

THE MOSCOW PAN-ORTHODOX COUNCIL (8-18 July 1948)

The year of 2018 marks the 70th anniversary of the Moscow Pan-Orthodox Conference (8-18 July 1948). Among other things, this event split the Orthodox world into two groups of churches: the churches in the areas under Soviet control allied with the patriarchate of Moscow, while those on the other side of the Iron Curtain supported the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople. The Cold War became a fact in the religious realm as well.

The text below present fragments from Chapter Nine of my book *The Russian Orthodox Church, 1917-1948: From Decline to Resurrection* (Routledge, 2015), which discusses the preparation, work, and results of the 1948 Moscow Pan-Orthodox Conference.

Chapter Nine

TOWARD AN EIGHT ECUMENICAL COUNCIL (1944-1948)

On 14 February 1947, Karpov reported to the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) that the international authority of the Moscow Patriarchate had reached a point that allowed it to take the leadership of world Orthodoxy. This was the end of the initial phase of Stalin's project to create an 'Orthodox Vatican'.¹ By that time, the Church of Patriarch Alexii had settled its major problems in the postwar Soviet territories: Its bishops were installed in the western eparchies; the Renovationist and Estonian schisms were overcome; the question of the Georgian autocephaly was settled; the Ukrainian and Transcarpathian Uniates were reunited; the Mukachevo eparchy was integrated. In addition, the Moscow Patriarchate had spread its jurisdiction over the Russian parishes in Eastern and Central Europe as well as over the Orthodox Church in Czechoslovakia. The reunion of Russian church communities in areas free of Soviet military control seemed an achievable goal. Despite the continued fight of the Moscow Patriarchate with the Orthodox Poles about the abolishment of the autocephaly granted them by the Patriarchate of Constantinople, this problem too was expected to find a solution in short time. At the same time, the Russian church leadership established close relations with the Orthodox churches in the Balkan people's democracies and became a decisive factor in their postwar development. Finally, its influence penetrated the Middle East Orthodox communities. In all these areas, the Moscow Patriarchate and the Soviet government successfully collaborated despite the different nature of their aims.

1. Karpov's Plan for a World Congress of Churches

The Soviet victory in World War II had a contradictory effect on Russian Orthodoxy. It did not guarantee the freedom of religion in the Soviet Union that was expected by

its western allies. In fact, many foreign observers registered an increase of religious restrictions there. At the same time, the Moscow Patriarchate secured a series of benefits. It restored almost entirely its jurisdiction over the former Russian imperial territories, and even expanded it beyond the postwar Soviet borders. This development gave new meaning to the 1943 concordat between Stalin and Sergii (Starogorodskii). As the war approached its close, the Soviet government intensified the use of the church for the ends of its foreign policy. On 15 March 1945, Karpov approached Stalin with a proposal for the convocation of an international Christian congress in Moscow.² Its aim was to unite all non-Catholic churches against the Vatican's pretensions to world leadership. The tentative list of participants included not only representatives from Orthodox churches, but also from other Christian denominations, such as the Anglican Church, Old Believers, various Protestant and Methodist churches from Europe and the United States, the Coptic Church, etc. In this document, Karpov also presented the major theses of the future forum. They planned to condemn Catholic teaching about the Roman Pope as Christ's vicar on the earth as groundless, to declare the dogma of the Pope's infallibility as contradictory to the Holy Scriptures, history and logic, to unmask the Vatican's involvement in fascist and anti-democratic activities, especially its support for the Nazis during the war, etc. At the same time, the congress was to stress the contrast between the Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarchate by pointing to the antifascist fight of the latter and the wartime support it had received from non-Catholic Christians. According to Karpov, the CAROC was able to organize the forum within 5-6 months.³

Prepared in a moment when the Red Army was victoriously advancing to Berlin, Karpov's plan seemed to have a great chance for success. It relied on the alliance with the Great Britain, thus assigning a major role to the Anglican Church.

[...]

In the last months of the war, however, dissenting voices appeared in Great Britain and in the Anglican Church in particular. They criticized Metropolitan Nikolay's claims that the Katyn atrocities were not accomplished by the Soviets but by the Nazis.⁴

[...]

At the same time, British diplomats informed the Foreign Office that the Soviet government would probably 'encourage the Russian Church in attempts to become the center of the Orthodox world'.⁵ According to one of these diplomats, there was a parallel between the way in which the nineteenth century irreligious French republic used the Catholic orders in the Middle East and the Kremlin's postwar blessing of the Moscow Patriarchate's delegations sent abroad.⁶ Despite these warnings, the British government and the Anglican Church continued their wartime line of friendship during the visit of Metropolitan Nikolay in June 1945.

[...]

In the summer of 1945, however, the growing international prestige of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Middle East and the Balkans provoked some concerns among the

British authorities. Yet they did not consider it necessary to intervene. According to their embassy in the Soviet Union,

The Moscow Patriarchate has its weaknesses and shortcomings and these will become increasingly evident to the Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe and the Levant as contacts increase. We think that we can leave it to them to prevent undue Russian penetration, without ourselves encouraging a direct conflict between our own protégés in Athens and possibly Istanbul and the protégés of the Soviet Government.⁷

The Kremlin also began to realize that its scenario for a world congress of churches needed some updating. Postwar developments revealed the error of Karpov's assumption that the anti-Hitlerite rapprochement between the Moscow Patriarchate and the churches in the Allied states could be easily transformed into an anti-Catholic alliance. His plan had to compete with a similar project advanced by the ecumenical movement.⁸ The latter did not support the anti-Vatican fervor of the Moscow Patriarchate and united many non-Catholic churches, including Orthodox ones. A no less important weakness of Karpov's plan was its disregard for the freedom of religion, which was a decisive prerequisite for the support of western societies and their churches. Moreover, it did not take into consideration important theological, ecclesiastical and historical specificities of the different Christian denominations. Instead, the CAROC's scenario foresaw a mechanical union of a variety of churches based only on their non-Catholic nature.

This approach of the CAROC chairman reflected either a lack of knowledge or a disregard for Orthodox ecclesiology. His plan for a Moscow congress of world Christianity foresaw the participation of eleven Orthodox churches, namely those of Russia, Serbia, Georgia, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Finland.⁹ This selection, however, is problematic from the point of view of canon law. It treats as equal autocephalous and autonomous churches. [...]

... when the plan for a world Christian congress failed, it was replaced with a new one, which again relied on Orthodoxy. This new plan foresaw the convocation of a pan-Orthodox council under the aegis of Patriarch Alexii. This time, the CAROC entrusted the ecclesiastical and canonical aspects of this enterprise to the Moscow Patriarchate.

2. Metropolitan Nikolay and the Eighth Ecumenical Council

The CAROC's new plan made use of information collected by the Russian church leadership during the elections of Patriarch Alexii in February 1945. This event was used by the Moscow Patriarchate to investigate the opinions of its foreign guests about a future conference of the heads of all Orthodox churches. The same issue was discussed by the Russian church delegations during their visits in the Middle East and in the Balkans. The received answers were reported to Karpov. In this way, the

collaboration between the CAROC and the Moscow Patriarchate had been established before the elaboration of the plan for a pan-Orthodox council.

Although the central role in this forum was assigned to Patriarch Alexii, the technical details were delegated to Metropolitan Nikolay (Yarushevich). The latter drew up a special scheme to secure a canonical transfer of the ecumenical status of the Patriarch of Constantinople to that of Moscow. For this purpose, Nikolay recommended the convocation of the so-called Eighth Ecumenical Council.¹⁰ His arguments for this stemmed from the history of Eastern Orthodoxy. This branch of Christianity respects the first seven ecumenical councils (325-787) because their decisions have laid the grounds of its canon law. They have not lost their validity for all Orthodox churches. In this regard, there was a specific requirement that had to be borne in mind. In accordance with ecclesiastical traditions, the decisions of one ecumenical council need to be confirmed by the next one in order to become an integral part of canon law, i.e. the decisions of the Seventh Ecumenical Council (787) were recognized by the original Eighth Ecumenical Council (879). The conflict between the churches of Rome and Constantinople, however, blocked this process. As a result, the Eighth Ecumenical Council was not followed by another and its decisions remained unapproved. In the next centuries, due to the Great Schism and the decentralization of the Orthodox churches, they stuck to the canons of the first seven ecumenical councils, while the Roman Catholic Church was able to develop its own system of canons. On these grounds, Metropolitan Nikolay proposed convoking the Eighth Ecumenical Council anew.

In order to be canonical such a forum had to be attended by the heads of all Orthodox churches. Otherwise its decisions would have no binding force for Orthodoxy as a whole. If a church head was not able personally to take part in the council, e.g. because of illness, he had to authorize someone else to represent his church at the forum. According to the letter of Patriarch Alexii to Karpov, the forum had to be attended by the heads of the 12 autocephalous churches then existing.¹¹ This sensitivity of Moscow church leaders to the canonical aspects of the forum distinguished their approach from the one Karpov developed in his plan for a world anti-Catholic congress. At the same time, the Moscow Patriarchate was not a pioneer in this enterprise. The first attempts to organize a pan-Orthodox council were made by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In 1930, it organized special Pro-Synod sessions at the Vatopedi Monastery on the Holy Mount of Athos, the aim of which was to prepare the first pan-Orthodox council since Byzantine times. Due to the Bolshevik repressions, however, the Moscow Patriarchate was not able to participate. Its absence doomed the whole project to failure. To avoid such a development this time, Metropolitan Nikolay recommended a preliminary study of the Vatopedi proceedings. The Moscow Patriarchate decided to ask for copies of these proceedings from the Serbian Church and the Orthodox patriarchates in the Middle East that had attended the 1930 sessions. According to Nikolay, an ecumenical council would allow the Moscow Patriarchate

1. to establish closer relations among all Orthodox Churches;

2. to raise and strengthen the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church over the other Orthodox Churches;
3. to switch to the new [calendar] style;
4. to condemn the schismatic activity of Metropolitan Anastasii [the Karlovci Synod's chairman] and Metropolitan Theophil in America;
5. to declare Catholicism as a heresy and [to condemn] the pro-fascist policy of the Vatican.¹²

In his analysis, the metropolitan also paid attention to some weaknesses of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. Anxious about the shortage of experts necessary for such an initiative, Nikolay proposed that theologians from the Soviet Union and abroad be invited. Another difficulty he discussed concerned the attempts of the head of the Karlovci Synod, Metropolitan Anastasii, to undermine the 'ecumenical' nature of the planned council. To overcome this, the Russian hierarchy proposed an amnesty for Orthodox bishops who had been repressed before 1941, and their re-appointment to eparchial offices. Furthermore, he recommended a more careful study of the attitude of the Orthodox churches outside the Soviet Union to such an enterprise. In addition, to guarantee the success of the future pan-Orthodox council, Metropolitan Nikolay proposed that its convoking be preceded by a pre-council conference with the participation of representatives from the other Orthodox churches. This conference was to present the Moscow Patriarchate as the greatest authority in the Orthodox world. This approach reveals that despite Nikolay's loyalty to the Soviet regime, he was inclined to regard this initiative as a religious rather than a political event.¹³

At the end of his scenario, the metropolitan expressed some additional concerns about the project. In his view, an ecumenical council was not the proper place to deal with schisms within a particular Orthodox Church, because its prerogatives extend only to heresies threatening Orthodoxy as a whole. Therefore, he advised that discussion about the schismatic behavior of Russian exiles should be entrusted to a separate church delegation. He also expected that the churches of Constantinople, Alexandria and Greece would oppose the elevation of Moscow to the rank of ecumenical patriarchate. The same churches could also deviate from the condemnation of the Vatican's wartime pro-fascist position. Finally, Nikolay expressed his concerns that his church could find itself in an unpleasant situation if participants in the ecumenical council raised the question about the struggle with atheism.¹⁴

The Soviet government considered the suggestions of Metropolitan Nikolay. On 29 May 1946, the Council of Ministers in Moscow issued its decree No. 1132-465/cc. It permitted the CAROC to allow the Moscow Patriarchate to hold a pre-council conference of the heads of all Orthodox churches in Moscow. Its agenda included such issues as the organization of a common platform for the fight against the Vatican and the ecumenical movement, the convocation of an ecumenical council, etc. The pre-council conference was scheduled for October 1947.¹⁵

It seems that the Kremlin also took measures to popularize the idea of a new ecumenical council outside the Soviet Union. On 15 June 1946, the newspaper of the

Bulgarian pro-communist union of priests published an article entitled ‘An Eighth Ecumenical Council’.¹⁶ It pointed out that after the Second Council of Nicaea (787) the Catholic Church began to hold its own councils. Although this brought about a deviation from true Christianity, these councils became a tool that allowed the Catholic Church to adapt to changes in society. Efforts to respond to the needs of today by initiating an ecumenical movement were made by the Anglican Church as well. Only the Orthodox Church stayed passive. There were some occasional meetings of Orthodox hierarchs but no councils. In this regard, the article pointed to the visits which representatives of the four ancient patriarchates had paid to Moscow after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (1453). It also stressed the material support that these Orthodox hierarchs had received from Russia. On these grounds, the article advanced the question: ‘Who will take the initiative for a new ecumenical council?’ According to the author, the initiator of ‘the Eighth Ecumenical Council not only would receive the glory but also the gratitude, devotion and support of all other Orthodox churches’. At the same time, similar publications appeared in the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* advancing the idea of the Third Rome.¹⁷ The propaganda campaign of the Eighth Ecumenical Council had begun.

Preparation

With Stalin’s blessing, the Moscow Patriarchate scheduled the pre-council conference for the autumn of 1947 and the Eighth Ecumenical Council for 1948.¹⁸ In this way, the transfer of the ecumenical title from the patriarchal see in Constantinople to that in Moscow was to coincide with the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the Russian Church. According to the Kremlin, the key task of the future ecumenical council was to destroy the international influence of the Vatican, which was considered the major enemy of the Soviet Union in the religious field. In this regard, especially negative was the attitude of the Soviet leadership to the principle of Papal supremacy, which increased the influence of the Roman Holy See in international affairs.

Following this line, the CAROC’s chairman advanced the idea that the Catholic Church had to be liberated from its centralism and divided into national churches in the Orthodox manner.¹⁹ According to him, the discontent among religious people at the Vatican was sporadic and thus unable to bring changes in the Catholic world. In Karpov’s view, there was a simple solution for this problem: the Moscow Patriarchate should initiate an international Christian movement to accuse the Vatican of ruining the ecclesiastical basis of Christianity. For this purpose, Patriarch Alexii had to issue an ‘Appeal to Christians All over the World’. Karpov even formulated its major theses. The first of them proclaimed the Catholic Church guilty of the sin of worshipping the Pope. According to the second, by using religion for political ends, the Roman Holy See had perverted true Christianity. The next thesis stated that the Vatican had betrayed the spirit of the ancient church councils and damaged the interests of ordinary Catholics. The fourth claimed that the Catholic Church had been transformed into an international political organization supporting reactionary powers. Finally, the Vatican was accused of damaging the interests of mankind and allying itself with warmongers. The appeal ended with the conclusion that every true

Christian had as his/her duty to liberate the Catholics from Papal authority. Karpov expected that the appeal would increase international support for the anti-Vatican fervor of the Moscow Patriarchate not only among the Orthodox churches but also among non-Orthodox ones. According to his updated plan, the pre-council conference was to take place in September 1947. Its participants were to launch an anti-Vatican movement and to appoint an executive committee with its headquarters in Moscow. The major duty of this body was to organize conferences, sponsored by the churches that had joined the movement. At the end of his report, the CAROC's chairman proposed the publication of a volume entitled 'A Church from This World', a draft for which, prepared by the Moscow Patriarchate, was almost ready for publication.²⁰

The ecumenical movement was the next important issue on the CAROC's agenda for the pre-council conference. Moscow was alarmed by the decisions taken by the Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches in Geneva in 1946. The Kremlin was particularly irritated by the request for a reexamination of the Potsdam resolutions on Nazi Germany and the appeal for a struggle against Marxism. The Moscow Patriarchate was also anxious because Anglican support for this new ecumenical organization undermined the planned common anti-Vatican front.²¹ The future World Council of Churches also threatened its ambitions for world leadership. Of the 90 places in its ruling bodies, it allocated only 17 for representatives from the Orthodox churches, which was granted only 85 delegates out of the 450 participants in sessions. Such a proportion would not allow the Moscow Patriarchate to direct developments in accordance with Soviet interests. Therefore, the Kremlin decided to lay down terms fulfillment of which would allow the Russian Church to join the Council. After consultations with Karpov, the Moscow Patriarchate turned to the Anglican Church with a request to assist in increasing the number of places for Orthodox representatives, particularly those of the Russian Church. It also required the World Council of Churches to limit its activities to the religious sphere and repudiate any political statements.²² Until then, the religious departments in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were ordered to adopt firm anti-ecumenical policies and to forbid the corresponding Orthodox churches to attend ecumenical conferences and to join the World Council of Churches.²³ Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchate exerted parallel pressure over those church leaders who maintained contacts with ecumenists.

On 14 January 1947, Patriarch Alexii visited Karpov in his office to discuss the pre-council conference. They agreed to set up a special commission, chaired by Metropolitan Nikolay. Its task was to prepare the conference program, its theses and major papers. The patriarch requested the CAROC's assistance for the transfer from Belgrade to Moscow of Prof. Sergey Troitskii, who was to join the commission as an expert in Orthodox canon law. They also discussed the conference agenda. It was to include such issues as the Orthodox attitude to the Roman Catholic Church and measures for impeding the Vatican's activities, the Orthodox attitude to the ecumenical movement, the Eighth Ecumenical Council, the church calendar, etc. Alexii and Karpov also decided that the staff of foreign delegations should not exceed six persons. According to both, the conference would be also attended by Russian

bishops abroad, namely Nestor from Harbin, Victor from Shanghai, Elevation from Prague, Benjamin from America, Seraphim from Paris, Alexander from Berlin and Sergii from Vienna, each of them accompanied by one or two persons. Patriarch Alexii also suggested the participation of an Anglican delegation.²⁴ In fact, he had already received the consent of the Soviet government to invite the Archbishop of Canterbury, who was expected to support the anti-Vatican initiatives of the Moscow Patriarchate.²⁵

The preparatory work for the conference included settling many technical questions in advance. Some of these related to the Orthodox temples and buildings that the Soviet government was to repair and return to the Patriarchate. The Synod asked for the return of the entire complex of St. Trinity Monastery in Zagorsk. To that point the Russian Church had received only a part of it, while the conference scenario envisioned the foreign delegates accommodated in the Zagorsk monastery complex. In addition, the complex was to host the Moscow ecclesiastical academy and seminary, the Synodal printing house, and other church offices.²⁶ Another serious problem was to find temples suitable for becoming *podvoryes* of foreign Orthodox churches.²⁷ Initially, those for the patriarchates of Jerusalem and Serbia were to be selected from the Moscow churches, while those for the patriarchates of Alexandria and Antioch would be found in Kiev and Leningrad.²⁸ It was not an easy task. For example, there were only 11 functioning churches in Leningrad: three cathedrals, five churches in cemeteries and two outside the city. None of these was appropriate for *podvorye*. The only possibility was to repair some of the closed temples in the center of the city.²⁹ The exact time of the conference also needed to be determined. According to Patriarch Alexii, it was to be held in the period 1-10 October 1947, but after his meeting with Karpov, the forum was rescheduled for the second half of September.³⁰ Moscow had the ambition to gather together the heads of all autocephalous Orthodox churches. Still, it was not sure about the participation of the Patriarch of Constantinople, as the conference presented a threat to his ecumenical rights. Therefore, the guest list contained a remark: 'the Patriarch of Constantinople or his representative'. According to the first estimations, accommodation for about 50 persons was to be prepared.

The Russian Church Commission that was to prepare the pre-council conference was chaired by Metropolitan Nikolay and had nine members: the Bishop Makarii of Mozhaysk; Rev. N. Kolchitskii; Archimandrite Yoann, the administrator of St. Trinity and St. Sergii Lavra in Zagorsk; Prof. Rev. N. Chepurin, Rector of the Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy; the priests G. Razumovskii, S. Markov and P. Tsvetkov; and the secretary of the commission, S. Filippov. It had seven sessions before the official invitations were to be sent to the heads of the Orthodox churches in the beginning of April.³¹ The first of these sessions, held on 23 January 1947, was attended by Patriarch Alexii as well. During this first meeting, the Commission decided to invite Father Kostel'nik from Ukraine. He was to take part in the Commission as a major speaker on the Vatican. Another invitation was sent to Prof. S. Troitskii in Belgrade.³² In the beginning, however, his nomination was not supported by the Soviet government, which preferred to keep away the émigré from

the scholars under Soviet control³³ The Commission also appointed the lecturers responsible for key conference papers: Prof. Rev. N. Chepurin was to speak about the organized defense of Orthodoxy against Catholic aggression; Assoc. Prof. A. Georgievskii on the church calendar; Assoc. Prof. V. Vertogradov and V. Sretenskii on the Orthodox-Anglican relationship; Assoc. Prof. Doktusov on the Armenian-Gregorian Church; Assoc. Prof. Archimandrite Veniamin (Milov) and Prof. S. Troitskii on canonical problems; and Prof. V. Platonov on ecumenism.³⁴ The drafts of the papers were scheduled to be completed by mid-February.

Meanwhile, new issues were added to the pre-council agenda. One of them was provoked by a request from the Archbishop of Canterbury for the recognition of the Anglican orders by the Russian Orthodox Church.³⁵ In addition, Patriarch Alexii suggested that contacts be established with Monophysitic churches that had been proclaimed heretical by the Chalcedonian Council (451), namely the Syrian Jacobite and the Coptic churches, whose adherents were spread in Syria, Palestine and Egypt.³⁶ In parallel with this, the Russian Church established contact with the Syrian Patriarch Catholicos Mar-Georgius in England.³⁷ The Commission also discussed the possibility of a reunion with Old Catholics in Western Europe.³⁸ In this way, it hoped to widen international support for its project.

The discussion about the draft papers was completed by the end of March, when the commission sent Karpov a report about the 'Conference of Representatives of All Orthodox Churches'. According to this report, eleven autocephalous churches were to send six-member delegations. The Russian Orthodox Church would be represented by 14 clerics: the patriarch, three metropolitans and ten lecturers. The exarchates of the Moscow Patriarchate outside the Soviet Union (Eastern Asian, Central European, Western European and American) as well as the American Metropolia of Theophil would send three-member delegations. In this way, about 100 Orthodox clerics were expected to take part in the meeting: 60 foreigners, 20 Russians and Georgians from the USSR, and 20 Russians from abroad. The Commission set the Novodevichii Monastery as the conference venue, but proposed two possibilities for its timing: 18 - 29 October or 29 September - 10 October 1947. All foreign delegations were planned to arrive by special flight. Only the Romanians and Georgians were to travel by train. The conference program also included documentaries on the Lvov Sobor of reunion of the Ukrainian Uniates with the Russian mother church, sightseeing, common liturgy, and ceremonies on the occasion of the grant of Russian temples as *podvorye* to foreign Orthodox churches. Finally, considerable amounts of currency were prepared as gifts for the patriarchs of Constantinople and Serbia as well as for the Bulgarian Exarch, the Metropolitan Damaskinos of Greece and the Archbishop of Cyprus. The Russian exarchs Sergii (Korolev), Seraphim (Luk"yanov), Benjamin (Fedchenov) and Theophil (Pashkovskii) were also included in the list of beneficiaries. Such a present had been already offered to the Albanian church leader during his visit to Moscow in July 1946.³⁹

[...]

Meanwhile, the CAROC was busy with the final edition of the agenda for the pre-council conference. It gave priority to the struggle of the Orthodox Church with the Vatican, the Episcopal Synod Abroad of Metropolitan Anastasii, and the ecumenical movement.⁴⁰ It also was to coordinate the positions of the Eastern European Orthodox churches on these issues. In the case of the Catholic Church, Karpov thought that the 1947 pre-council meeting had 'to condemn the Papacy from a dogmatic point of view' and to recommend the reunion of the Uniate churches with the Orthodox churches in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania states. His council also planned to publish a special volume of anti-Vatican materials to be disseminated abroad.⁴¹ In 1947, *The Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union*, a volume of materials gathered by Karpov, was published in several Eastern European languages.⁴² Its aim was to persuade the other nations that there was freedom of religion in the Soviet Union and to increase the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. At the same time, another book, *Patriarch Sergii and His Spiritual Heritage*, presented the new Patriarch Alexii as the guardian of Sergii's legacy and the true leader of Orthodoxy.

Easter was used by the Moscow Patriarch as an occasion to announce the pre-council conference. On 8 April 1947, he sent official invitations to heads of the Orthodox churches together with the Easter greetings.⁴³ Patriarch Alexii wrote that his initiative was provoked by the necessity of discussing the questions that had accumulated in Orthodox Christianity since the last ecumenical council and that called for urgent solutions. One of them was 'the inimical hatred of non-Orthodox Christianity' and its anti-Orthodox propaganda, which typically was nothing but political activity. Another problem concerned the schisms in the Russian Orthodox Church. In regard to this, Patriarch Alexii mentioned that his church did not want to act alone, but to respect canon law in solving them together with its sister churches. Therefore, he invited the heads of the other Orthodox churches to Moscow in the autumn of 1947. He also sent the program of the conference and asked his colleagues to propose other questions for discussion as well as to send lists with the names of the representatives who would attend the forum.⁴⁴ On 2 June, Patriarch Alexii sent telegrams to the heads of the Orthodox churches asking them whether the end of September was suitable for them.⁴⁵ It seemed that Stalin's project of an Orthodox Vatican was going to achieve its goals.

The Failure

The Patriarch of Antioch Alexandros III became the first church leader who confirmed his participation in the pre-council conference. He expressed his pleasure in witnessing a revival of the ancient tradition of discussing ecclesiastical problems by church council and declared his 'full agreement with and approval of' the agenda of the forthcoming forum.⁴⁶ He agreed with 21 September as the starting date of the forum but asked that a Soviet airplane be sent from Tehran to Damascus for his transportation to Moscow. According to Karpov, the Soviet government should satisfy

this request, as Alexandros III was the only patriarch from the Middle East who would take part in the conference.⁴⁷

The Balkan state churches, with the exception of the Greek one, also confirmed their participation in the pre-council conference.⁴⁸ The only troublemaker was the Bulgarian Exarch, Stefan, who called into question some of the conference issues. In a letter sent to the Patriarch of Moscow on 10 June 1947, Stefan pointed out that many Orthodox churches had participated in the ecumenical movement since its very inception and were even co-authors of the idea for the World Council of Churches. Moreover, the same Orthodox churches had already recognized the Anglican orders.⁴⁹ On these grounds, the Bulgarian Exarch hinted that the Russian position on these issues was exceptionable, and suggested that these issues should be reconsidered before their ultimate inclusion in the conference agenda. He also referred to his bad health and expressed doubts about his participation in the Moscow church forum.⁵⁰ On 15 June, however, Exarch Stefan had talks with the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Georgi Dimitrov, about the status of his Church in the future constitution. The latter promised some relaxation in the religious sphere, particularly by restoring the Church's property rights over the ecclesiastical seminaries in Sofia and Plovdiv and by keeping the Faculty of Theology as part of the University of Sofia. In these circumstances Stefan also made some concessions. On 28 June, he sent a new letter to Patriarch Alexii.⁵¹ This time the head of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church expressed greater enthusiasm for the Moscow initiative. He wrote:

According to today's understanding and expectations of our holy Church, the initiative for this [council] naturally belongs to the largest sister, victorious in the past and devoted to God – the Holy Russian Church. Thus, she keeps her responsibilities, which are rooted in her strength and glory, and has taken the initiative of confirming the spiritual unity and future peace and love among the holy local churches.⁵²

The Bulgarian Exarch, however, did not give up his support for the ecumenical movement. He also avoided confirming his participation in the pre-council conference on the pretext of poor health. On 26 July 1947, the government in Sofia sent Stefan to Karlovy Vary at the expenses of the state budget.⁵³ According to the preliminary plan, he was to undergo two months of medical treatment and then from there go directly to Moscow, where he would attend the pre-council conference. It seems that since the Soviet Exarch, Elevation, was installed in Czechoslovakia, Karlovy Vary had become a place where key religious figures received not only medical but also ideological treatment, e.g. Patriarch Gavrilo.

Despite these measures, the pre-council conference had to be canceled after the refusal of the so-called 'Greek churches' to take part in it. Their group included the patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, and the Orthodox churches of Greece and Cyprus. The *locum tenens* of the Church of Cyprus, Archbishop Leontios, was in Cairo when he received his invitation from the Russian Consulate there.⁵⁴ He refused to take part in the Moscow conference, giving the argument that the Patriarch of Constantinople was the only one who had the canonical right to convene ecumenical councils. Metropolitan Nikolay (Yarushevich) responded

immediately with an attempt to persuade Leontios that the latter did not grasp correctly the meaning of the forum. The Russian hierarch declared that it was not going to be 'a Pan-Orthodox *Synedrion*', but simply a meeting for discussing issues equally important for the entire Orthodox Church.⁵⁵ He also reminded Leontios that the idea for it had been negotiated with the heads of the other Orthodox churches during the 1945 election of Patriarch Alexii, as well as by the postwar delegations exchanged between the Moscow Patriarchate and the other Orthodox churches.

Meanwhile, the invitation to Leontios provoked a wave of anti-Russian protests among the Greek communities in the Middle East. On 1 July 1947, the Orthodox newspaper *Fis* in Cairo published an article entitled 'An Uncanonical Council: a Council of Disobedience'. According to this article, the true Orthodox churches would not take part in the 'Soviet church conference' because it was a political enterprise. Moscow was accused of neglecting the ecumenical status and rights of the Patriarch of Constantinople and of attempting to bring all Orthodox churches under the sway of the Russian patriarchal throne. The newspaper declared that the Orthodox Greeks would not fall into the Kremlin's trap. It also stressed that only a hierarch of non-Greek origin, the Patriarch of Antioch, had agreed to take part in the Moscow conference.⁵⁶ The article pointed out that without the participation of the Patriarch of Constantinople this forum would be turned into a parody. Therefore, it did not deserve the name 'Pan-Orthodox', but had to be regarded as a kind of a Slavonic church conference whose aims had nothing in common with religion. The author also stressed that the decisions of this forum would be observed only in churches exposed to communist pressure or with low canonical culture. He argued that the Soviet government had used Patriarch Alexii as bait while pursuing the participation of the Orthodox Church of Greece. Still, the author was sure that no native Greek would accept the initiatives of the Moscow Patriarchate, as it had become an appendage of the Soviet state.⁵⁷

At the same time, the Kremlin's project for a new ecumenical council had some side effects on global Christianity. It softened the centuries-old tensions between the Catholic Church and some other churches and conditioned a rapprochement between them. In fact, the Vatican's position on the pre-council conference was not far from that of the 'Greek churches'. According to the Roman Holy See, the Moscow forum was 'part of the new crusade of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose leaders were close friends of the Kremlin'.⁵⁸ At the same time, the Church of England took a neutral stand and avoided direct intervention in the discussion. It limited its reaction to an expression of fear that the conflict between the patriarchal sees of Moscow and Constantinople threatened Orthodoxy with division.⁵⁹

The Patriarch of Alexandria, Christophoros, also declined the invitation from Moscow. Generally, he agreed with the necessity of an ecumenical council and mentioned that this idea had been his credo since his consecration.⁶⁰ But he found the Moscow initiative inappropriate and he recommended its postponement. The Patriarch of Alexandria offered a reminder that the international situation had not allowed for the realization of such a forum in the past. He also referred to his talks with

Metropolitan Grigorii in 1946, when they discussed this issue. At that time, Patriarch Christophoros had even suggested the Holy Mount of Athos and Jerusalem as places where such a council could take place before the end of 1947, but he had never agreed with its convening in Moscow. He also opposed the agenda proposed by the Russian Church. In his view, most of the issues proposed for discussion were internal problems of the Russian Orthodox Church that should be solved by a local church council. His colleague, Patriarch Timotheos of Jerusalem, was more laconic. On 3 July, he responded with a telegram in which he declared his non-readiness to participate in a 'hypothetical conference'.⁶¹ In this regard, it is interesting that a day earlier, Patriarch Alexandros III of Antioch discussed with the Soviet ambassador in Lebanon a letter he had received from Patriarch Christophoros. According to this document, the head of the Church of Alexandria was afraid that the Moscow church conference would be subject to Bolshevik influence. Another argument of Christophoros was 'Patriarch Alexii's lack of right to convoke such a forum'.⁶²

The last word for this initiative, however, canonically belonged to the ecumenical patriarchate in Istanbul. In February 1947, Karpov proposed to the Soviet government that it allocate 50,000 USD for Patriarch Maximos of Constantinople. This amount was to guarantee his participation in the Moscow church conference.⁶³ This plan, however, was ruined by the resignation of Maximos. Officially, this act was justified by his illness, but its real goal was to stop Moscow's influence on the Patriarchate of Constantinople. On 30 June 1947, its temporary leader, the *locum tenens* Metropolitan Dorotheos, announced the refusal of his church to take part in the pre-council conference, arguing that the initiative was a transgression of canon law. Copies of this document were sent to the heads of all autocephalous Orthodox churches. Despite the principle agreement of Dorotheos with the necessity for an ecumenical council, he firmly rejected the right of the Moscow Patriarch to convene such a forum. This position was justified by the requirements of canon law. Dorotheos stressed that questions that concern the Orthodox Church as a whole must be addressed to the ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, and only after his approval could any initiative for an ecumenical council be distributed to other churches. The same rule was also valid for problems exceeding the jurisdiction of a single autocephalous Orthodox Church. In this regard, Dorotheos offered a reminder of the steps undertaken in this direction by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the 1930s. At the same time, keeping in mind the internal turmoil of the Russian Church and its long isolation from the other Orthodox churches, the *locum tenens* of the ecumenical patriarchal throne was inclined to excuse its anti-canonical undertaking. At the end of his letter, Dorotheos expressed a hope that in the future the Russian Church would obey the canons. He also promised to include issues raised by the Moscow church leadership in the agenda of the next ecumenical council, the convocation of which was the unique right of the Patriarch of Constantinople.⁶⁴ This letter put an end not only to the pre-council conference scheduled for the autumn of 1947, but to the entire Moscow plan for an Eighth Ecumenical Council.

3. *Towards a Pan-Orthodox Conference*

Although the resistance of the ‘Greek churches’ ruined the pre-council conference, Moscow did not give up. On 1 August 1947, Patriarch Alexii informed the leaders of the other Orthodox churches that the forum was postponed.⁶⁵ On 5 August, the Patriarch of Alexandria responded that he understood the necessity of a pan-Orthodox council but did not accept the Russian approach. In his view, only the ecumenical patriarch in Istanbul had the right to convoke a pan-Orthodox council. Therefore, Christophoros advised Alexii first to appeal to the Church of Constantinople with a request to convoke a pan-Orthodox council and not to schedule its time in advance.⁶⁶ His counsel was not heard. Instead, the Moscow church and state authorities prepared a new scenario. It dropped Nikolay’s idea of the Eighth Ecumenical Council and envisioned only a meeting of the heads of all autocephalous churches scheduled for July 1948. In this way, it would precede the assembly of the World Council of Churches scheduled for August of the same year. Another advantage of this timing was its coincidence with the 500-year anniversary of the Russian autocephaly. This allowed the Moscow Patriarchate to accuse those who refused to attend the new conference of bringing politics into religion.⁶⁷

The new edition of the Moscow church conference was a Cold War product and reflected the postwar polarization of the Christian world. Its division alongside political rather than denominational lines undermined the Kremlin’s efforts to unite various non-Catholic churches in a common anti-Vatican front. The Cold War also increased the international opposition against Stalin’s policy of promoting the Moscow Patriarchate as the new leader of world Christianity. This policy was perceived as a revival of the sixteenth-century concept of Moscow as the Third Rome. Under these circumstances, the Kremlin abandoned the plan for transferring the ecumenical leadership of Constantinople to Moscow. Its new scenario preserved the religious form of the failed pre-council conference, but now it pursued purely political goals. The new Pan-Orthodox forum was to consolidate the Orthodox churches from people’s democracies around the Russian patriarchate and to coordinate their common struggle against the Western religious centers.⁶⁸ The number of participants was reduced as well. According to the CAROC’s estimations, the conference was to be attended by 25-30 Russians and Georgians from the Soviet Union and 40-45 guests from abroad.⁶⁹ Its agenda preserved the questions about the Vatican, ecumenical movement and the church calendar. It also foresaw a discussion on the Anglican orders.⁷⁰

[...]

[In the end of 1947], Alexii again approached the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria and Jerusalem, who had declined his invitation for the 1947 pre-council conference. He attempted to persuade them of the right of his Church to organize such a forum. On 31 December 1947, he wrote to the Patriarch of Alexandria expressing regret about the misunderstanding between the two churches.⁷¹ Alexii rejected Christophoros’ accusations that Moscow had intended to convoke an ecumenical council. The Russian patriarch declared that his only purpose was to organize ‘a

conference of the supreme hierarchs of the Orthodox churches'. He insisted that its staff and competence was quite different from that of an ecumenical council. According to Alexii, such a forum had to be attended by all Orthodox bishops, and if somebody was not able to attend it, he had to send his representative. In addition, he pointed to another difference that concerned the conference decisions. In the case of an ecumenical council they would have compulsory force for the entire Orthodox Church, while the conference decisions would be valid only for those churches whose episcopate had approved them. Finally, the Russian patriarch mentioned that the forum initiated by his church did not introduce any novelty in Orthodoxy but simply followed the established tradition. In this regard, he gave the examples of the 1930 Pro-Synod meeting on Mount Athos and the Jerusalem conference of the three Middle East patriarchs in 1940.

Patriarch Alexii also rejected the arguments of the patriarchs of Constantinople and Alexandria against the Russian Church's right to convene a pan-Orthodox conference. He referred to the Pentarchy concept and its sixteenth-century changes, when the Moscow Patriarchate joined the alliance of the five leading Orthodox churches. He also listed those ecclesiastical documents and canonical codes that had placed the Moscow Patriarchate in the fifth place of honor. On these grounds, the Russian hierarch drew his conclusion about the equality of his Church with the four ancient Orthodox patriarchates. In addition, Alexii accused the Patriarchate of Alexandria of subordinating non-Greek churches (including that of Antioch) to the Greek ones. He also stressed that no patriarch had the right to spread his rights over other Orthodox churches.⁷²

In the last part of his letter, the Russian patriarch dealt with the political aspects of the problem. He demonstrated an understanding of the situation of Patriarch Christophoros. Alexii reminded the Patriarch of Alexandria of his own words that the government in Cairo considered the participation of a church delegation in the Moscow conference as support for the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Moscow Patriarch expressed his readiness to 'excuse' the negative response of the Church of Alexandria. Still, he did not fail to mention that, according to the proceedings from the negotiations between Metropolitan Grigorii and Patriarch Christophoros, the latter had agreed to the Moscow pre-council conference in 1947.⁷³

Despite these efforts, the participation of the ancient patriarchates remained an open question until the start of the Pan-Orthodox conference in July 1948.

[...]

Initially, the Patriarch of Antioch agreed to decline the Moscow invitation, but upon his return to Damascus, he changed his mind and sent a delegation to the Pan-Orthodox conference.⁷⁴ On its eve, the Patriarch of Alexandria also softened his position. He sent a telegram to Moscow entitling the leader of the Antiochian delegation to represent his church as well.⁷⁵ Until the last moment, it seemed that the ecumenical patriarchate and the Church of Greece would boycott the Pan-Orthodox conference. By the time of its start, however, the *locum tenens* of the Patriarchal see

of Constantinople decided to commission Metropolitan Germanos of Thyateria.⁷⁶ The Archbishop of Greece also sent a small delegation. The Kremlin was not expecting them.⁷⁷ According to a CAROC's investigation, the arrival of Germanos was an initiative of the Bulgarian Exarch Stefan.⁷⁸ Although the Greek guests stayed in Moscow until 18 July, they took part only in the events dedicated to the 500th anniversary of the Russian autocephaly, and did not attend the sessions of the Pan-Orthodox forum.⁷⁹ In this way, only the churches of Jerusalem and Cyprus did not have their own representatives at the forum. The Patriarch of Jerusalem informed the Moscow Synod that he was not able to send a delegation due to the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War and the siege of his city.⁸⁰ At the same time, the Cypriot church leadership remained firm in its boycott of the Moscow forum and sent neither a delegation, nor a telegram of excuse.⁸¹

For its part, the Anglican Church took a neutral position on the Pan-Orthodox conference, and referred to it as 'purely an internal Orthodox affair in which it would desire to intervene in no way'.⁸² This behavior was motivated by fear that an anti-communist crusade against the Orthodox churches in Russia and Eastern Europe would have a disastrous effect on their believers. By this time, many leading Anglican bishops believed that the Moscow Patriarchate was the only force that 'had any influence at all independently of the Soviet regime, and was the only hope for anti-communist influence there'.⁸³ Concerning the Pan-Orthodox conference, they argued that the 'acceptance of [Alexii's] invitations by Greek hierarchs would certainly not convert them to communism or to sympathy for Russia'. As a result, the Church of England did not close the door on a dialogue with the Patriarchate of Moscow.

The participation of the Orthodox churches from the so-called people's democracies was the least problematic part of the preparation for the Pan-Orthodox conference. In this case, the Kremlin also relied on the pressure that the Eastern European communist governments would exert over the local church leaderships.⁸⁴ In the beginning of 1948, however, there were still some technical problems that needed to be solved by the Moscow Patriarchate. The most serious of these was Polish autocephaly. In June, the Polish Synod formally repudiated its 1924 autocephalous status, which had been gained without Moscow consent. It 'officially stripped Dionizy [i.e. Metropolitan Dionisii of Warsaw] of his clerical rank and duties and asked the Russian patriarch to re-grant autocephaly'.⁸⁵ In a reply, sent on 22 June, the Russian Synod approved the autocephalous status of the Polish Orthodox Church.

Meanwhile, the negotiations with the other Eastern European churches were much smoother. On 28 March 1948, a Romanian church delegation visited the Soviet Union. It brought the drafts of papers scheduled for delivery at the forthcoming pan-Orthodox conference. They dealt with the relations between the Orthodox Church and the ecumenical movement, the Vatican attitude to Orthodoxy since 1917, the recognition of Anglican ordination by the Orthodox Church and the non-Chalcedonian churches. The papers were given to Russian theologians for evaluation and then discussed at joined sessions with the Romanian guests. The latter were also informed about the major theses and resolutions of the forthcoming conference. The

Moscow Patriarchate reached a full agreement with the Romanian delegation to keep 'a uniformed line' at the forum.⁸⁶ Another useful development was the enthronement of the Moscow loyalist Justinian as Romanian Patriarch in place of the late Nicodim (6 June 1948).⁸⁷

In Bulgaria, the communist leaders Georgi Dimitrov and Vassil Kolarov, suppressed the attempts of Exarch Stefan to negotiate the participation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the World Council of Churches. On 2 July, G. Karpov informed A. Vishinskii, then Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the aim of the forthcoming Pan-Orthodox conference was 'to condemn the anti-Christian and anti-democratic essence of papism and to deny the participation of the Orthodox churches in the ecumenical movement'.⁸⁸ This line was also accepted by the Serbian Patriarch Gavriilo. In February 1948, searching for harmonious relations with the Russian Church, he consulted with Patriarch Alexii about his response to the invitation to join the World Council of Churches.⁸⁹ When everything seemed to be arranged, however, the split between Tito and Stalin provoked new problems. It called into question the participation of the Serbian Patriarch Gavriilo in the Pan-Orthodox conference. On 5 July, Karpov reported to the Soviet government that Tito forbade the visit of the Serbian church delegation.⁹⁰ Finally, the crisis was overcome and Gavriilo attended the Pan-Orthodox conference.

4. The Moscow Pan-Orthodox Conference

On 8 July, the Pan-Orthodox conference was opened with a ceremony dedicated to the 500th anniversary of Russian autocephaly. According to the CAROC reports, the event was attended by 58 foreigners from 11 autocephalous churches.⁹¹ Another group of participants represented the foreign exarchates and missions of the Moscow Patriarchate. This group included Archbishop Elevation of Prague and Czechoslovakia, Archbishop Makarii from the US, Metropolitan Seraphim from France, Archbishop Sergii from Austria, Archimandrite Gavriil from the Russian church mission in China, Archimandrite Dionisii from the Netherlands, etc. The new Patriarch of all Armenians, Georg VI, was also there.⁹² The guests were welcomed by Patriarch Alexii, who brought their attention to the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as a savior of Orthodoxy. He reminded them that it had become autocephalous in a moment when the purity of Orthodoxy in Constantinople had been damaged.⁹³ His address was followed by a divine liturgy in the Moscow Epiphany cathedral.

Later on the same day, the guests went to the Resurrection Cathedral (*Voskresnskii Sobor*), the main conference venue. There they attended a solemn meeting opened by the Patriarch of Moscow. In his oration, Alexii defended the view that the dependence of the Russian Church on its mother church, i.e. the ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, had been symbolic since the conversion of Russians to Christianity.⁹⁴ Alexii also stressed that the 1448 autocephaly of the Russian Church had a positive effect on Orthodoxy as a whole, and pointed to help that his church had given to the four ancient Orthodox patriarchates in the past. Concerning the conference, he declared that its aim was to restore the destroyed unity of the Orthodox Church and

refuted the claims that it was an attempt on the part of Moscow to subject the other Orthodox churches. According to him, 'these lies' were created by the enemies of Orthodoxy and Russian people.⁹⁵ At the same time, he did not let pass the opportunity to point to the absence of certain Orthodox churches from the celebrations. He said:

We are sorry that the highly pious heads of the ancient East Churches could not join to us as they were deprived of the freedom of traveling and action because of the regrettable conditions in their countries ...⁹⁶

His position was supported by the Romanian Patriarch Justinian, who insisted on recording the passiveness of Greeks, thus making the next generations aware of 'their responsibility for the needs and interests of the whole Orthodox Church'.⁹⁷ At the same time, any hints about the ambitions of the Moscow Patriarch to an ecumenical leadership of Orthodoxy were firmly rejected by the Russian clergy at the conference. Father G. Razumovski even declared:

We are protesting not only against the first Rome, but also against the second. However agitation abroad, inimical to us, tries to present us as supporters of the theory of the Third Rome (Moscow), we do not wish the Third Rome, either. Our appeal is: not to Rome, but to the heavenly Jerusalem!⁹⁸

After the patriarchal oration, the floor was given to the CAROC's chairman, who underscored the understanding manifested by the Soviet government toward the desire of the Russian Church to celebrate the 500th anniversary of its autocephaly. He claimed that the Moscow Patriarchate was completely free in organizing this event. Karpov repeated Alexii's words about the missing Greek hierarchs and mentioned that despite their absence the forum was respectable enough. At the same time, he emphasized that 'the Orthodox Churches of all countries, supporting the new order', i.e. from the people's democracies, were presented in the conference. Karpov concluded that in a time when the world was divided into two camps, 'the Church was free only in the Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracy'.⁹⁹ What remained behind the scenes were the talks that the church delegations from people's democracies had with the CAROC's boss. His speech was followed by official addresses from the heads of the 'democratic' Orthodox churches to their hosts. In general, they repeated the main theses of Patriarch Alexii and the CAROC's chairman. Only the Greeks showed reservations.¹⁰⁰ In the end of this solemn meeting the delegates sent a telegram to Stalin greeting him as a world peacemaker.¹⁰¹

On 9 July, the jubilation continued as a regular conference attended only by the representatives of the 'democratic' churches. The metropolitans Germanos and Chrisostomos excused their non-attendance with reference to their lack of mandate to take part in its sessions. They also offered a reminder that they had announced in advance that their participation would be limited to the celebrations of autocephaly.¹⁰² The conference was opened by Patriarch Alexii, who summarized its main issues.¹⁰³ The first of them concerned the Vatican. The Russian patriarch accused the Roman Holy See of initiating political intrigues and using lay tools for the achievement of its aims. In this regard, he paid special attention to its involvement in Hitler's war against Slavdom.¹⁰⁴ The next issue discussed the Orthodox attitude to ecumenism. It

provoked hot debates that revealed the lack of unanimity.¹⁰⁵ According to Karpov, the attempts of some church heads to oppose the anti-ecumenical line of Moscow was a result of the visits paid by leaders of the ecumenical movement to Eastern European churches in the summer of 1948, as well as of the influence of Metropolitan Germanos.¹⁰⁶ To calm the situation, Metropolitan Nikolay (Yarushevich) proposed not to discuss these problems in the plenary sessions (9-10 July) but in commissions (11-18 July).¹⁰⁷ At the same time, the CAROC used the next days to exert pressure over Exarch Stefan and the Armenian Catholicos Georg VI, who intended to speak in favor of the World Council of Churches.¹⁰⁸

The third issue raised by Patriarch Alexii concerned the recognition of the Anglican orders.¹⁰⁹ In this regard, Alexii mentioned that the patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Romania, as well as the Bulgarian Exarchate, had already acknowledged them. According to Russian hierarchy, however, this recognition cannot be justified by dogmatic and canonical arguments, nor did it stem from the historical experience of the Orthodox Church. Finally, Alexii referred to the calendar question. In this case, he considered it important for the unity of the Orthodox Church to have the main religious celebrations on same days.

Under the CAROC's supervision, the Pan-Orthodox conference strictly followed its agenda. During the sessions, the plenary papers were read by Russian theologians, followed by papers by representatives of separate Orthodox churches. The latter strictly maintained the main theses of their Soviet colleagues and added some national content and data to them.¹¹⁰ The major task of the conference was the adoption of four resolutions dealing with the Vatican, the ecumenical movement, the Anglican orders and the calendar question. In fact, their texts had been approved by the Kremlin in advance, but their being voted on by the conference would give them legitimacy in the eyes of outside observers.¹¹¹

[...]

Finally, the conference voted on an 'Appeal to All Christians'. The fact that the stubborn Bulgarian Exarch, who caused much trouble to the Soviet hosts, was presented as its author provokes some questions. Keeping in mind the thorough preparation of every detail of the conference, including the preliminary censorship of the Romanian papers, it is difficult to believe that the writing of such a key document was entrusted to the main troublemaker among the conference participants. Most probably this step was aimed at discrediting Stefan in the eyes of his western friends. In this way, any future attempts of the Bulgarian church leader to join the World Council of Churches were blocked. At the same time, the Appeal was not read by Stefan, but by Metropolitan Nikolay of Krutitsy, i.e. the so-called foreign minister of the Moscow Patriarchate.¹¹²

According to this document, the world was living in stormy times when the irreconcilable differences between the Catholic-Protestant West and the Orthodox East had become clear.¹¹³ It stressed that while the Orthodox East was inspired by the glorious principles of peace and mutual fraternal love among people, the military

aggression of the capitalist and imperialist world had become obvious for the entire mankind. According to the Appeal, every true Christian sought justice and peace and thus had to support the voice of fraternal love, humanity and truth coming from Moscow. Therefore, the conference participants referred to progressive people with a call to support the Soviet efforts to stop the new warmongers. To assist their choice the document 'unmasked' the Vatican as 'a fortress of Catholicism' and America as 'a nest of Protestantism', while portraying the Moscow Patriarchate as the only church ready to sacrifice itself on behalf of peace.¹¹⁴ The document left the impression that Orthodox people were the only true and active peace-lovers who struggled against war. This ideological interpretation was completely suited to the Soviet policy of 'the imposition of doctrinal uniformity', hierarchical order and coordination in the socialist camp. It made clear why the conference was supported by the government of the Soviet Union and those of 'people's democracies'.¹¹⁵ The Moscow Pan-Orthodox conference also followed the tendency of changing the focus from 'the Soviet experience' towards 'the leadership of the Soviet Union' in Eastern Europe.¹¹⁶ According to the closing speech of Patriarch Alexii, the only aim of the conference was 'to unite Orthodox Churches in one spiritual union'.¹¹⁷ During this last meeting, the four resolutions and the appeal were unanimously approved by all delegates. They were also signed by all heads of the Orthodox churches who had attended the session.¹¹⁸ Upon their return home, they were expected to impose the conference decisions on their clergy and flock.

Another important event that remained outside the attention of the external observers was the establishment of network of the so-called *podvoryes* by the Moscow Patriarchate. On 17 July, it made special gifts to the Bulgarian, Serbian and Antiochian churches. Each of them received its own *podvorye*, i.e. a temple whose administrator acted as their ambassador before the Moscow Patriarchate.¹¹⁹ At the same time, a special instruction for the management of these temples was drawn up.¹²⁰ According to this, the temples were given for free and temporary use (art. 1). Religious services should be conducted either in the national language of the corresponding Church or in Church-Slavonic, with the consent of its Holy Synod (a note to art. 1). Each priest in the temples had to name the Moscow Patriarch and the local Russian bishop (supervising the eparchy) alongside the head of his own Church (art. 5). The main priest of the temple and other clerics were to be appointed by a joint agreement between the corresponding Church and the Moscow Patriarchate (art. 7). The Moscow Patriarchate appointed administrators responsible for the material valuables belonging to the temple (art. 8). The salary and flats for the representatives of the Churches at each *podvorye* were supplied by the Moscow Patriarchate (art. 14). The donations left by believers in the church should be transferred to the Moscow Patriarchate (art. 15). Finally, all staff of the *podvorye* had to observe Soviet law.

The draft of this instruction was submitted for approval to the Soviet state authorities, who made some revisions. Generally, they removed the texts that did not concern the interests of the Soviet State. The transfer of financial means from one country to another was also restricted. It is interesting that the CAROC defended the rights of the Moscow Patriarchate to elaborate in detail its relations with the autocephalous

churches that had received *podvoryes*. On 7 January 1949, the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued its order No. 383, which permitted the Moscow Patriarchate to put the *podvorye* instruction in force.¹²¹

5. *The Aftermath*

The Pan-Orthodox meeting revealed a tendency to change the focus from ‘the Soviet experience’ to ‘the leadership of the Soviet Union’ in Eastern Europe.¹²² It sought to demonstrate the unity of the ‘democratic’ churches under the guidance of the Patriarchate of Moscow. Therefore, no dissenting voices reached the public square during the conference. The only case when a different opinion was allowed concerned the calendar. In this regard, the Russian hierarchy agreed with the statement of the Romanian Patriarch Justinian that his church would not abandon the new calendar for the sake of the old.¹²³ In this way, the Romanian Patriarchate preserved its right to use the new calendar in its liturgical life. At the same time, the Romanian Patriarchate returned the gesture by becoming the first Eastern European Orthodox Church whose Synod approved the resolutions of the Moscow conference during its session on 19 October 1948.¹²⁴

Despite the conflict between Tito and Stalin, Patriarch Gavriilo and the other members of his delegation demonstrated loyalty not only to the Moscow Patriarchate but also to the Soviet government. The Serbian clerics complained that the government in Belgrade repressed their Orthodox Church, while allowing the imprisoned Catholic Bishop Stepinac to live in two rooms and to have his own servants. Patriarch Gavriilo also complained about the neglect of Orthodoxy demonstrated by the religious department in Yugoslavia, whose head was Catholic, while his deputy was Muslim.¹²⁵ Meanwhile, ‘the relationship established between the Serbian and Russian churches was damaged by the difficulties created by Tito’s regime in Yugoslavia’.¹²⁶ After his return from Moscow, Patriarch Gavriilo was not allowed to implement its decisions. He faced the resistance of the Democratic Priests’ Union in Yugoslavia, which supported Tito. In addition, Metropolitan Josif, famous for his hatred of Moscow, became the actual master of the Serbian Church and established close relations with the British embassy in Belgrade. The Belgrade Faculty of Theology also refused to follow the Moscow line and sent representative to the Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam. As a result of these developments, the Russian community in Yugoslavia found itself in a difficult situation. The nuns from the Russian Lesnenski Monastery were forced to go to America and to join the Russian émigré churches there. After their refusal, they were expelled from Yugoslavia in February 1950.¹²⁷ With the help of the Soviet government, they found temporary asylum in Albania. In August 1953, at the request of Patriarch Alexii, they were issued an invitation by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and accommodated in the Kapinov monastery.¹²⁸

During the 1948 Pan-Orthodox meeting, the Moscow Patriarchate did not distribute financial gifts to its guests, as had been planned for the pre-council meeting.¹²⁹ One of the reasons for this was the abandoned project for an ecumenical council. The other

was rooted in the changed position of the Orthodox churches in people's democracies. They were separated from the state and deprived of their economic potential, while their clergy suffered persecutions. At the same time, the local communist parties consolidated their power and established control over the disobedient local Orthodox hierarchs, such as Exarch Stefan. While he was in Moscow, the Bulgarian government plotted against him. As a result, on 8 September, he was forced to resign. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to transfer his duties to Metropolitan Kiril, who began to execute the decisions of the Moscow church conference and took an active part in the peace movement initiated by the Moscow Patriarchate in the 1950s.¹³⁰

Archbishop Timothy, the temporary head of the Polish Orthodox Church, was the next victim of the Kremlin's new religious policy. With the CAROC's support, the Moscow Patriarchate undertook steps for his 'canonical' removal. After the Pan-Orthodox conference, Metropolitan Dionisii was released by the Polish government. In August, he sent a letter of penance to Patriarch Alexii, asking to enter into communion with the Russian Church. In November, the Moscow Synod lifted the ecclesiastical interdictions against him and returned his title of metropolitan.¹³¹ At the same time, it officially retired Dionisii from his clerical duties, 'thereby vacating the leading position in the Polish hierarchy'.¹³² The appointment of a new head of the Orthodox Church in Poland was postponed due to the underdeveloped structure of the Church: It had only two dioceses, while an autocephalous church had to have a minimum of four. Therefore, in this interregnum period it was governed by a Synod. In 1949, a third Orthodox eparchy was set up in Poland. A year later, one more eparchy was established and the formal canonical requirements for autocephaly were met. At the same time, an Orthodox seminary was opened in Warsaw for the training of future Orthodox priests.

Finally, on 19 April 1951, the Synod sent a message to the Russian patriarch declaring that no one in Poland was worthy to fill the position of metropolitan of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church and asked that he select a Russian hierarch for this post. Two months later the Moscow Synod granted their request and on 8 July 1951, Archbishop Macarius of L'viv and Ternopil' was formally enthroned as metropolitan of Warsaw and all Poland.¹³³

The promotion of such Soviet hierarchs in Eastern Europe was followed by the elevation of the 'democratic' churches to a higher canonical status. On 10 October 1951, the Moscow Synod took a decision to grant autocephaly to the Czechoslovakian daughter church. It reads:

1. If the Exarchial council decides for the Czechoslovakian Church to become autocephalous, then the Patriarch [of Moscow] and the [Russian] Holy Synod bless this decision and give their full consent for the Czechoslovakian Orthodox Church to be declared autocephalous;
2. If His Higher Eminence, Metropolitan Elevtherii, is elected as a head of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Czechoslovakia, then the Russian Orthodox Church with love will give him permission to take charge of the welfare of that Church.¹³⁴

Two months later, Czechoslovakian autocephaly was declared in Prague in the presence of church representatives from Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Antioch and

Alexandria. On 10 December, Metropolitan Elevation was enthroned as the head of the new autocephalous church.

The next demonstration of the increased international prestige of the Orthodox churches from the socialist camp was the restoration of the patriarchal dignity of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. This act was in unison with Decision No. 52/1948 of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. According to this, 'proceeding from the need to strengthen the public prestige of the Bulgarian Church, which is necessary from the standpoint of organizing the struggle of the Orthodox Churches against the Vatican and its reactionary policy, the Central Committee gives its consent for the Bulgarian Exarchate to be elevated into a patriarchate'.¹³⁵ Although this decision was taken immediately after the overthrow of Exarch Stefan in 1948, it was only realized after a delay of several years. Part of the reason for this was linked to the selection of a proper candidate for the patriarchal crown. There were also canonical obstacles. The most serious of these was the 1945 agreement between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Bulgarian Exarchate, which required the permission of the former before any steps for the restoration of the Bulgarian patriarchal dignity could be undertaken. In May 1953, the Bulgarian communist government put this plan into operation and the Bulgarian Church was declared a patriarchate. The ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras, however, refused to accept the invitation to attend the church council in Sofia for the election of the first Bulgarian patriarch since the fourteenth century. He sent a letter of protest to the Sofia Synod in which he declared:

It was not expected that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, recently declared independent and autocephalous, would try, introducing again in the Church innovation and deviating from the existing canonical and ecclesiastical order, to arbitrarily ascribe to itself patriarchal dignity and honor. Meanwhile, contrary to the promises and assurances given by it [Bulgarian Church] to the Blessed Mother Church through its delegates and during the setting of the question of removing the schism, it kept in complete ignorance our Holy Ecumenical See and the other Holy Patriarchal Sees and autocephalous Churches. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church had, in accordance with the ecclesiastical order established in ancient times, to attest in advance to its maturity and ability by keeping constancy and devotion in the canonical order established for it, and in general, while presenting considerable flourishing in Christ and particular church activity in normal conditions, and only then to ask through us for its elevation to patriarchal dignity from the host of the honorable prelates of the Holy Orthodox Churches.¹³⁶

In this way, the Cold War division between the 'socialist' and 'imperialist' Orthodox churches was accomplished. The Patriarchate of Constantinople and the other 'Greek' churches did not recognize the changes in the status of the Baltic, Polish, Czechoslovakian, Albanian and Bulgarian Orthodox churches. In turn, the Moscow Holy See accused the Ecumenical Patriarchate of retaining the Finnish Orthodox Church and the West European Russian Exarchate of Metropolitan Vladimir under its jurisdiction.¹³⁷ The Cold War in the Orthodox world was a fact, and the Kremlin assigned new tasks to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Orthodox churches from the 'camp of peace and democracy'.

¹ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 407, pp. 34-39.

- ² GARF, f. 6991, op. 1, d. 29, pp. 101-109.
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Ibid., pp. 307-309.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 310.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 311.
- ⁷ Kirby, p. 147.
- ⁸ O. Vasil'eva, *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov' v Politike Sovetskogo Gosudarstva v 1943-1948 gg.*, Moscow: IRI RAN, 1999, pp. 195-197.
- ⁹ GARF, f. R-6991, op. 1, d. 29, pp. 101-109.
- ¹⁰ GARF, f. 6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 28-30.
- ¹¹ Letter from Patriarch Alexii to G. Karpov, 13 January 1947. Published in N. Krivova (ed.), *Pis'ma Patriarkha Alekseya I v Sovet po Delam Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi pri Sovete Narodnykh Komissarov – Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 1945-1953 gg.*, vol. 1, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009, pp. 223-225.
- ¹² GARF, f. R-6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 28-30.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Vasil'eva, pp. 164-165.
- ¹⁶ P. Ikononov, 'Eight Ecumenical Council', *Naroden Pastir*, 15 June 1946, pp. 1, 3.
- ¹⁷ M. Shkarovskii, *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov' pri Staline i Khrushcheve: Gosudarstvenno-tserkovnye otnosheniya v SSSR v 1939-1964 godakh*, Moscow: Krutitskoe podvorye, 1999, p. 301. See also: *Zhurnal Moskovskoy Patriarkhii* (henceforth *JMP*), 1946, 9, p. 56.
- ¹⁸ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 407, pp. 34-39.
- ¹⁹ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 506, pp. 12-16.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ In February 1946, a delegation, appointed by the Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches made a round trip in the Middle East, investigating the attitude of the Orthodox and non-Chalcedonian churches there to the participation in the Assembly of the WCC in 1948. The delegation's report is published in *World Council of Churches: Minutes and Reports of the Meeting of the Provisional Committee*, Black Hill Falls, Penn.: April 1947, pp. 104-117.
- ²² RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125 p. 407, pp. 34-39.
- ²³ *Tsarkoven vestnik*, 18 April 1946, p. 3.
- ²⁴ GARF, f. 6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 5-6.
- ²⁵ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 407, p. 38.
- ²⁶ Ibid., pp. 2-42.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ GARF, 6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 1-3.
- ²⁹ Ibid., pp. 44-45.
- ³⁰ Ibid., pp. 1-3.
- ³¹ Ibid., pp. 7-41.
- ³² Ibid., pp. 7-9.
- ³³ Despite the many requests of Patriarch Alexii and the commission, Sergey Troitskii was not allowed to leave Serbia. He was involved in its work only after the failure of this plan, when his expertise was necessary for the second edition of the conference, i.e. when the Kremlin gave up the idea of an ecumenical council.
- ³⁴ GARF, 6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 10-13.
- ³⁵ Ibid., pp. 17-19.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Ibid., pp. 36-39.
- ³⁸ Ibid., pp. 40-41.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 407, pp. 2-42.
- ⁴¹ Ibid.
- ⁴² In Bulgarian language the book was published by the Priests' Union.
- ⁴³ GARF, 6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 51-52.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 55.
- ⁴⁶ GARF, 6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 66-67.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 71.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 61. Telegrams sent by the Serbian Patriarch Gavriilo and the Albanian Metropolitan Christopher confirming their participation and support for the initiative of the Moscow Patriarch. The file does not include telegrams from the Bulgarian and the Rumanian heads, but Exarch Stefan had sent a letter of confirmation (Ibid. pp. 68-69), while the consent of the Rumanian Church was received during the visit of Patriarch Alexii there in May 1947.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 68-69.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ⁵¹ TsDA, f. 165, op. 1, a. e. 4., p. 3.
- ⁵² ATsIAI, f. 2, op. 4.

- ⁵³ TsDA, f 165, op. 3, a.e. 35, p. 6.
- ⁵⁴ GARF, f. 6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 53-54.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 56-58.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 53-54.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 70.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 72.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 59-60.
- ⁶¹ Vasil'eva, p. 169.
- ⁶² GARF, f. 6991, op. 1, d. 150, pp. 20-21.
- ⁶³ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 407, p. 34.
- ⁶⁴ ATsIAI, f. 2. op. 4.
- ⁶⁵ GARF, f. 6991, op. 2, d. 65, p. 73.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., op. 1, d. 14, pp. 187-190.
- ⁶⁷ On 25 February 1948, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a plan for the preparation of a Pan-Orthodox conference in Moscow from 8 to 18 July. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 26-27. Report from Karpov, 7 July 1948.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ⁶⁹ GARF, f. 6991, op. 2, d. 65, p. 73.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 74-78.
- ⁷¹ GARF, f. 6991, op. 2, d. 65, pp. 79-85.
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Ibid.
- ⁷⁴ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 2-8.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 28-31.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 2-8.
- ⁷⁷ In a series of reports Karpov mentioned that those who refused to come were Greeks. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 45-47; Ibid. pp. 2-8. His surprise from the arrival of delegations of the churches of Constantinople, Alexandria and Greece is recorded in GARF, f. 6991, op. 1, d. 290, pp. 121-129. Karpov's report to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 3 August 1948.
- ⁷⁸ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 45-47.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 28-31.
- ⁸⁰ Shkarovskii, *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov' i Sovetskoe gosudarstvo: "Ot peremiriay k novoy voyne"*, St. Petersburg: DEAA & ADIA, 1995, p. 37.
- ⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 37-38.
- ⁸² LPL, Fisher Papers, vol. 46, ff. 136-137.
- ⁸³ Ibid.
- ⁸⁴ T. Volokintina, G. Murashko, A. Noskova (eds.), *Moskva i Vostochnaya Evropa: Vlast' i tserkov' v period obshtestvennykh transformatsii 40-50-kh godov XX veka*, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008, p. 100.
- ⁸⁵ E.. Wynot, Jr.. 'Prisoner of History: The Eastern Orthodox Church in Poland in the twentieth century', *Journal of Church and State*, Spring 1997, 39 (2). Used in HTML format via EBSCOhost.
- ⁸⁶ GARF. F. 6991, op. 1, d. 272, pp. 38-41.
- ⁸⁷ *Tsarkoven vestnik*, 19 June 1948, pp. 1-2. The enthronement of the Romanian Patriarch Justinian was attended by Metropolitan Nikolay from the Moscow Patriarchate and Metropolitan Kiril from the Bulgarian Exarchate.
- ⁸⁸ Volokintina et al., *Moskva i Vostochnaya Evropa*, p. 99.
- ⁸⁹ GARF, f. 6991, op. 1, d. 422, pp. 15-16.
- ⁹⁰ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 45-47.
- ⁹¹ GARF, f. R-6991, op. 1, d. 290, pp. 121-129.
- ⁹² A Chronology of the events during the Pan-Orthodox conference is presented in *JMP*, 1948, 8, pp. 3-6.
- ⁹³ *JMP*, 1948, 8, pp. 6-7.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid., 1948, Special issue, pp. 7-8.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 10.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 9. I
- ⁹⁷ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, p. 77. S
- ⁹⁸ TsDA, f. 1318k, op. 1, a.e. 2304, p. 9-10.
- ⁹⁹ *JMP*, 1948, Special issue, pp. 11-12.
- ¹⁰⁰ *JMP*, 1948, 8, pp. 8-22.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 13. It is interesting that the telegram was sent and signed by Patriarch Alexii on behalf of all participants. At the same time, it is not mentioned whether it has been voted by them.
- ¹⁰² GARF, f. 6991, op. 1, d. 290, pp. 121-129.
- ¹⁰³ All papers of the conference were published in two volumes. *Deyaniya soveshtaniya glav i predstaviteley avtokefal'nykh pravoslavnykh tserkvey v svyazi s prazdnovaniem 500-letiya avtokefalii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi: 8 - iyuulya 1948 g.*, Moscow: 1948, 2 vols.
- ¹⁰⁴ *JMP*, 1948, Special issue, p. 16.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 17-19.
- ¹⁰⁶ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 34-43. See also Volokintina et al., *Moskva i Vostochnaya Evropa*, p. 99.

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- ¹⁰⁷ JMP, 1948, Special issue, pp. 53-56.
- ¹⁰⁸ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 34-38. According to this document, Exarch Stefan had prepared a speech in defense of the ecumenical movement but changed his mind under pressure.
- ¹⁰⁹ The Anglican Church consecrates its bishops without conducting religious mysteries as it is in the Orthodox Church.
- ¹¹⁰ TsDA, f. 1318k, op. 1, a.e. 2304, p. 9-10.
- ¹¹¹ Shkarovskii, *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov' i Sovetskoe gosudarstvo*, p. 38.
- ¹¹² Ibid., p. 66.
- ¹¹³ The Moscow Patriarchate was able to offer a church interpretation of Stalin's two camp theory by the means of the 1948 Pan-Orthodox conference. Its resolutions and appeal to all Christians expanded Stalin's theory beyond the religious sphere. On its basis the involvement of the 'socialist' Orthodox churches in the peace movement initiated by the Soviet Union became possible. See: Zbignev Brzezinski, *The Soviet Block: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967, p. 70.
- ¹¹⁴ JMP, 1948, Special issue, pp. 31-32.
- ¹¹⁵ Brzezinski, pp. 63-70.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 71.
- ¹¹⁷ JMP, 1948, Special issue, p. 35. Alexii's closing speech, 17 July 1948.
- ¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 37.
- ¹¹⁹ The Serbian Patriarch, Gavriilo, could not send his representative to the granted temple because of the worsening of the relations between Tito and Stalin. See V. Tsypin, *Istoriya Russkoy Tserkvi: 1917-1997*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Spaso-Preobrazhenskovo Valaamskogo Monastyr'a, 1997, p. 356.
- ¹²⁰ TsDA, f. 1318k, op. 1, a.e. 2307.
- ¹²¹ A summary of the Instruction on *podvorye* is included in *Pis'ma Patriarkha Alekseya*, vol. 1, pp. 378-279.
- ¹²² Brzezinski, pp. 63-71.
- ¹²³ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 34-38.
- ¹²⁴ GARF, f. 6991, op. 1, d. 272, p. 141.
- ¹²⁵ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 28-31.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid., op. 132, d. 111, pp. 78-82.
- ¹²⁷ Ibid.
- ¹²⁸ GARF, f. 6991, op. 2, d. 109, pp. 288-291.
- ¹²⁹ The guests begged for money this time. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 8, pp. 34-38.
- ¹³⁰ TsDA, f. 1b, op. 6, a.e. 539, p. 1.
- ¹³¹ Tsypin, p. 352.
- ¹³² Wynot, Op. cit.
- ¹³³ Ibid. Makarii (Oksiyuk) was an alumnus of the Warsaw ecclesiastical school, the seminary in Kholm and the Kiev ecclesiastical academy. In 1942, he was ordained as priest and consecrated as bishop in 1945. See also Tsypin, p. 353.
- ¹³⁴ TsDA, f. 1318k, op. 1, a.e. 2417, pp. 7-12.
- ¹³⁵ Ibid., f. 1b, op. 6, a.e. 539, p. 1.
- ¹³⁶ ATsIAI, f. 2, op. 4.
- ¹³⁷ GARF, f. R-6991, op. 2, d. 108, pp. 5-10.