to affirm their theology based on examples from what occurs among us, let them also confess that there are two causes and two principles, and not deny the necessary conclusions that follow from their arguments. One may ask: How is it that creation, which receives its being from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, does not have three principles, but one principle and one creator? To this I replied: Creation is not attributed to the essence of the Father and the Son, nor to their hypostases, but to their common will and power, which is the same and one in all three. Hence, it is that the one God is the principle and the creator. However, if the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the hypostasis of the Father, and if, as you claim, He also proceeds from the hypostasis of the Son, then He would have two hypostases as causes and two principles, which would be absurd. Therefore, do not use incongruent examples again, for creation is from God not by essence, but by power.

42. If the Son is considered the nearest principle of the Holy Spirit, and the Father is not considered the nearest, these are opposites, and opposites cannot simultaneously coincide. Therefore, the Father and the Son cannot be one principle if they are opposites; thus, there are two principles. How, then, will such illogical principles live, when they are cornered from all sides?

43. While the Latins assert that the Father and the Son are principles of the Holy Spirit, designating the first, second, and third principles in a certain necessary natural order, they very clearly separate the Holy Spirit from the Father by a certain interval, introducing gradations and disparities into the Holy Trinity, claiming that the Father is greater than the Son and the Son is greater than the Holy Spirit. But let them learn from the Fifth General Synod, where these are condemned as the views of Origen. Indeed, the Emperor Justinian of blessed memory, in his speech against him, calls these blasphemies. He said, "The Father is greater than the Son, and the Son is greater than the Holy Spirit." This is rightly condemned, for as Gregory the Theologian says: "We believe in one God, because there is one divine essence, and all things which proceed from Him are referred to the one." Thus, if those who refer all things which proceed from Him to one God, believe in one God, then those who refer one thing to two cannot possibly believe in one God, but in many gods. What, then, are they saying against the Gentiles?

44. If the Holy Spirit proceeds closely from the Son, and not closely from the Father, as the Latins assert, it is clear that He proceeds from the hypostasis of the Son, but not from the hypostasis of the Father. For how could this happen if He does not have His existence proximate to the Father? It is not correct to say that Jacob, who was not directly born of Abraham, proceeds from the hypostasis of Abraham, unless one wishes to say from his nature, since we are all considered to be from Adam's nature, but not from his hypostasis. Yet the holy doctors plainly teach the opposite about the Holy Spirit, declaring that He proceeds from the hypostasis of the Father, as divine Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor, and all others, affirm. No one says that He proceeds from the hypostasis of the Son. Therefore, the Latins err in claiming that the hypostasis of the Son is the nearest cause of the Holy Spirit.

45. Whenever the Latins say that the Father is not the nearest principle of the Holy Spirit, let us ask them whether they mean that the Son is the principle of the Spirit, and if so, do they also mean that the Son contributes something to the Spirit's being? If they say the Son is the principle, it is clear that the Son is not properly the principle of the Spirit, for He is not the proximate principle. From this, it follows that the Father and the Son are proper principles, as proximate, but the Spirit is not properly so, since He is not proximate. This theology, or rather this theomachy, we have not heard until now, but we do hear the claim that just as the Son proceeds from the Father, so too the Spirit proceeds from the Father. They make it an absurdity when they try to deny the Spirit's proceeding from the Father alone, while affirming it from the Son. If they claim that the Father contributes anything to the Spirit's being, how can one refrain from declaring this doctrine full of absurdities? For it leads to the conclusion that there are two principles, as the hypostases are two, and the essence of the Spirit is divided, with part from the Father and part from the Son, thus composing the Spirit from both, having existence from both, and bringing about monstrous consequences.

46. Furthermore, the Latins, pressed by these arguments, again resort to the issue of creation, attempting to show themselves clearly as pneumatomachians, by manifestly considering the Holy Spirit as a created thing. They argue that even the creation of all things from the Father through the Son has the principle of being, yet it is still considered to have one principle and one creator, not two or three causes, nor one properly and the other not, nor do they suggest that one contributes to the other's existence. If they say this, they must either plainly confess that they consider the Holy Spirit a creature, or else admit that outside of their nature and hypostases, two persons can, by one action and one reason, achieve whatever they wish. But if each person naturally produces one person through one single action from its own hypostasis, it cannot be done unless part of the existence is contributed, so that there are two principles, two actions, and a composite effect. Thus, how they can attribute to one personal action the operations of two persons, while asserting that there is one principle, is truly perplexing.

47. The human mind itself, I say, produces reason from itself and sends forth spirit as the messenger of its movements and thoughts, to animate and move the body, and to manifest and

express reason. Thus, both the reason and spirit are produced simultaneously by the mind, the one announcing externally the thoughts of the generator, the other animating and moving the body according to the will of the speaker. However, no sane person would say that the spirit proceeds from reason, for the spirit is the companion of the word for its manifestation, and in turn, the word is manifested by the spirit. In the same way, the eternal Word is produced with the Spirit by the first mind, namely the Father, but it is not the cause for the Spirit's being. This is similar to how we are taught by the divine Maximus, who adapts a marvelous example to the divine model. Just as the word in us is the messenger and interpreter of the movements of the mind, so the divine Word is the angel of the great counsel of the Father; and just as the spirit in us is the principle of life and movement of the body, so the divine Spirit is the principle by which creation lives, moves, is preserved, and sanctifies. Therefore, the divine man says in the third chapter of the third century of the Centuries of the Gnostics: "The Word neither was, nor is, nor will be prior to the Word; but the Word is, not independent of the mind or life, but one that is endowed with mind and life, as it has the Father, who possesses essential life, coexisting with Him, and the Holy Spirit." Notice how the mind is named as God and the Father, the Word as the Son, and life as the Holy Spirit, coexisting with the Son, but not originating from the same existence. This is what another theologian says: "He proceeds from the Father and remains in the Son."

48. Now, if the processions of the divine persons differ according to the principle of remoteness and proximity, let the Latins be pressed on the point that the Son is from the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son. If this is said to be a procession, as they claim, then the procession must be the same as generation, and generation must in turn be the same as procession. Therefore, in the Trinity, there would be two sons: one begotten from the Father alone, and the other from the Father through the Son, with one being proximate to the Father and the other proximate to the Son, but remote from the Father, as a grandson. But such reasoning, or rather delirium, about God has never been heard until now.

49. Either the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit is the same, or it is different. If it is the same, since the Father alone is the principle of the Son, certainly the Father alone will also be the principle of the Spirit. But if they are different, how can there not be two principles?

50. The hypostasis of the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit; there is also another hypostasis, namely the Son, according to the Latins, who claims to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, according to their doctrine, the Father and the Son are two principles of the Spirit. Thus, they assert that there are two principles of the Spirit.

51. The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit in such a way that either one alone is the principle, or neither. If both are one principle as one person, then they are certainly one principle, as they are one person, and thus Sabellianism is revived. But if, on the other hand, both are one principle, yet each individually also can be considered a principle, how can there not be two principles? Indeed, if there is a difference, it is certain that it introduces a numerical distinction.

52. In the divine persons, either there is one principle, or there is not one. If there is one person as the principle, then we have what is sought, for the Father, without a doubt, will be the sole principle. But if there is not one, then there will certainly be two principles, as there are two things that arise from the principle. This is absurd, and the thing itself speaks for itself.

53. If the proximate cause is greater and closer than the mediated cause, why is it that when it is so often said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, the words "through the Son" are rarely added? Why is it that the greater and closer cause is omitted, while the lesser and more distant cause is always expressed? And how can there not be two principles when both greater and lesser, closer and more distant, are relevant?

54. The Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit either by reason of nature or by reason of hypostasis. If by reason of nature, since the nature is the same in all three, the cause will be common to all, and thus the Spirit himself will proceed from one or the other. But if the Son is the cause by reason of hypostasis, since the hypostasis of the Son is different from that of the Father, and also from that of the Spirit, then the Son will be the cause, as will the Father, with a distinct principle. Therefore, there will be two hypostases as causes, and thus two principles.

55. The power of producing the Spirit, according to the Latins, is one and the same in the Father and the Son, and it will be essential and natural. However, the Holy Spirit will be excluded from this power, since he does not produce any other person. But, as the theologians teach, things of the same virtue must also be of the same nature. Therefore, things with different essential virtues must necessarily not have the same nature, and thus the Holy Spirit is excluded from the common essence of the Father and the Son, as he is excluded from the common essential power. But we know that the Holy Trinity, being of the same essence, is also of the same virtue, and we proclaim the power of all three persons as one, just as we proclaim one essence. The new pneumatomachians who make many assertions are not valid.

56. According to the theologians, the properties of the Father are that He is unbegotten, that He begets, and that He sends forth. If one of these properties, namely the sending forth, pertains to the Son, which is the Latin view, then the Father will have a greater communion with the Son than with the Holy Spirit, and consequently, a greater distinction from the Holy Spirit than from the Son. So, why do the Latins accuse Macedonius of heresy, when they themselves openly become pneumatomachians?

библиография

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